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Numerous academics and foreign policy practitioners have argued that relations with 
Russia are one of the most divisive issues within the European Union (cf. Leonard 
and Popescu 2007, Mandelson 2007). Mainstream explanations highlight that this is 
due to the different interests and security concerns of EU member states (David et al. 
2011). This dissertation proposes an alternative understanding that focuses on 
national identity construction and Russia‘s role therein. Germany, Poland and 
Finland, three EU member states that traditionally have different stances towards 
Russia, are selected for in-depth analysis. The key argument is that divergent 
national discourses on Russia are due to the different ways in which the country was 
constructed in national identity.  
In order to show this, the thesis elaborates on social constructivist scholarship 
studying the relationship between identity and foreign policy. It argues that 
constructivist models theorising a causal link between identity and foreign policy (eg 
Wendt 1999, Katzenstein 1996) are insufficient to fully explain the complexity of 
this relationship. Drawing on the work of scholars such as Ted Hopf (2002), Richard 
Ned Lebow (2008, 2008a) and Ole Waever (2002), this thesis develops an 
interpretive theoretical framework in which national identity and foreign policy are 
conceptualised as mutually constitutive and studied at the level of discourses. 
Dominant identity and foreign policy narratives are examined in a longue durée 
perspective, which allows for an exploration of their deep historical roots.  
The research conducted through this model highlights the relevance of long-standing 
narratives on Russia to current foreign policy discourses. However, the thesis also 
shows that national identity is malleable and top national officials can reformulate 
dominant discourses in order to achieve particular foreign policy goals. This is 
illustrated in the case studies, which focus on official narratives concerning the 
building of the Nord Stream pipeline, the Russian-Georgian war of August 2008 and 
the mass demonstrations in Russian cities in the winter of 2011-2012. The empirical 
analysis shows that gradual convergence took place across national discourses as 
national constructions of Russia were reformulated in order to pursue a pragmatic 
foreign policy towards Moscow. Finally, through the comparison of national 
discourses in the EU discursive arena, the dissertation assesses the prospects for the 
emergence of shared EU foreign policy narratives on Russia. 
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Chapter 1: Identity, memory and Russia as Europe’s 
Other: an introduction 
 
Rationale for the dissertation 
This dissertation explores the relationship between national identities and foreign 
policy discourses concerning Russia within the European Union. It originated from a 
broad interest in the development of several sub-disciplines and theories in the field 
of International Relations. An increasingly large body of European Studies literature 
has explored the emergence of a shared European identity (cf. Bayley and Williams 
2012, Checkel and Katzenstein 2009, Herrmann et al. 2004, Risse 2010). These 
works generally argue that European identity is, at best, still developing next to 
national identities. Following Willfried Spohn‘s (2005: 2) categorisation, three main 
perspectives can be identified in the literature. The first sees European identity as a 
weak addendum to strong national identities. The second one assumes that European 
identity will unfold in the long run and restructure national identities through the 
gradual Europeanisation of the latter. The third one hypothesises the future 
emergence of a variable mix of European and national identities. All three 
perspectives agree on the current dominance of national identities over a still weak 
European identity.  
As these initial observations suggest, national identities play an important role in 
Europe and may provide a key to understanding European politics. Scholars studying 
nationalism have argued that we are unlikely to see the transcendence of national 
identities by a strong European identity during our lifetime (Smith 1996: 363). Their 
colleagues working on memory politics, a domain that is very close to and partly 
overlaps with identity studies, have come to similar conclusions in their assessments 
of the prospects for a common European memory: national discourses are pervasive 
in collective memory and can hardly be reconciled into a shared European discourse 
(Bell 2006: 16, Jarausch and Lindenberger 2007: 1). This is not surprising, as nation-
states have a much longer history than European institutions. Linguistic, historical 
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and cultural differences contribute to the endurance of national identities and of 
political constructions that draw their legitimacy from national communities. 
The focus on the national level in this dissertation should not lead to the assumption 
that the concept of European identity can simply be dismissed. A feeling of 
attachment to Europe and to the political structures of the European Union is 
observable both among European elites and citizens, however weak and inconsistent 
it might be.
1
 The creation of a common European market, the removal of barriers to 
the free movement of citizens and numerous transnational schemes have contributed 
to its emergence. However, as most of the relevant scholarly literature argues, in 
Europe national identities and memories are still stronger than transnational ones. 
Studying national identities is thus a fundamental precondition to understand both the 
dilemmas surrounding European identity and, most importantly, current European 
politics.  
Social constructivist literature has highlighted the strong relationship between 
national identity and foreign policy discourses.
2
 The dissertation applies a social 
constructivist theoretical model to examine this relationship in three European states 
(Germany, Poland and Finland) and, through a comparative analysis, assesses the 
prospects for a shared European foreign policy discourse concerning Russia. 
Relations with Russia have been chosen as a litmus test for a shared European 
foreign policy discourse because they have proven to be one of the most dividing 
issues among European Union countries. In 2007, former EU trade commissioner 
Peter Mandelson stated that ―no other country reveals our differences as does 
Russia‖ (cited in Kagan 2008: 14).  
Russia is the EU‘s largest neighbour, a key energy supplier and an essential, though 
often very controversial partner in the European security architecture. As highlighted 
by the profound crisis that erupted in Ukraine in the fall of 2013, the European Union 
and its member states cannot guarantee the stability of their Eastern neighbourhood 
without taking into account Russia as a geopolitical factor. Furthermore, the political 
                                                          
1
 Cf. Standard Eurobarometer 77 (Spring 2012), QD5, p. 173. 
2
 For a detailed discussion, see chapter 2. 
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system built by post-Soviet Russian leaders challenges some of the European 
Union‘s founding values, particularly in the field of democracy and human rights (cf. 
Treaty on European Union Art. 2, Shiraev 2013).
3
 
Hence, the main research question is:  
To what extent and how do national identities in EU member states influence foreign 
policy leaders’ discourses on Russia?  
Key sub-questions are:  
Are historically constructed images of Russia influential in current foreign policy 
discourses and, if yes, how?  
Can different national foreign policy narratives on Russia be reconciled in the EU 
discursive arena? 
As can be inferred from the research questions, the thesis is primarily an analysis of 
official discourses. Dominant themes, linguistic and discursive strategies constitute 
the ―evidence‖ on which arguments are based in the dissertation. The key argument 
is that divergent national foreign policy approaches to Russia are due to the different 
ways in which the country was constructed in national identity. However, the thesis 
also shows that national identity is malleable and a country‘s leaders can reformulate 
dominant narratives in order to achieve particular foreign policy goals. Hence, it is 
argued that national discourses on Russia can be reconciled if divisive identity 
narratives are marginalised and common foreign policy goals are pursued. 
The focus of the empirical analysis is restricted to key foreign policy leaders (heads 
of state or government and foreign ministers) for reasons of feasibility and relevance. 
Covering thoroughly three national discursive arenas, each having thousands of 
participants, would not be possible within the scope of this dissertation. Foreign 
policy making today is the result of complex interactions between politicians, expert 
and interest groups and public opinion. However, in countries such as those under 
analysis, key foreign policy decisions are ultimately made by a restricted group of 
                                                          
3
 All references to the Treaty on European Union in the dissertation concern the treaty version as 
amended by the Treaty of Lisbon. Cf. also the European Commission’s Country Strategy Paper for the 
Russian Federation, 2007-2013, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/russia/docs/2007-2013_en.pdf (accessed 12/11/2012). 
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leaders who received a mandate from a parliamentary majority or a majority of 
electors. These leaders also represent the country internationally and, thanks to their 
political prominence, they have the discursive power to steer the country‘s main 
foreign policy debates. Most importantly for this analysis, their behaviours and 
decisions are influenced by the national identities in which they are embedded.
4
 
As argued in this chapter and in the theoretical section, national identity is a very 
useful concept to understand the domestic construction of international politics 
because it encompasses and is forged by the defining cultural, historical and political 
constituents of a state. Its relationship with foreign policy discourses is complex. It is 
mutually constitutive, because national identity and foreign policy discourses 
influence each other. It is also malleable, because the two concepts are in constant 
flux and change over time. For some scholars, the notion of national identity might 
be elusive (cf. Malesevic 2011). However, it is exactly the complexity of the concept 
and its changing and multifaceted nature that make it a fascinating research topic. 
National identities are not the only element in the complex scenario of international 
politics, but certainly one that scholars cannot ignore in a comprehensive analysis. 
 
Theoretical and empirical contribution 
Relations with Russia are a test for the very idea of a united EU foreign policy 
because they have traditionally been based on a bilateral, national dimension. The 
most frequent explanations for this bilateralism refer to the different economic 
interests and security concerns of EU member states, as well as to Russia‘s 
preference for dealing with European countries separately (David et al. 2011: 183-
184). This dissertation proposes an alternative understanding of the EU‘s and its 
member states‘ relations with Russia that is based on national identity. The focus on 
national identity is innovative because, in contrast with predominant analyses 
focusing on power politics and economics, it seeks to explain relations with Russia 
through an investigation of historical and cultural factors. 
                                                          
4
 See chapters 2 and 3. 
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The conceptualisation of identity as a key element in international relations provides 
a much-needed alternative to realist and liberal institutionalist models framed around 
the notions of anarchy, balance of power and institutional cooperation. The 
dissertation analyses international relations as a social construction, of which 
national identities are essential constituents. Drawing on constructivist literature, a 
theoretical model is developed highlighting the mutually constitutive relationship 
among national identity, interests and foreign policy discourses. In particular, the 
historical dimension of national identity formation is explored in order to examine its 
relevance in current foreign policy discourses. Hence, the thesis adopts a historicist 
approach, which assigns key importance to cultural and historical context. 
Foreign policy discourses are studied through discourse-historical analysis, a variant 
of critical discourse analysis developed by Ruth Wodak (2002a). The discourse-
historical approach was previously used by scholars to study debates about 
immigration and identity politics in the media, in EU institutions and among the 
wider public (Krzyzanowski 2010 and 2009, Oberhuber et al. 2005, Reisigl and 
Wodak 2001, Wodak 2009). This dissertation constitutes the first application of the 
methodology to the analysis of national foreign policy elites‘ public discourses. Most 
notably, it is the first study that uses discourse-historical analysis to investigate the 
relationship between national identity and the construction of narratives about a 
foreign country. 
Empirically, the thesis also contributes to the understanding of the European Union‘s 
and its member states‘ current foreign policy towards the Eastern neighbourhood. It 
constitutes an attempt to strengthen the strand of research focusing on the role of 
nationalism, identity and memory politics in EU-Russia relations. The surge of 
nationalist sentiment and widespread political use of history during the 2013-2014 
Ukrainian crisis has exposed that these are powerful factors in EU-Russia relations.
5
 
The dissertation shows that national identity and memory politics played an 
                                                          
5
 See Alec Luhn, “The Ukrainian nationalism at the heart of ‘Euromaidan’”, The Nation, 21 January 
2014, http://www.thenation.com/article/178013/ukrainian-nationalism-heart-euromaidan 
(accessed 10/5/2014) and Marco Siddi, “The abuse of history in the Ukrainian crisis”, Open 
Democracy, 5 May 2014, http://opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/marco-siddi/abuse-of-
history-in-ukrainian-crisis (accessed 10/5/2014). 
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important role in this relationship well before the beginning of turmoil in Ukraine. 
The four empirical chapters highlight the significance of identity and memory 
politics in events that took place during the last decade in fields of extreme 
importance for the EU, such as energy security, the stability of the neighbourhood, 
Russia‘s democratisation and its role in the European security system. Through an 
interdisciplinary approach combining social constructivist theory, discourse theory 
and historical analysis, the dissertation sheds light on the deep identity and cultural 
roots of relevant foreign policy discourses. 
 
Nations, national identity and collective memory 
Constructivist scholars argue that grasping the relationship between national identity 
and foreign policy is essential in order to understand international relations. Before 
exploring why this might be so, it is fundamental to define and explore the concepts 
of nation and national identity. Due to their diverse uses and confusion with concepts 
such as nationalism, the terms are highly ambiguous and have generated a lively 
discussion among academics. The most relevant debates took place among historians 
and sociologists who, especially from the 1980s onwards, attempted to assess the 
role played by nations and nationalism in international politics during modern and 
contemporary times. 
Prominent scholars such as Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm, Benedict Anderson and 
Anthony D. Smith used different parameters to define nation and national identity, 
alternatively emphasizing concrete elements (for instance territory, economy), 
psychological and abstract factors (memories, myths) or both. Some considered the 
terms too ambiguous for a precise classification and adopted only working 
definitions (Hobsbawm 1990), others rejected them altogether as explanatory 
variables (Malesevic 2011). Most treated national identity as a corollary of the 
nation, a collective belief in belonging to a national community and to its defining 
elements. Although the relationship between nation and national identity is in fact 
more complex, a close link exists between the two concepts. To understand national 
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identity, we thus have to grasp the concept of nation first (cf. Guibernau 2004: 134, 
Smith 1991: 9). 
One of the most widely debated definitions of nation is the one provided by Anthony 
D. Smith (1996: 359): 
 
A named human population sharing a historic territory, common myths 
and memories, a mass public culture, a single economy and common 
rights and duties for all members. 
 
Smith‘s definition provides an apparently easy way out of terminological issues: it 
includes both the concrete and the abstract factors highlighted in previous definitions 
of nations. However, Smith broadens the scope of the definition at the expense of 
clarity: does a nation need to satisfy all these characteristics to be classified as such? 
Which elements are more important? Furthermore, additional terminological 
problems arise: what is a ―mass public culture‖ and what is meant by ―historic 
territory‖? Cannot diasporas constitute or be part of a nation because they do not 
share a historic territory? 
Smith‘s definition reveals one of the main confusions that occur in debates on the 
nature of nations: by listing ―common rights and duties for all members‖ as one of 
their key elements, it conflates the concepts of nation and state. As Montserrat 
Guibernau (2004: 127) argues, judicial functions pertain to the state and are not 
inherent in the nation. While most nations have their own states, and thus also their 
own judicial systems, some do not. Furthermore, due to immigration and 
globalization, many states are no longer nation-states: they include sizeable 
minorities that are bound by the same rights and duties and yet do not lose their 
distinctive identity. To avoid confusion, states and nations have to be classified 
differently. Borrowing from Max Weber‘s conceptual framework, a state can be 
defined on the basis of its coercive powers, namely as a body that successfully claims 
monopoly of legitimate force in a particular territory (cited in Miller 1997: 19-20). A 
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state has the means to enforce its rules and a legal system to discipline those who do 
not comply with them. 
In contrast, a nation is defined more by feelings of attachment to both concrete and 
abstract elements, rather than in terms of powers and prerogatives. Ernest Gellner 
(1983: 7), a pioneer in the study of nationalism, identified two essential components 
of the nation, namely a shared culture – broadly meant as a system of ideas, signs, 
associations and ways of behaving and communicating – and its members‘ mutual 
recognition of belonging to the same nation. Gellner stressed that nations are human 
artefacts, social constructions deriving from people‘s convictions and loyalties.  
Benedict Anderson (1991: 6) also focused on the constructed nature of nations and 
defined them as ―imagined political communities‖. According to him, nations are 
imagined because the members of even the smallest nations will never meet most of 
their fellow members, but the image of belonging to a single community lives in all 
their minds. 
Anderson argued that nations are political communities because they emerged 
simultaneously to concepts such as popular sovereignty (namely the idea that 
political power rests in the hands of the people), at the time of the Enlightenment and 
of the French Revolution. The argument that nations originated with the advent of 
the modern age connects them closely with nationalism, namely the political 
principle which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent 
(Gellner 1983: 1). This connection generated a lively debate among academics. 
According to ―modernists‖ such as Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm, Montserrat 
Guibernau and Benedict Anderson, nations emerged in modern times because they 
were the product of nationalism. Conversely, ―ethno-symbolists‖ such as Anthony D. 
Smith and John Hutchinson argued that the constitutive elements of many nations, 
notably their foundation myths and their ethnic and cultural heritage, predated the 
French Revolution and the modern age (Guibernau et al. 2004, Smith 1996). 
The academic dispute between modernists and ethno-symbolists was arguably the 
longest and liveliest ever in the field of nationalism studies. It is relevant to this 
analysis because it highlights different ways of conceptualising the nation and 
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national identity. Modernists claim that, from the early nineteenth century on, 
nationalists were successful in disseminating the concept of nation thanks to mass 
schooling and the standardisation of national languages (Hobsbawm 1990: 10). 
Nationalists carefully selected pre-existing cultural elements and branded them as 
defining components of the nation (Gellner 1983: 55). Hence, according to 
modernists, nations are constructed entities and national identity is a fabrication of 
the modern state, which attempts to gain the support of citizens by uniting them in a 
single national community (Guibernau 2004: 140).  
Ethno-symbolists concur that creating national identities was one of the objectives of 
the nationalist movement during the nineteenth century. However, they maintain that 
collective memories, cultural heritage and traditions developed before the age of 
nationalism played the key role in nation formation. According to ethno-symbolists, 
modern nations are not simply political constructions or imagined communities, but 
are founded on concrete cultural elements and tend to have strong ties to pre-modern 
ethnic identities. Ethnic groups are considered as the precursors of nations, having 
―shared ancestry myths and memories or ‗ethno-history‘, with a strong association 
[…] to a historic territory or homeland‖ (Smith 1994: 382).  
The emphasis on ethnicity highlights the major weakness of the ethno-symbolist 
approach: in order to define the nation, it introduces other concepts that are equally 
ambiguous. The same criticism applies to modernist definitions, which refer to the 
complex phenomenon of nationalism to explain the emergence of nations and 
national identity. Although all these concepts are interrelated, cross-references in 
their classification are confusing. A clear and comprehensive definition of nation and 
national identity should take into account the most insightful observations of ethno-
symbolists and modernists, without relying on equivocal terms. 
David Miller‘s (1997: 18, 22-27) definition of nation provides a good starting point. 
According to Miller, a nation is a community with shared beliefs and mutual 
commitment, extended in history and connected to a particular territory. It is marked 
off from other nations by a distinct public culture, including shared political 
principles (for instance, belief in democracy or the rule of law), social norms and 
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cultural ideals. Like Gellner, Miller argues that members‘ mutual commitment and 
recognition of one another as compatriots is an essential precondition for the 
emergence of a nation. This reciprocal sense of obligation is extended over time, in 
the past, present and future, and ensures the historical continuity of the nation. 
Collective memories play an important role in this respect, as they remind the 
members of a nation of their forebears‘ presumed achievements and cultural heritage.  
Collective memories are instrumental to the formation of national identities. National 
identity can be defined as the psychological attachment of a collective to the nation 
and its defining elements. Shared memories and culture are the main sustaining 
factors of this attachment, as they constitute the core of narratives stimulating 
identification with the nation (Anderson 1991: 205). As Anthony D. Smith (1996a: 
383) argues, ―only by remembering the past can a collective identity come into 
being‖. Collective memories provide the ―cognitive maps and mobilising moralities 
of nations as they struggle to win and maintain recognition‖ (Smith 1988: 14). 
According to Smith (1996a: 384-385), vital elements of the nation such as its drive 
for regeneration, the sense of national authenticity, collective mission and national 
destiny depend on collective memory. Similarly, Eric Hobsbawm and David Kertzer 
(1992: 3) argue that ―nations without a past are contradictions in terms. What makes 
a nation is the past; what justifies one nation against others is the past‖.  
 
Table 1. Definitions: nation and national identity 
 
Nation: a community with shared beliefs and mutual commitment, extended in 
history and connected to a particular territory. It is marked off from other nations by 
a distinct public culture, including shared political principles, social norms and 
cultural ideals. 
National identity:  the psychological attachment of a collective to the nation and its 
defining elements. 
 
Source: own compilation 
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The politics of memory and national identity 
While Hobsbawm and Smith are right to emphasise the importance of the past for 
national identity, the way in which a nation remembers its past is more complex and 
ambiguous than their statements may suggest. In fact, the collective memory and the 
past of a nation are fundamentally different concepts. The term ―collective memory‖ 
refers to the shared memories held by a community about the past (Hunt 2010: 97), 
an image of the past constructed by a subjectivity in the present (Megill 2011: 196). 
Collective memory is a discourse about historical events and how to interpret them 
based on a community‘s current social and historical necessities (Arnold-de Simine 
2005: 10, Pakier and Stråth 2010: 7). It is neither a mere or accurate reflection of the 
past, nor the product of historical research. As Maurice Halbwachs (1992) argues, 
collective memories are socially framed: they form when people come together to 
remember and enter a domain that transcends individual memory. According to 
Andreas Huyssen (2003: 6), collective memory is also essential to imagine the future 
and give a strong temporal and spatial grounding to life.  
The study of collective memory is of particular relevance at institutional level 
(Lebow 2006: 13-14). Political elites formulate or adopt selective discourses of past 
events in order to forge national identities that strengthen social cohesion. In 
particular, politicians try to forge national memories, a particular type of collective 
memory where the collective coincides with the nation (Gillis 1994: 7). National 
memory is disseminated primarily via political leaders‘ official discourses and 
commemorations in realms of memory (lieux de mémoire), namely historical or 
pseudo-historical sites that are reminiscent of selected events in national memory 
(Nora 1992: 7). This does not preclude the role of other, unofficial actors in the 
forging of national memory. Individual or other group memories coexist side by side 
with official national memories and often influence them. However, political leaders 
play a decisive role in the construction and diffusion of national memory because 
they have easier access to mass media, which makes them highly influential. Richard 
Ned Lebow, Wulf Kansteiner and Claudio Fogu (2006) call the selection and 
dissemination of discourses on a country‘s past ―the politics of memory‖. It involves 
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actors who use their public prominence to propagate narratives about the past which 
are functional to their political goals (Lebow 2006: 26-28).  
Memory matters politically because it can be used by the political establishment as a 
source of legitimacy for its power. For instance, policy makers can make reference to 
events that play an important role in national memory and construct plausible 
historical analogies to obtain support for their policies (Bell 2006: 20, Gildea 2002: 
59, Koczanowicz 1997: 260, König 2008: 27-34, Olick 2007: 122). The inherent 
ambiguity of collective memories, which are in constant flux, facilitates their 
manipulation and mobilisation in the service of national identity formation (Berger 
2002: 81, Müller 2002: 21-22, Ray 2006: 144). As Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan 
(1999: 6) have noted, political elites manipulated the past on a massive scale during 
the twentieth century. Manipulations of national history took place in particular after 
wars and regime changes, when states and new political elites attempted to restore 
social cohesion. Following major social dislocations, political elites tend to formulate 
and propagate official narratives that reflect their view of history and exclude all 
events and elements that do not fit therein (Hunt 2010: 110). Furthermore, they 
construct national histories as triumphant narratives, a selective retelling of the past 
based on accounts that stimulate strong identification with the nation (Eder 2005: 
214-215).  
Due to the constant influence of a multiplicity of political, historical and social 
factors, collective memories and identities are not fixed; they undergo a process of 
gradual change and adaptation. As Pierre Nora (1989: 8) argues, national memories 
are constantly constructed and reconstructed in a selective way; they are ―in 
permanent evolution, a perpetually present phenomenon‖. During the last 20-30 
years, this process has been fuelled by a dramatic upsurge of public memory debates 
in North American and European societies (Huyssen 2003: 12-15). Politicians have 
attempted to intervene and guide these debates in a way that suited and served both 
their political aspirations and their conception of national identity (Gillis 1994: 3, 
Müller 2002: 23, Smith 2011: 235). 
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A widespread use of the politics of memory to forge national identities took place in 
almost all European countries immediately after the Second World War and again 
after 1989 in most East-Central European countries, following the collapse of the 
Soviet bloc (Assmann 2006: 260, Evans 2003: 5, Judt 1992: 96).
6
 Both in 1945 and 
1989, the new political elites that emerged from the ordeal of war and from regime 
change needed founding myths to strengthen social cohesion at a time of economic 
dislocation and transformation from authoritarian to democratic forms of government 
(Müller 2002: 7-9). This political necessity led new leaders to search for a ―usable 
past‖ in national history and reframe it in narratives that propped present political 
goals (Moeller 2003, Torbakov 2011: 215). 
The national memories that were constructed or perpetuated in Western Europe after 
1945 and in East-Central Europe after 1989 constitute the core of current national 
memory discourses in most European countries. This is due to the fact that many of 
the founding myths of today‘s national political systems in Europe date back from 
these two historical moments. In countries such as the ones under analysis in this 
work, the images of Russia that crystallised in national memories during these 
periods, partly in continuity with pre-existing perceptions and partly based on new 
elements, influenced the process of national identity construction. Thus, particular 
perceptions of Russia as a foreign policy actor have become enshrined in national 
consciousness and still affect attitudes to Moscow.
7
 
National memory can be conceptualised as an essential component and driving factor 
of national identity. Unsurprisingly, the two concepts share many of their essential 
features. Like national memories, national identities are multiple, malleable, 
contested and provide a powerful instrument for the political elites that have enough 
power to manipulate them. Their multiplicity derives from different conceptions of 
national identity across the large and diverse national community. However, states 
                                                          
6
 Following the classification adopted by Konrad Jarausch (2010: 310-311), in this dissertation “East-
Central Europe” includes EU member states that were located in the Soviet sphere of influence 
during the Cold War (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria) or were part of 
the Soviet Union (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia).  
7
 The analysis of different national perceptions of Russia is beyond the scope of this chapter.  
However, chapter 4 provides a thorough discussion of Russia’s role in German, Polish and Finnish 
collective memory and identity. 
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tend to propagate one particular narrative of national identity, which becomes 
dominant in official discourses. Individual and other group identities coexist and 
interact with officially endorsed versions of national identity, thereby creating 




National identities are malleable because they are influenced by domestic and 
external events and can change over time. Changes usually take place gradually; core 
constituents such as the nation‘s founding myths and cultural frameworks of 
reference (notably in literature, the arts and music) are relatively stable. However, 
sudden changes in national identity discourses may also occur, particularly when 
historical events force upon the nation a reconsideration of its values and interests.
9
  
National identities are contested because they are subject to manipulations by social 
groups vying for dominance; they compete for people‘s allegiance with class, 
religious, local and supranational identities (Miller 1997: 45-46). Narratives of 
national identity also tend to be used as political instruments because they are 
generally formulated and propagated by the state in order to strengthen and 
legitimate the existing political system (Guibernau 2004: 140). States and political 
leaders are both the main advocates and key beneficiaries of national identity 
construction. National identity promotes homogeneity in a community because it cuts 
across class and local differences and transcends divisions of rank, descent, region 
and profession. It is therefore functional to the creation of a strong bond between 
political leaders and ordinary citizens, as well as among different sections of the 
population (Benner 2001: 162, Greenfield 1990: 550).  
Since national identity provides a very useful tool for the unity and cohesiveness of a 
state, governments employ several strategies to favour its consolidation. They 
disseminate a specific image of the nation that usually relates to the dominant ethnic 
group. In addition, they confer citizenship and advance numerous symbols and rituals 
that serve the purpose of reinforcing the sense of community among citizens, as well 
                                                          
8
 As shown in chapter 4, for instance, unofficial narratives of national identity in pre-1989 Poland 
became part of official discourses following the fall of communism. 
9
 Germany after the Second World War provides a good example in this respect. 
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as their loyalty towards the state. National identity is constructed also through the 
steering of public education and the mass media. This phenomenon is particularly 
marked in authoritarian states but also exists in democratic countries.  
Furthermore, states often attempt to strengthen national identity by creating external 
enemies (Guibernau 2004: 140). For instance, France and Germany constructed each 
other as external threats for nearly a century (from the 1860s to the 1940s) and used 
the image of the menacing neighbour to foster national unity in moments of crisis. 
Past rivalries in Franco-German relations left a trace in national identity that 
influenced the political debate at a later stage, as shown by the French reservations 
about German reunification in 1989-1990 (Gildea 2002a). Similar patterns of 
national identity formation against an external Other, namely an actor that tends to be 
perceived as alien and antithetical, can be detected inter alia in Soviet-US, US-
Chinese and Europe-Russia relations.
10
 This last case bears direct relevance to the 
subject of this study and will be analysed in more detail. 
 
Russia as Europe’s Other 
As Iver Neumann (1998: 67-112) has shown, numerous primary sources suggest that 
Russia has played the role of Europe's Other for more than four centuries.
11
 This is 
not to say that Russia was the only or the main Other for Europe throughout this long 
historical phase. Discourses on Russia were not homogeneous all over the continent 
and differed depending inter alia on the social milieu, political orientation and 
personal experiences of observers. Nevertheless, numerous and significant patterns 
consistently pointing at Russia as Europe‘s Other can be detected throughout this 
period. Studying these patterns is essential and of current relevance because Russia is 
                                                          
10
 For a theoretical discussion of “othering” and of the construction of the Other see chapter 2. 
11
 On the other hand, during this period Russian leaders never questioned their country’s 
“Europeanness”. The often quoted dispute between Russian “Westernisers” and “Slavophiles” 
concerned the question of whether Western Europe should serve as a role model for Russia or if 
Russia itself should become the leader of European (and world) civilisation. None of the sides in this 
controversy questioned Russia’s European nature, even if some Slavophiles placed it within a 
broader Eurasian framework and attributed to it a global civilising mission (Tsygankov 2008: 766-
770). 
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still central to national identity discourses and to the debate on European identity. 
Analysing dominant perceptions of Russia also helps to understand present political 
discussions, such as the one concerning the European security order (Webber 2009: 
267-288). 
European depictions of Russia show a tendency to portray it as a liminal case of 
European identity. Russians were often depicted as barbarous and deficient in terms 
of civility, form of government and religion (Poe 2003: 21). The first depictions of 
Russia as ―the barbarian at the gates‖, a recurrent theme in European discourses of 
the powerful Eastern neighbour, emerged in the descriptions of Russian soldiers 
during the Northern War against Sweden in the early eighteenth century. Around the 
same time, geographical handbooks argued that Russians were constructed as ―body 
and nature‖, whereas Europeans were constructed as ―mind and civilization‖. The 
metaphor of the Russian ursa major, which associated Russia with wild nature, 
originated in this context. Its endurance over time is demonstrated by the fact that it 
is still used today in modern variants, most notably the depiction of Russia as a 
threatening and irascible bear (Naarden 1992: 7-27, Neumann 1998: 67-80). 
During the Napoleonic wars Russian soldiers advanced as far as Paris and, after 
Napoleon‘s defeat, Russia was accepted as a legitimate player in the Concert of 
Europe. However, this acceptance was relativised by the enduring perception of 
Russia as ―the barbarian at the gates‖, a country that lacked the rationality which had 
become a defining element of European civilisation during the Enlightenment. 
European liberals, democrats and socialists were particularly keen on describing 
Russia as a socially and economically backward power. Conversely, conservative 
forces saw it as a bulwark of legitimism and of the European ancien régime 
(Neumann 1998: 66-93, 96-97). The Bolshevik revolution inverted radical and 
conservative views of Russia. The Bolsheviks‘ radical political programme made the 
Soviet Union a threat to conservative political elites in the rest of Europe throughout 
the interwar period. The threat was substantiated by the fact that the Soviet Union 
could count on the extraterritorial presence of faithful allies, organised in European 
communist parties. On the other hand, numerous European radicals praised the 
USSR‘s political and economic system, as well as the allegedly higher morality of 
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the Soviet model (Naarden 1992: 28-39, Neumann 1998: 99-102, Service 2007: 85-
96). 
During the Second World War, the idea of the Russians as a barbarous civilisation 
was pushed to the extreme by the Nazi racial discourse, which depicted them and all 
other Slavic peoples as sub-humans (Untermenschen). The idea that Russians should 
be excluded from humankind, and not just from Europe, was radically new (Müller 
and Ueberschär 2009: 209-252). However, there was continuity between some 
themes used by Nazi propaganda and pre-existing discourses about Russians, such as 
the claim that they were a barbarous and uncivilised Asiatic people. Some of these 
themes also characterised discourses about the Soviet Union in the post-war period; 
Konrad Adenauer‘s 1946 statement that ―Asia stood on the Elbe‖ (cited in Rupnik 
1994: 94) provides an excellent example in this respect. Adenauer referred to the 
presence of the Red Army in Eastern and Central Europe, which became one of the 
main determinants of European perceptions of the Soviet Union during the Cold 
War. While in the inter-war period the Soviet Union had been mostly perceived as a 
political threat, during the Cold War it primarily constituted a military threat in the 
mindsets of most Europeans. The perception of a political threat persisted in the 
immediate post-war period, but gradually decreased as communist parties in Western 
Europe lost their appeal or became critical of the Soviet Union (Neumann 1998: 99-
100, Service 2007: 261-271, 379-390). 
The Cold War played an important role in the construction of European perceptions 
of Russia also because it became the setting in which a distinct East-Central 
European narrative developed. This discourse, fiercely critical of both the Soviet 
Union and of its perceived Russian core, emerged in East-Central European countries 
that were located within the Soviet sphere of influence and was reflected in the 
writings of dissident intellectuals who were born there. Milan Kundera‘s (1984) 
article The tragedy of Central Europe is the most representative of these writings. 
Kundera, a Czech writer living in exile in France, argued that Central Europe (in 
which he included the nations of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire and Poland) 
was a part of the West that had been ―kidnapped, displaced and brainwashed [by the] 
totalitarian Russian civilisation‖. According to Kundera, Central Europe was the 
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cultural heart of Europe and its separation from Western Europe meant that the latter 
was losing its cultural identity. On the other hand, Central Europe kept defending its 
identity and ―preserving its Westerness‖ despite Soviet domination.  
The main difference between Central Europe and Russia, Kundera argued, was above 
all cultural, as demonstrated by the fact that the anti-Soviet revolts of 1956 and 1968 
were led by local students and intellectuals. One of the key objectives in Kundera‘s 
article was that of drawing the attention of the Western world towards the oppression 
of East-Central European countries under Soviet influence. In order to show that 
these countries culturally belonged to Europe while Soviet Russia did not, he 
described the former as the ―vital centre of gravity of Western culture‖ and the latter 
as ―the radical negation of the modern West‖. 
Kundera‘s views on Russia were echoed by other intellectuals from East-Central 
Europe. Different epithets, such as ―Second World‖, ―authoritarian‖ and 
―totalitarian‖ (as opposed to ―First World‖, ―democratic‖ and ―free‖), were 
associated with Soviet Russia in order to differentiate it from Europe and the West. 
Some extreme voices in the intellectual world went as far as using quasi-racial 
arguments to criticise Russia. For instance, Hungarian philosopher Mihaly Vajda 
(1989: 170-173) argued that Russia had made the choice to become non-European 
and that Russians were ―incapable of tolerating another civilization, another form of 
life‖. Vajda also spoke of ―the Russian beast‖ and Russian practices of ―holocaust, 
imprisonment, banishment, exile‖, forgetting that the Holocaust was actually a page 
of European history, rather than a Russian crime, and that its perpetrators had spoken 
of Russia in a way very similar to his own. 
In 1989, when the communists were ousted from their posts and the Soviet Union left 
its satellites free to choose their political future, new East-Central European political 
leaders such as Vaclav Havel started to speak of a ―return to Europe‖.
12
 However, it 
soon became clear that the Central Europe to which Kundera had referred to in his 
1984 essay had not emerged from the Cold War as a united political or cultural 
                                                          
12
 Cited in Charles Powers, “Czech-Polish-Hungarian Accord Urged: Europe: Havel proposes 'spirit of 
solidarity' in aftermath of Soviet domination”, Los Angeles Times, 26 January 1990, 
http://articles.latimes.com/1990-01-26/news/mn-726_1_central-europe (accessed 1/6/2014). 
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entity. East-Central European countries had only managed to pass themselves off as a 
united entity vis-à-vis third parties by using the image of the Soviet Union as a 
common Other. After 1989, the new East-Central European leaders emphasised 
cultural differences between their countries and Russia, with the objective of creating 
a Self compatible with Western Europe and strenuously opposed to Russia. This 
strategy was meant to create the cultural preconditions, both at home and abroad, for 
the integration of East-Central European countries into the EU and NATO (Neumann 
1998: 144, 158). 
When East-Central European states joined the European Union, they brought along 
the legacy of four decades of resentment and confrontation with Soviet Russia. In 
some cases, notably those of Poland and the three Baltic States, anti-Russian feelings 
dated back from much earlier than the Cold War period. Anti-Russian discourses and 
attitudes in these countries did not vanish once the ―return to Europe‖ had been 
accomplished. Historical conflicts, the enduring fear of a resurgent Russian military 
might and economic issues, aggravated by East-Central Europe‘s energy dependence 
on Russia, continued to characterise the relations of the former Soviet satellites with 
Moscow. Furthermore, conflicts between the new East-Central European EU 
member states and Russia were transferred to the EU level and risked paralysing EU-
Russia relations. Poland‘s decision to veto negotiations on a new partnership 
agreement between the EU and Russia in 2006, following a quarrel over a Russian 
import ban on Polish meat, was the clearest manifestation of this. 
 
Thesis structure 
This introductory chapter presented the main research questions, highlighted the 
significance of the topic under analysis and the dissertation‘s intended theoretical and 
empirical contribution. It defined key concepts in the dissertation, namely those of 
nation, national identity and collective memory. It also introduced the European 
context of the topic and showed that Russia was traditionally perceived as Other by 
the rest of Europe. Furthermore, the chapter argued for the necessity to explore 
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identities and discourses on Russia at the national level due to the fragmented nature 
of European history, politics and identity construction.  
The next chapter examines in greater detail the significance of the Other in identity 
construction. It provides a survey of relevant debates in International Relations 
theory and a theoretical framework for this analysis. The focus is on social 
constructivist scholarship, which emphasises the importance of concepts such as 
identity, the construction of Others and collective memory to understand 
international relations. A distinction is drawn between conventional constructivist 
approaches, which tend to focus mostly on structural factors with a positivist 
epistemology, and interpretive constructivist analysis, which pays more attention to 
domestic factors (such as the domestic construction of national identity) and adopts a 
post-positivist epistemology. The theoretical framework of the dissertation is based 
on this latter approach.  
Chapter 3 outlines the methodology adopted in this study. Critical discourse analysis, 
notably its discourse-historical variant, offers a systematic approach to the 
investigation of discourses on Russia. After defining the concept of ―discourse‖, the 
chapter relates the main features and practical application of discourse-historical 
analysis. Subsequently, it explains and justifies the selection of case studies and of 
the sources for the analysis of discourses on Russia. Issues pertaining the 
generalisability and reliability of findings are also addressed 
Chapter 4 examines national identity construction in Germany, Poland and Finland, 
with a special focus on Russia‘s role as Other. It takes a longue durée perspective 
that follows the construction of national identity in the three countries approximately 
from the nineteenth century until the present. This perspective allows an 
investigation of how Russia was internalised in national identity starting from the 
emergence of modern national identities, with a focus on the historical events that 
mark key fractures in the selected countries‘ process of identity formation and 
relations with Russia. The longue durée approach best fits the study of national 
identity construction, which took place slowly, over a long time span. Dominant 
themes in identity discourses and discourses on Russia over time are identified and 
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provide an interpretive key for the subsequent analysis of policy makers‘ discourses 
on Russia from 2005 to 2012. 
Chapters 5 to 7 analyse policy makers‘ discourses on Russia in the selected countries 
in response to three major events in which Russia was a prominent actor: the 
controversies surrounding the construction of the Nord Stream pipeline, the 2008 
Russian-Georgian war and the street protests that followed the December 2011 
parliamentary elections in Russia. The analysis of the relationship between these 
discourses and national identity constitutes the thesis‘s main empirical contribution. 
It sheds light on how conceptions of Russia framed within national identity relate to 
contemporary foreign policy discourses, and how the latter in turn contribute to the 
consolidation or change of the images of Russia enshrined in national identity and 
memory.  
Chapter 8 examines German, Polish and Finnish leaders‘ discourses on Russia during 
their countries‘ presidency of the European Union. This focus allows an investigation 
of how national priorities concerning Russia are transposed in the EU discursive 
arena. It also offers insights into the deeper, identity-based roots of European foreign 
policy discourse. Finally, the concluding chapter presents a comparative summary of 
the dissertation‘s findings concerning national discourses on Russia and discusses 
avenues for further research. Drawing on the comparative analysis, the final chapter 
also assesses the prospects for the emergence of a shared foreign policy discourse on 
Russia in the European Union. 
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This chapter outlines the theoretical framework of the dissertation. It argues that 
interpretive constructivism provides the best approach to study the relationship 
between national identity and foreign policy discourses. The main concepts 
introduced in the previous section, notably national identity and the relationship 
between Self and Other, are defined and analysed from a theoretical perspective. The 
key questions addressed are: which theoretical approach within the discipline of 
International Relations best explores the relationship between national identity and 
foreign policy discourses? How does constructivist research conceptualise national 
identity and the relationship between Self and Other? What is the main criticism of 
positivist constructivist theory? How can this criticism be integrated in a revised 
constructivist approach to study the relationship between national identity and 
foreign policy discourses? 
The chapter first explores the conceptualisation of identity in the three main grand 
theories of International Relations, namely neorealism, neoliberalism and social 
constructivism. Due to its focus on identity as a factor in international politics, social 
constructivism is identified as the best theoretical approach to explore the 
relationship between national identity and foreign policy. Hence, constructivist 
theorisations of identity formation and of the relationship between Self and Other are 
examined. The investigation of constructivist literature starts from the works 
published by Alexander Wendt and other positivist scholars during the 1990s. As 
emerges from the analysis, these works argued that interest formation and policy 
formulation are a function of identity. Wendtian scholarship established a 
unidirectional causal link between identity on one side and both interests and policy 
making on the other. 
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Subsequently, the analysis presents the main criticism of the Wendtian approach. 
This criticism focuses primarily on Wendt‘s positivist epistemology, his neglect of 
material power as a constitutive element of international relations and his lack of 
attention to the relevance of the domestic level in identity formation. Positivist 
constructivist scholarship from the 1990s is critiqued also for stylising the Other as 
an exclusively antitethical and negative factor in national identity construction. 
Drawing on this criticism, the chapter revises the Wendtian approach and proposes a 
new theoretical model that conceptualises the relationship between identity, interests 
and foreign policy discourses as mutually constitutive. This model provides the 
theoretical framework for the empirical chapters of the dissertation. 
  
National identity and European foreign policy towards 
Russia: a constructivist perspective 
As highlighted in the previous chapter, Russia is arguably the most divisive issue in 
European foreign policy. Divergent views often emerge when European Union 
member states are required to formulate a foreign policy response to a major event 
that sees Russia as a protagonist. Different opinions frequently result in the 
prevalence of bilateral approaches over a united EU position. The response of EU 
member states to the 2008 Russian-Georgian war, to Moscow‘s energy policies and 
to its concerns over NATO Eastern enlargement provide prime examples of 
diverging European approaches to Russia (David et al. 2013). Despite belonging to a 
single economic and defence community, EU member states perceive Russia 
differently, particularly with regard to their security interests. The reasons for these 
differences go beyond neoliberal and neorealist theorisations of institutional 
cooperation or interstate relations in an anarchic and hostile environment. They must 
be investigated at the domestic level, where national identities and interests are 
constructed and discourses on Russia are formulated.
13
 
                                                          
13
 As Henry Nau (2002: 16) argues in his study of US foreign policy, national interests “begin with 
what kind of society the nation is, not just what its geopolitical circumstances are”. 
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This dissertation adopts a theoretical approach that highlights the mutually 
constitutive relationship between national identity construction and European foreign 
policy towards Russia. The constructivist school of thought defines the politics of 
identity as one of the keys to understanding how a country‘s domestic dynamics 
interact with and affect global politics (Hopf 1998: 192). Constructivists treat 
identities and interests as endogenous to interaction, whereas neoliberals and 
neorealists consider them as exogenously given and constant. For neoliberals and 
neorealists, states have uncomplicated and unchanging identities and interests, which 
neither affect nor are influenced by agents and structures (Laffey and Weldes 1997: 
193-237; cf. Waltz 1979). 
Neoliberals investigated the significance of norms and ideas in international 
relations, but did not explain whether and how they play a role in identity 
construction. Neoliberal studies tend to consider ideas and norms only as intervening 
factors between states seeking self-help in the anarchic international system and their 
subsequent actions (Waever 2002: 21). They largely neglect the domestic level of 
analysis and the function that the domestic constituency plays in the formulation of 
foreign policy preferences. Hence, neoliberalism does not provide solid theoretical 
foundations to analyse the domestic construction of national identity and its 
interaction with international politics. 
Neorealism also focuses on structures and treats states as monoliths, unproblematic 
units that follow the logic of self-help and power-balancing in an anarchical 
international environment (cf. Waltz 1979: 102-128). The neorealist approach to 
international relations does not attribute any role to domestic and social factors such 
as national identity in foreign policy making. Due to the lack of attention to these 
factors, neorealism offers a static view of international politics and is unable to 
explain change, particularly peaceful change (Ruggie 1998: 874-875). This 
deficiency is due also to the neorealists‘ inability to articulate a convincing 
framework to understand the formulation of state interests. State interests cannot be 
derived from the condition of anarchy, as neorealists claim, because anarchy is an 
ambiguous concept. In fact, neorealism handles interest formation by assumption 
(Ruggie 1998: 862-869).  
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Furthermore, neorealism oversimplifies the process of preference formation and 
decision making. Decision makers are not always rational, as neorealists tend to 
assume (Legro and Moravcsik 1999: 53).
14
 They may rely on heuristic, the logic of 
appropriateness (Müller 2004) and the logic of practice (Pouliot 2008), in which the 
decision making process is deeply influenced by the social embeddedness of actors, 
their identity and other cultural elements. Thus, decision making processes are best 
studied within a constructivist framework that endogenises and analyses the 
multifaceted, malleable and complex nature of identities, as well as their mutually 
constitutive relationship with agents and structures (Checkel 2008: 72). Table 2 
below summarises the different conceptualisations of identity in the main approaches 
of International Relations theory and highlights its central role in social 
constructivism. 
 
Table 2. Conceptualisation of identity in the main theories of International 
Relations  






Exogenous to theory Endogenous to theory 
Constant   Fluid, malleable 
Does not influence agents and 
structures 
Shapes and constitutes agents 
and structures 
Does not affect state interests, 
which are derived from the 
anarchic international system 
Shapes and constitutes state 
interests 
Has no influence on rational 
decision makers 
It is a cognitive device that 
influences decision makers‘ 
motives, actions and 
understanding of the world 
 
Source: own compilation 
                                                          
14
 Jeffrey Legro and Andrew Moravcsik (1999: 53) go as far as claiming that a generic commitment to 
this assumption is the only element that neorealists currently share. In all other respects, their work 
diverges due to their attempts to subsume the causal mechanisms of competing theories. 
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National identity tends to be constructed in relation to one or more significant 
Others, namely actors in the international environment that are perceived as different 
or antithetical by the nation (or Self). It operates as a cognitive device that provides a 
state with an understanding of other countries, their motives, interests, probable 
actions and attitudes (Hopf 2002: 5). Language and discourses play an essential role 
in the construction of national identity and its significant Others. Dominant identity 
discourses are the cognitive structures through which policy makers formulate 
national interests and take foreign policy decisions. A country‘s leaders, particularly 
its political and intellectual elites, are the primary agents and interpreters of national 
identity construction, as they both shape and are influenced by the dominant 
discourses of the national environments in which they are embedded (Checkel 2006: 
63, Lebow 2008: 556-564).
15
  
In this work, the construction of national identity and its relationship with foreign 
policy narratives concerning Russia are examined through an interpretive 
constructivist framework and discourse analysis. Discourse analysis is indispensable 
for the investigation and interpretation of policy makers‘ discourses, which 
accompany and shape foreign policy decisions. These narratives reflect the national 
identity in which policy makers are embedded and thus constitute an essential source 
to study the relationship between national identity and foreign policy. Furthermore, 
the comparison of national discourses on Russia across European countries allows 
investigating prospects for the emergence of a shared foreign policy stance towards 
the Kremlin within the EU. According to interpretive constructivists, diverging 
national discourses are often associated with conflicting interests and different 
foreign policy behaviours (Hopf 1998: 193, Lebow 2008: 563-564). We can 
therefore expect diverging national identity discourses to translate into different 
foreign policy attitudes towards Russia. 
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 As Jeffrey Checkel (2006: 63) argues, agents are persuasive because they are authoritative, but 
also “because they are enabled and legitimated by the broader social discourse in which they are 
embedded”. 
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The epistemological and ontological groundings of social constructivism offer an 
ideal theoretical model for this analysis. As Stefano Guzzini (2000: 147) argued, 
constructivist epistemology focuses on the social construction of knowledge, 
whereas its ontology is about the construction of social reality. Accordingly, this 
dissertation explores the social construction of narratives concerning national identity 
and Russia in the selected countries. Ontologically, it examines the mutually 
constitutive relationship between these narratives and national foreign policy towards 
Russia. 
 
National identity, the Other and Wendtian constructivist research 
The concept of identity has been discussed widely in constructivist scholarship. The 
term originates from social psychology, where it describes the individuality and 
distinctiveness of an actor (the Self) in its evolving relations with significant Others 
(Jepperson et al. 1996: 59). Alexander Wendt transposed the concept to international 
relations theory and argued that identities are relatively stable (albeit subject to 
change in the long run) role-specific understandings and expectations about an actor 
(the Self) that are constructed in interactions with other actors. The type of social 
structure that prevails in the international system depends on how actors construct 
their identity in relation to others. Relatively stable identities and expectations about 
each other develop as a result of continuous interaction (Wendt 1994: 384-396). 
According to Wendt (1999), national identity formation happens at state level, but it 
is also influenced by international structures. In the international arena, countries 
define the boundaries of their Selves and those of their respective Others, so as to 
consolidate their distinctive national traits. National interests are rooted in national 
identity because an actor ―cannot know what it wants until it knows who it is‖ 
(Wendt 1999: 231).
16
 In particular, national identity determines a state‘s interests 
based on how other actors are perceived (Wendt 1999: 224-233; cf. Adler 1997: 337, 
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 To emphasise the tight correlation between identity and interests, Wendt (1999: 231-232) also 
claims that “interests are needs or functional imperatives which must be fulfilled if an identity is to 
be reproduced”. 
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Hopf 1998: 175). Such perceptions are profoundly influenced by historical 
interaction between the state and its Others. An actor that has played the role of 
Other over a protracted historical period becomes internalised as such in a country‘s 
national memory (Barnett 1996: 446, Lebow 2006: 3, Smith 1992: 58). In the 
national memory of several European states, Russia has been internalised as a 
significant Other (Lebow 2008: 10, Neumann and Medvedev 2012: 13). Together 
with Turkey, Russia constituted the main Other against which identities were 
constructed in early modern and modern Europe (cf. Neumann 1998). The concept of 
otherness is thus fundamental to understand Russia‘s role in national identity 
construction in European states. 
The antithesis between Self and Other is a central theme in modern philosophy, 
social anthropology, psychology and literary theory (Neumann 1996: 141-154). In 
the early nineteenth century, Hegel (1999: 15-20) argued that the citizens of a state 
develop a collective identity as a result of conflicts with other states. Hence, 
according to Hegel the formation of the Self occurs through interaction with the 
Other. In the second half of the century, Nietzsche elaborated on Hegel‘s thinking 
and stated that Self and Other are not fixed elements, but perceive each other from 
changing perspectives (cited in Neumann 1998: 148). Following the same line of 
argument, a century later Carl Schmitt (1976) claimed that political identities can 
best be formed in struggles against others. 
During the last twenty years, the dichotomy between Self and Other became a pivotal 
topic in International Relations theory. David Campbell (1998: 191-205) attempted 
to explain US foreign policy as a continuous search for new collectives to treat as 
Others in order to consolidate national identity and rally domestic support. Campbell 
argued that, following the demise of the Soviet Union, Washington identified new 
Others in Saddam Hussein‘s Iraq and China. Writing a decade later, Richard Ned 
Lebow (2008: 11) asserted that American domestic and foreign policy after the 
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terrorist attacks of 9 September 2001 showed how easy it was for political leaders to 
exploit the fear of Others to create solidarity at home.
17
 
Ole Waever (2002) analysed the relationship between Self and Other from an 
interpretive constructivist perspective that focuses on the role of discourses. 
According to Waever, a collective Self is predicated on some essential political 
ideas, such as what constitutes a state or a nation. The Self attempts to make these 
ideas the core of institutionalisation in political cooperation, which produces 
discursive clashes with the Other. Waever argued that these conflicts can be studied 
as the substance of world politics in an alternative, identity-based approach to foreign 
policy analysis. Further studies investigated specific aspects of the Self/Other 
dichotomy. Erik Ringmar (1996: 80) highlighted the active participation of the Other 
in an actor‘s identity construction. He claimed that Others are the main recipients of 
the Self‘s narratives and determine whether such narratives are a valid description of 
the Self through interaction. Jennifer Mitzen (2006: 341-370) studied the use of 
Others in the framework of ontological security, or security of the Self. She 
contended that states become dependent on security dilemmas
18
 due to their reliance 
on routines that help consolidate their identities in relation to significant Others. 
Elaborating on Wendt‘s theoretical framework, the essays in Peter Katzenstein‘s 
(1996) edited volume The culture of national security further investigated the 
dichotomy between Self and Other. Most importantly, they offer crucial insights for 
the study of the relationship between identity and foreign policy. In an introductory 
essay, Katzenstein, Wendt and Ronald Jepperson argued that cultural and 
institutional elements of states‘ domestic and global environments shape national 
identity. Variations in national identity determine a state‘s security interests and 
policies and in turn affect normative structures, namely culture and institutions 
(Jepperson et al. 1996: 53-65). These relationships can be summarised in the 
following model: 
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 The popularity of Samuel Huntington’s (1997) work on “the clash of civilisations” showed that the 
dichotomy Self/Other has become a pervasive theme in public debates. Huntington’s book in itself 
was evidence that “othering” could be used as a deliberate policy to strengthen national identities 
(cf. Neumann 1996: 168). 
18
 Security dilemmas refer to a condition in which one state's gain in security decreases the security 
of other actors (Jervis 1978: 169-170). 
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Normative structures (culture, institutions) ↔ Identity → Interests 
                                                                     ↖         ↓           ↙ 
                                                                           Policies 
 
As the model shows, identity influences policies through the determination of 
interests. However, it can also shape policies directly as a result of a state‘s identity 
politics. The case studies in Katzenstein‘s volume provide convincing empirical 
evidence for the model. Among these, Thomas Berger‘s work (1996: 318) argued 
that, due to historical experiences and how these are interpreted by domestic political 
actors, Germany and Japan have developed national identities which make them 
reluctant to resort to the use of military force.
19
 Berger then showed that German and 
Japanese post-1945 identity politics, notably the decision to construct an 
antimilitaristic national identity, had a direct impact both on policy making and on 
the domestic institutional context where defence policy is formulated (cf. Bjola and 
Kornprobst 2007). 
Robert Herman‘s (1996) essay on Soviet foreign policy in the late 1980s showed the 
interrelation between identity construction, the formation of interests and the 
formulation of foreign policy. Herman argued that the end of the Cold War was a 
consequence of Gorbachev‘s new thinking, which caused a radical 
reconceptualization of state interests. This redefinition was determined by the 
emergence of a new identity in some post-Brezhnev Soviet elites, who thought that 
Soviet interests could best be served by overcoming the East-West division and by 
cooperating with the United States to achieve peace and stability. The new Soviet 
thinking allowed progress in arms control, produced a peaceful response to the 
revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe and led to a democratic shift in Soviet 
political culture and institutions. Thus, Herman‘s work illustrated the effects that 
changes in identity can have on normative structures. 
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 Events with enduring significance for a country, such as the Second World War for Germany and 
Japan, create dominant collective memories that allow the mobilization of national identities in 
particular directions (Liu and Hilton 2005: 545).  
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Also in Katzenstein‘s volume, Michael Barnett‘s analysis of alliances in the Middle 
East showed that often the politics of identity offers a better explanation than the 
realist logic of anarchy of the mechanisms that lead a state to identify partners and 
threats to its security. Most notably, Barnett (1996: 401) claimed that there is a 
correlation between an actor‘s identity and its strategic behaviour. Furthermore, 
Thomas Risse-Kappen‘s essay (1996: 397) argued that collective identities based on 
shared democratic values ensure the longevity of institutions and applied this logic to 
explain NATO‘s endurance after the end of the Cold War. According to Risse-
Kappen, NATO‘s longevity could hardly be understood following the realist logic of 
balancing, as the fall of the Soviet Union meant the disappearance of the superpower 
which the Atlantic Alliance was supposed to balance. 
Other scholars elaborated on the theoretical framework developed in Katzenstein‘s 
edited volume. Richard Ned Lebow (2008) showed that identity construction can 
explain events which have traditionally been analysed in terms of power and rational 
choice, such as the Cuban missile crisis (cf. Allison and Zelikow 1999). Lebow 
argued that individuals, armies and political elites are committed to asserting and 
maintaining their identities. To achieve this purpose, they use all available means and 
power, which Lebow conceived not simply as material power, but also as immaterial 
capabilities.
20
 Lebow (2008: 552-557) also claimed that actors are reluctant to 
behave in ways and take decisions that do not conform to their identities, even when 
such behaviours and decisions appear more rational. Policies that are at odds with 
national identity create domestic conflict and weaken decision makers‘ legitimacy at 
home. 
As Ted Hopf (2002) argued, decision makers are embedded in social cognitive 
structures that are shaped by national identity. National identity and political elites 
(the decision makers par excellence) are mutually constitutive: the latter are 
influenced by, contribute to create and act based on the former (cf. Jepperson et al. 
1996: 51). Hence, determining dominant identity discourses is an essential 
component of national politics. At the domestic level, political elites vie for control 
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 For instance, the authority to determine the official discourses that constitute a state’s identity 
and interests (cf. Adler 1997: 336). 
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over the discursive power that is necessary to produce meaning and acquire 
legitimacy in a national group. However, their behaviour is also influenced by 
supranational structures. In particular, their foreign policy decisions are constrained 
and empowered by prevailing social practices both at home and abroad (Checkel 
1998: 343-344, Hopf 1998: 179-196).  
As previously argued, interaction with Others in the international arena is 
fundamental for national identity construction. Political elites at the highest level 
(such as heads of state or government, ministers of defence, economy and foreign 
affairs) are the main agents in this interaction. Their discourses matter most because 
they are formulated in institutional settings that are authoritative and conducive to 
persuasion (Checkel 2004: 240). The analysis in the following chapters offers one 
possible way of examining and interpreting these discourses, focusing on their social 
and identity roots. 
 
The complexity of identity construction: criticism of the 
Wendtian approach 
In order to refine the theoretical model that will be applied to this investigation, the 
most relevant criticism of the Wendtian approach to the study of international 
relations will be examined and integrated in the model. This criticism concerns 
primarily Wendt‘s lack of attention to the domestic level, his positivist approach, the 
complexity of the use of Others in identity construction and the necessity to take into 
account material factors in an identity-based theoretical model developed by 
Katzenstein et al. (1996). 
Maja Zehfuss (2001: 335-338) argued that Wendt‘s definition of identity is 
problematic because it lacks complexity and does not take into consideration 
domestic processes of articulation of state identity. According to Zehfuss, Wendt 
focused more on the boundaries of the Self than on its internal construction. He 
neglected identity construction at the domestic level to focus on social identities at 
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the systemic level (cf. Checkel 1998: 341).
21
 Zehfuss claimed that identity cannot be 
merely negotiated between states. Hence, the social construction of actors‘ identities 
must be studied at both the systemic and the domestic level. As Ted Hopf (1998: 
196) argued, any state identity in world politics reflects the social practices that 
constitute identity at home. Identity politics in the domestic arena enable and 
constrain identity, interests and actions abroad. 
Zehfuss also criticized Wendt‘s positivist approach. She claimed that the scientific 
identification of causal mechanisms cannot be applied to social sciences because 
identities are not logically bounded entities. They are continuously rearticulated and 
contested, they can be complex and multiple, which makes it difficult to use them as 
variables or as explanatory categories.
22
 Due to the nature and complexity of national 
identities, tracing direct causal links between them and foreign policy is not possible. 
The interaction and mutually constitutive relationship between national identities and 
foreign policy is best analysed as a fluid, multifaceted phenomenon, excluding rigid 
positivist methodological categorisations. 
In Wendt‘s theory, epistemological issues are compounded by ontological 
oversimplifications, such as those regarding the essence and role of the Other in 
national identity construction. Conventional constructivists tend to exaggerate the 
significance of threatening Others. Their theorization of a highly conflictual 
relationship between Self and threatening Others has become a source of inspiration 
for some realists too. Alastair Iain Johnston (1999) integrated the identity variable in 
a model that seeks to explain countries‘ realpolitik behaviour. According to Johnston, 
a perceived threat to the legitimacy of the Self‘s cohesion, organisation and values 
leads to an increase in the intensity of its identity. As a result of this, the Self adopts 
a more competitive behaviour towards the Other and reacts to the threat in a 
realpolitik fashion. For instance, the Self becomes more sensitive and reactive to the 
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 Wendt (1994: 387) hinted at the importance of the domestic level when he argued that states 
depend heavily on their society for political survival. However, he failed to follow up this argument 
with an in-depth analysis of the relevance of domestic politics. 
22
 As Fiona Adamson and Madeleine Demetriou (2007: 489-526) have shown, national identities can 
also acquire an extraterritorial dimension in the context of diasporas, with specific and distinct 
characteristics. 
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growth of the Others‘ relative material capabilities as the intensity of its identity 
increases. 
Johnston applied this model to explain Chinese reactions to the June 1989 protests in 
China, which the country‘s leadership portrayed as an American-led attempt to 
overthrow socialism and ―exterminate China‖ (1999: 295). Simultaneously to the 
increase in the intensity of Chinese identity discourses, Beijing raised its military 
expenditure and thus reacted in a realpolitik fashion to the perceived threat. 
Johnston‘s model offers an interesting perspective to explore the relationship 
between Chinese identity and foreign policy. However, it is marred by several 
fundamental weaknesses. It does not analyse identity in its complexity, but merely in 
terms of intensity. Furthermore, as Johnston acknowledged, there is no good 
indicator for the intensity of identity. He also conceded that Chinese realpolitik has 
deeper roots than the intensification of national identity after 1989. Furthermore, in 
his model identity construction is described exclusively as a process of ―devaluing 
external others and portraying the external environment as conflictual‖ (1999: 295). 
However, Richard Ned Lebow (2008) has shown that identity is not always 
constructed against or to exclude others. It can also form prior to the construction of 
the Other. In addition, the Other is not necessarily associated with negative 
stereotypes; positive interaction also occurs. As Ted Hopf (2002: 7) contended, 
identities are always relational (we understand them only by relating them to other 
identities) but only sometimes oppositional. Furthermore, Lebow (2008a: 473-492) 
convincingly argued that cultural and other differences can be overcome through 
assimilation and allegiance to a common humanity, which allows transcending the 
dichotomy between Self and Other. For instance, prominent German intellectuals 
such as Kant and Hegel constructed the German Self by incorporating crucial 
elements of the French Other (Lebow 2008: 12). Ancient Roman identity was also 
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Following Lebow‘s argument, Erik Gartzke and Kristian Gleditsch (2006) showed 
that culture and identity may influence international disputes in a way that runs 
counter to conventional beliefs. In a study on identity and conflict, they argued that 
conflict is more likely among states with closer cultural ties. Hopf (2002: 8) 
concurred with this argument and claimed that the most threatening Other is perhaps 
the closest Other, as it may be able to replace the Self more easily than any 
alternative. For instance, this consideration helps explain the Soviet Union‘s conflicts 
with communist China and Yugoslavia during the Cold War. Chinese and Yugoslav 
communists were condemned in Soviet discourses because they proposed a different 
way to the construction of state socialism, thereby challenging Moscow‘s primacy in 
the communist camp. 
Lebow (2008a: 476-486) conceded that abundant historical evidence highlights the 
construction of a stereotyped and negative Other in conjunction with national identity 
formation. He also stated explicitly that Russia was mostly treated as a cultural and 
political Other in the construction of European society. However, his warning against 
assuming that the Other always has negative connotations remains valid. Empirical 
studies have shown that Russia‘s role as a negative Other for Europe has often been 
exaggerated. Iver Neumann (1998: 67-80) has documented that Russia was portrayed 
as a liminal case of European identity during the last century: at times, Europeans 
perceived it as a threatening Other, but occasionally it was considered as a full and 
valuable member of the European family of nations. 
Both when Russia was constructed as a threatening Other and as part of the European 
Self, its considerable power in the international scene constituted an essential 
determinant of these constructions. Hence, as Ole Waever (2002) argued, both 
ideational and material factors must be taken into account in the analysis of the 
Self/Other dichotomy. The relationship between ideas and material factors is 
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 Conversely, groups or elements considered at the core of a community’s identity can lose their 
status and even become threatening Others. Shifting US colonists’ perceptions of Britain during the 
eighteenth century provide a good example in this respect (Lebow 2008a: 487-488). 
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dialectical. Material power acquires significance only in particular discursive 
constructions that define it as, for instance, threatening or not. As Waever (2002: 22) 
noted, Wendt neglected the material aspect, which turned his theoretical approach 
into a culturalist explanation for inertia and continuity. The Wendtian approach is 
therefore unable to explain material interests and the complexity of evolving foreign 
policy beyond historical narrative.  
 
A model for analysis: discursive relations between identity 
and foreign policy 
National foreign policy discourses can be studied through a theoretical framework 
that allows an investigation of how they mutually interact with national identity 
construction. Some recent research on this subject has relied on similar, 
constructivist models. In an edited volume on EU-Russia and German-Russian 
relations, Iver Neumann and Sergei Medvedev (2012: 13-18) argued that 
constructivist theory provides the missing link to bridge political practices with 
social identities. According to them, identity is a key precondition for foreign policy. 
The other essays in the volume focus on identity and cultural discourses, reciprocal 
historical perceptions and the implications of different national assessments of 
Russia for EU foreign policy (Krumm et al. 2012). 
In a milestone study of interpretive constructivist research, Ted Hopf (2002) 
analysed the domestic construction of Soviet and Russian identities and their impact 
on foreign policy, focusing on the years 1955 and 1999. Hopf‘s work shows that 
domestic identities allow for the understanding and formulation of strategic and 
economic interests. Identity discourses shaped Soviet leaders‘ understandings of 
other states and influenced their foreign policy moves, which in turn had an impact 
on the development of Soviet identity. Thus, deconstructing the national identity in 
which Soviet leaders were embedded and studying their discursive practices 
constitute fundamental preconditions to understand their foreign policy decisions. 
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A focus on the domestic level is essential also to assess the nature of European 
identity. Jeffrey Checkel (2006) argued that European identity is shaped by 
numerous domestic elements, including deeply entrenched social discourses. 
Political and societal debates largely originate and take place in national discursive 
arenas. For common policies to be agreed at the European level, national discourses 
need to be coherent among each other, so that national elites and public opinions 
share similar viewpoints concerning common policies (cf. Liu and Hilton 2005: 542). 
A constructivist approach to the study of European identity and policies should 
therefore integrate the European and the national levels of analysis (Checkel 2006: 
68-69). This work attempts to do this by assessing how national identity discourses 
interact and relate to each other in the European context.   
An adjusted version of the model elaborated by Katzenstein, Wendt and Jepperson 
and discussed above can be applied to investigate the relationship between national 
identities and foreign policy discourses on Russia. This relationship is best studied as 
the interaction of discursive formations, rather than as a causal concatenation of 
variables. The association between national identity and foreign policy discourses is 
complex, dialectical and mutually constitutive (cf. Prizel 1998: 12-37). Describing it 
as a unidirectional cause-effect relationship, where national identity determines 
foreign policy, oversimplifies reality. Foreign policy discourses reflect and in turn 
constitute the essence of national identity. National identity provides the cultural 
context for national interest formation and for a country‘s behaviour in the 
international arena. It is in turn influenced by international structures and by the 
pursuit of national interests therein. Hence, an updated model for this analysis would 
look as follows: 
 
Normative structures ↔ National identity ↔ Interests 
                                         ↕                        ↕                       ↕ 
             Foreign policy discourses on Russia 
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The arrows in the model represent mutually constitutive discursive relationships. 
Numerous identity and foreign policy discourses exist in each national context. The 
dissertation focuses on dominant official discourses formulated by heads of state or 
government and foreign ministers, as these actors are the main decision makers in the 
realm of foreign policy. Dominant media discourses are occasionally referred to in 
order to contextualise policy makers‘ statements and reconstruct the main Russia-
related themes in public debates. These debates influence the social cognitive 
structure in which policy makers are embedded and help understand the domestic 
roots of their discourses about Russia (cf. Hopf 2002: 20). 
Decision makers‘ agency, namely their capacity to act and influence dominant 
discourses and policies, is central to the model adopted for this analysis. As argued, 
national identity guides and constrains decision makers‘ choices. However, national 
leaders can also make selective and instrumental use of particular identity discourses 
in order to achieve specific foreign policy goals. For instance, decision makers who 
intend to strengthen economic relations with Russia will emphasise narratives 
portraying it as a good and reliable partner. Conversely, politicians who oppose the 
partnership with Russia, or who attempt to strengthen domestic consensus by 
constructing negative external Others, will rather stress identity discourses portraying 
it as threatening and unreliable.  
National identity and foreign policy narratives are studied both at the domestic level, 
in their process of national formation and contestation, and in their interaction with 
international structures. In this latter regard, the focus is on interaction with Russia 
and its construction as an Other in national identity. Russia is not considered a priori 
as a negative Other against which national identity is constructed. The investigation 
of national identities‘ historical construction shows that, occasionally, positive 
interaction between Russia and the three countries under analysis occurred in the 
past.
24
 Furthermore, the boundaries between Self and Other are treated as blurred and 
not as sharply delimited. For instance, in spite of their historical rivalry, post-1945 
Poland and Russia followed parallel paths of social and economic development, 
which are reflected in similar national identity discourses today (for example, those 
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 See chapter 4. 
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expressing a rejection of communism as a political model or emphasising the role of 
religion in society). 
While Russia is a significant Other for the three countries under investigation, it is by 
no means the only one. For a long historical period, France and Sweden were at least 
equally important Others for Germany and Finland respectively. Today, due to its 
double role as Other in the international arena and as the country of origin for 
millions of immigrants, Turkey may be an even more critical Other for Germany. 
Furthermore, Polish identity construction was affected by interaction with several 
significant Others, including Germans, Ukrainians, Lithuanians and Jews (Prizel 
1998: 38-152). Hence, the analysis of Russia‘s role as Other in Polish identity and 
foreign policy discourses has to take into consideration this tangled web and the fact 
that additional Others may often influence and even feature more prominently in 
these discourses. 
The theoretical model adopted in the dissertation investigates both the cultural and 
the material factors constituting national discourses on Russia within a constructivist 
framework. Material power acquires significance only within particular discursive 
constructions. For instance, Polish leaders may consider Russia‘s energy power both 
as a positive factor, as after the Polish-Russian agreement to build the Yamal-Europe 
pipeline in the early 1990s, and as a national threat, as shown by Warsaw‘s overt 
hostility to the German-Russian Nord Stream pipeline (cf. Prizel 1998: 132).
25
 Polish 
national identity, notably the construction of the Russian and German Other therein, 
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 See also Stephen Castle, “Poles angry at pipeline pact”, The Independent, 1 May 2006, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/poles-angry-at-pipeline-pact-476320.html 
(accessed 4/2/2013). 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that social constructivism provides the best theoretical 
approach to examine the relationship between national identity and foreign policy 
discourses. Following constructivist theory, national identity reflects historical 
relations with Russia and influences current foreign policy narratives in the countries 
under analysis. Conversely, neorealist and neoliberal approaches largely ignore the 
importance of identity and interaction with the Other in the formulation of foreign 
policy discourses. Building on the insights of positivist constructivist scholarship 
from the 1990s and its subsequent criticism, the chapter developed an interpretive 
constructivist model for the ensuing empirical analysis.  
In the model, identity is conceptualised as a multifaceted and fluctuating construct, 
hard to measure or quantify. Its relationship with foreign policy is best studied as the 
interaction of discourses, both at the domestic level (where foreign policy is 
formulated) and in the international arena. This relationship is complex and mutually 
constitutive. Concretely, this means that national identity narratives are both shaped 
by and influence discursive interaction with Russia. 
The relationship between national identity and top national leaders, the primary 
agents in foreign policy making, is also mutually constitutive. The leaders of a 
country are embedded in social cognitive structures shaped by national identity. 
Hence, they are reluctant to enact policies that do not conform to it. However, as they 
are also the main agents in the construction of national identity, they sometimes 
develop new narratives that complement and further develop dominant identity 
discourses. This in turn contributes to explaining the malleability of national identity. 
The focus on the discursive level allows for the inclusion of material factors and 
power in the model. These are analysed as important constituents of discursive 
constructions that have a dialectical relationship with ideational factors. For instance, 
this means that Russia‘s energy power can acquire different significance (as a threat 
or as a driver of trade with Moscow) depending on how Russia is constructed in 
national identity and in dominant discourses. 
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Most importantly, while interaction with the Other is considered an essential element 
in national identity formation, the Other is not defined a priori as antitethical to the 
Self. Positive interaction between Self and Other is possible, leading to the reciprocal 
assimilation of cultural practices. As the following chapters show, this is true also for 
relations between Russia and the countries under investigation. This theoretical 
approach therefore allows for a more nuanced study of Russia‘s role in national 
identity and foreign policy discourses in the countries under analysis. 
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Chapter 3: Applying discourse-historical analysis: 
methodology and research design  
 
Introduction 
This chapter outlines the methodology that was adopted to investigate the research 
questions and apply the theoretical framework presented in the previous sections. 
The main issues addressed are: what is critical discourse analysis and how can its 
discourse-historical variant be applied to the study of foreign policy discourses? How 
are case studies and national discursive arenas selected for this study? What are the 
main methodological issues in the selection of sources and case studies? Are the 
dissertation‘s findings reliable and generalisable? 
The chapter begins by defining the concept of discourse and introducing the main 
aspects of critical discourse analysis. It then presents a detailed discussion of the 
discourse-historical approach and of its application to the study of foreign policy 
makers‘ discourses. Subsequently, the selection of three national discursive arenas 
and of three case studies for the investigation of official narratives concerning Russia 
is outlined and justified. The rationale behind the selection of sources and the 
timeframe of the study are also presented. The last sections of the chapter include a 
discussion on the reliability and generalisability of findings and address the main 
methodological issues encountered in this research. 
 
Discourse analysis and the discourse-historical approach 
Discourse analysis is the methodology used in this study to investigate German, 
Polish and Finnish discourses on Russia.  ―Discourse‖ is defined as a form of social 
practice, a specific type of language use in social interaction, both in speech and in 
writing. Discourses are socially constructed and have a mutually constitutive 
relationship with social structures. Discursive practices contribute to sustaining, 
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reproducing and transforming social structures. They reflect and affect power 
relations through their representation of the world. No discourse can be fully 
understood without taking into account the context in which it was produced; it is 
meaningful only in its cultural, historical and ideological embedding (Wodak 1996: 
14-19).  
Most important for the purpose of this study, a country‘s identity discourses and their 
relationship with external Others are of essential relevance to the formulation of 
foreign policy (Waever 2005: 35). As Ruth Wodak (2002a: 66) has noted, a 
dialectical relationship exists between discursive practices and the field of action in 
which they are embedded. Accordingly, policy makers‘ discourses on Russia affect 
their country‘s foreign policy towards Russia. Discursive practices are constructed 
domestically in hegemonic struggles for political and moral-intellectual leadership. 
They are instrumental in perpetuating, justifying or transforming national identities. 
They also involve the formation of social antagonism, most notably the exclusion of 
threatening Others. Discourses about external Others - like all discourses - are fluid 
and should be studied as flexible, historically-bound constructs. Hegemonic 
discourses become dislocated when they prove unable to explain new events (de 
Cilla et al 1999: 157, Torfing 2005: 15-16). 
Discourse analysis, particularly its discourse-historical approach, offers the best 
methodological framework to study national discourses on Russia and their 
relationship to foreign policy in their evolving, historical dimension. Discourse 
analysis is an interpretive and explanatory methodology that systematically reduces 
the number of possible readings of a text by identifying its cultural and historical 
embedding. It deconstructs texts and relates them to their social and ideological 
background (Wodak 1996: 19). Critical discourse analysis investigates social 
processes from which texts originate and within which social actors create meanings, 
with the aim of exposing power relations and changing discursive structures.  
Three concepts are essential in critical discourse analysis: power, ideology and 
history (Wodak 2002: 3). In discourse theory, power is defined as ―the political acts 
of inclusion and exclusion that shape social meanings and identities and condition 
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the construction of social antagonisms and political frontiers‖ (Torfing 2005: 23). 
Power rests in the hands of social groups that formulate dominant discourses and can 
thus demarcate the boundaries of identity. This means that power and identity 
discourse are intrinsically linked. As discourse is shaped by dominant social 
structures and groups, it reflects their ideology. The role of ideology, meant as the 
system of political and cultural beliefs of an actor, must therefore be recognised and 
deconstructed in discourse analysis (van Dijk 2002: 117, Wodak 2002: 3). 
Critical discourse analysis has a contextual and historicist view of discourses. It 
seeks to place them against their historical background in order to understand how 
they evolve and to investigate political attempts at restructuring them (Torfing 2005: 
14). The discourse-historical approach, which is the variant of critical discourse 
analysis adopted in this study, pays particular attention to the historical dimension of 
discourse. By integrating knowledge about the historical sources and the background 
in which discursive events are embedded, it provides a comprehensive interpretation. 
Accordingly, the analysis of Russia‘s role in German, Polish and Finnish national 
identity formation in chapter 4 serves the purpose of delineating the historical 
framework of current discourses on Russia. Furthermore, discourse-historical 
analysis explores how discourses are subject to diachronic change. Hence, the 
historical background is studied as a factor affecting the development of discourses 
over time (Wodak 2002a: 65; cf. de Cilla et al. 156). 
The discourse-historical approach is interdisciplinary, as it draws on the methods and 
thematic focus of both political science and history. It is problem-oriented, because it 
focuses on specific social themes (in this study, the role of Russia as Other in 
national identity and foreign policy discourses) and not exclusively on linguistic 
issues, as is the case with other discourse analytical approaches. It is applicable to 
different genres of text, including political speeches and newspaper interviews, 
which are the main primary sources for this dissertation. Texts and discourses are not 
studied in isolation; relationships with other texts (intertextuality) and discourses 
(interdiscursivity) are also investigated (Wodak 2002a: 69-70).  
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Most of the textual work involves tracing the development of a few key concepts and 
themes, including their historical origins and relationship to other subjects (cf. 
Waever 2005: 36). Key concepts and themes identify semantic macrostructures that 
play a fundamental role in communication and interaction. They reflect what a 
discourse is about globally speaking and exemplify its most important information 
(van Dijk 2002: 101-102). Identifying key concepts is crucial because they epitomise 
the gist of discourses, namely the essence that an audience retains from a discourse. 
Language users are unable to memorise and process all meanings in a discourse; they 
reorganise them into a few global meanings. Key themes are often explicit in titles, 
headlines or summaries of a text. Sometimes they are not observable directly, but can 
be inferred through a careful analysis of the text (van Dijk 2002: 102, Wodak 2002a: 
66). 
The process of identifying key themes in a text is affected by the subjectivity of the 
analyst and involves the risk that different analysts detect different themes in the 
same text. However, this risk can be minimised by examining a large number of texts 
and by using the background knowledge acquired from the investigation of relevant 
scholarly literature. Dominant themes should be clearly detectable in many texts, if 
they are indeed dominant. Furthermore, the texts chosen for analysis must be 
formulated by individuals with sufficient discursive and societal power to construct 
dominant discourses. For instance, they can be speeches of key policy makers or 
articles in mainstream newspapers with a broad readership.  
Undoubtedly, there is no single reading of texts and diverging selections of key 
themes are possible also if the number of primary sources under analysis is large. 
However, the deconstruction of numerous and authoritative texts will at the very 
least offer sufficient data for a plausible interpretation of key themes. In this work, 
the plausibility of the interpretation is augmented by the fact that it is guided by and 
can be confronted with the findings of existing scholarly literature on national 
identity and discourses on Russia. 
As Teun van Dijk has noted, no complete discourse analysis is possible, as a 
thorough examination of even a short passage may require months and hundreds of 
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pages of explanation. However, a satisfactory investigation of key themes in 
discourses can be performed if specific structures are selected for closer analysis, 
namely the ones that are most relevant for the study of the main research question 
(van Dijk 2002: 99). Accordingly, in this work the focus will be restricted to the 
textual extracts concerning descriptions and interpretations of Russia‘s domestic and 
foreign policy, with particular reference to the construction of the Nord Stream 
pipeline and Russia‘s international energy policy, the August 2008 war between 
Russia and Georgia and the post-electoral street demonstrations in the main Russian 
cities in 2011 and 2012. 
Critical discourse analysis usually involves a normative dimension. It is often applied 
to study social problems and the role of discourse in producing power abuse or 
domination by scholars who are keen on unmasking and modifying existing power 
relations (van Dijk 2002: 96, Wodak 2002a: 70). The pragmatic potential of the 
methodology is one of its most interesting and useful aspects, but is not a conditio 
sine qua non for its application. In particular, discourse-historical analysis allows an 
exploration of the cultural and historical roots of dominant discourses, but does not 
necessarily require a normative approach aimed at changing dominance relations. 
Accordingly, this work focuses on the construction of discourses on Russia and their 
relationship with foreign policy making, without advising on how to change them. 
The main aim is that of exposing the different nature of discourses on Russia in 
European countries, as well as the deep identity and historical roots of such 
differences. Pragmatic and policy-oriented considerations are left to the subjective 
interpretation of readers. 
 
Discourse-historical analysis in practice 
The methodology adopted in the dissertation is based on Wodak (2002a). Its main 
features are summarised in the table below. 
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Table 3. The main features of discourse-historical analysis 
The Discourse-Historical Approach 
Based on interpretation/hermeneutics 
Problem-oriented 
Interdisciplinary 
Historical context analysed and integrated into the interpretation of texts and 
discourses 
Moves back and forth from theories to empirical data 
Investigates intertextual and interdiscursive relationships 
Focuses on multiple genres of text 
Incorporates fieldwork and ethnography 
 
Source: own compilation, based on Wodak (2002a) 
 
Wodak starts from the observation that causal models do not match the complexity of 
the real world. In order to provide a thorough reading of multicausal and mutually 
constitutive phenomena, such as the relationship between national identity and 
foreign policy discourses, researchers have to rely on their knowledge and 
interpretive skills. As Wodak (2002a: 65) argues, the researcher ―makes use of her or 
his background and contextual knowledge and embeds the communicative or 
interactional structures of a discursive event in a wider frame of social and political 
relations, processes and circumstances‖. 
Furthermore, Wodak states that only interdisciplinary research can make complex 
social relationships transparent. Following this approach, the dissertation combines 
International Relations theory with discourse theory and historical analysis to 
perform an in-depth investigation of national discourses concerning Russia. Social 
constructivist theory and historical analysis are applied throughout the empirical part 
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of the thesis in order to substantiate the interpretation of discourses. The historical 
dimension of discursive actions and the social and political background in which 
discursive events are embedded are integrated in the analysis. 
Wodak also suggests incorporating fieldwork and ethnography, whenever possible, 
in order to explore the subject under investigation from a closer perspective. Due to 
the time constraints of this research, this was done only partially and with the sole 
purpose of acquiring background for the historical and textual analysis. Fieldwork 
included an investigation of how the German, Polish and Finnish nations, as well as 
their historical relationship with Russia, are portrayed in the main history museums 
in the respective national capitals. Table 4 below lists the museums where fieldwork 
took place. 
 
Table 4. Museums where national identity construction was analysed 
Location Museum 
Berlin, Germany  German Historical Museum (Deutsches Historisches 
Museum) 
 German-Russian Museum (Deutsch-Russisches Museum) 
Warsaw, Poland 
 Warsaw Uprising Museum (Muzeum Powstania 
Warszawskiego) 
 Museum of Independence (Muzeum Niepodległości) 
 Museum of the Polish Army (Muzeum Wojska Polskiego) 
Helsinki, Finland  National Museum of Finland (Suomen kansallismuseo) 
 
Source: own compilation 
 
While the examination of narratives presented in these museums provided useful 
background material, the analysis of national identity construction and of historical 
discourses on Russia is based mostly on secondary literature. Relying on secondary 
sources could be methodologically problematic, as some of their findings may be 
debatable and require further research. However, a study of the construction of three 
national identities across centuries based entirely on primary sources is beyond the 
scope of this work. Furthermore, issues related to the reliability of secondary 
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literature can be tackled by including different conceptual histories and by verifying 
the quality of their primary analysis. This can be done through the examination of a 
few key primary texts to which secondary sources refer and a subsequent comparison 
of the researcher‘s reading with the one presented by the conceptual history (cf. 
Hansen 2006: 84). 
The investigation of secondary literature serves the purpose of identifying dominant 
discourses on Russia over time, which helps situate current discourses within a 
broader historical framework. Most importantly, it provides in-depth background 
information and hence a solid foundation for the ensuing interpretive textual 
analysis. As Lene Hansen (2006: 83) argues 
 
[…] the writing of good discourse analysis of primary texts requires 
knowledge of the case in question, and knowledge comes, in part, from 
reading standard works on the history, processes, events and debates 
constituting a foreign policy phenomenon.  
 
Furthermore, the analysis of secondary literature complements the interpretive 
theoretical framework outlined in the previous chapter, which requires thorough 
historical and contextual grounding (cf. Hansen 2006: 10-11).  
After examining the secondary literature, I set out to analyse primary sources, 
starting from the research sub-question: are historically constructed images of Russia 
influential in current national foreign policy discourses and, if yes, how? To address 
the question, I proceed as follows for each text under analysis. First, I sample 
information concerning the immediate context of the text: who is the author? When 
was the text produced? Which contemporary events does it make reference to? What 
is the target audience? Relevant political, historical and sociological background is 
incorporated in the analysis. 
The text genre is also discussed, as it may provide important indications on how the 
text should be read. For instance, a speech delivered by a foreign minister in front of 
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an audience of diplomats is likely to be much more cautious in terms of wording and 
judgements expressed than a pre-election speech or a newspaper interview. 
Following Hansen (2006: 86), both highly formal texts and texts with more clear 
articulations of identity are included in the analysis, reflecting the broad spectrum of 
genres in foreign policy discourse. 
Once this preliminary and background information on the text has been acquired, I 
identify dominant discourses. In order to detect dominant discourses, their essential 
constituents are traced in texts: recurrent arguments, the corresponding semantic 
structures (the use of specific verbs, nouns and adjectives to construct meaning) and 
the logical outcome of an argument in terms of policy making. For instance, in the 
case study on Nord Stream, recurrent claims about the importance of energy relations 
with Russia, its construction as a ―reliable‖ and ―indispensable‖ partner and frequent 
statements supporting the building of the pipeline clearly highlighted the dominant 
German discourse.
26
 I also explore interdiscursivity and intertextuality. Based on the 
dominant discourses, I formulate research questions specific to the text and to its 
linguistic constructions. Questions generally asked are: how is Russia defined 
linguistically (with what adjectives, images, metaphors or other figures of speech)? 
What does Russia do in these discourses, that is, how is Russia presented as an actor? 
With texts that have a normative dimension, I ask: in the speaker‘s opinion, how is 
Russia to be addressed? 
The next step concerns the analysis of discursive strategies and of specific linguistic 
markers that constitute dominant themes and discourses (see also table 5 below). By 
discursive strategies I mean systematic ways of using the language, including 
argumentation strategies, in order to achieve a particular social, political, 
psychological or linguistic aim (Wodak 2002a: 73). Membership categorisations in 
order to construct in-groups and out-groups are examples of discursive strategies. For 
instance, peoples are categorised as Europeans and non-Europeans with cultural or 
geographic arguments, with the use of figures of speech such as metaphors (asserting 
that something is the same as an otherwise unrelated object) or synecdoches (when a 
term for a part of something is used to refer to the whole or vice versa; for instance, 
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calling Russia ―Asia‖). Other discursive strategies such as predication (defining the 
action, state or quality of the subject) are used to label social actors in positive or 
negative terms. For instance, the previously mentioned category of non-Europeans 
can be labelled with stereotypical attributions of positive or negative traits. In the 
texts under analysis, for example, Russia was labelled alternatively as ―strategic 
partner‖, ―a threat‖, ―a friendly neighbour‖ and ―inherently imperialistic‖. 
Perspectivation, namely the ways speakers contextualise their perspectives and show 
their relevance to the interpretation of a fact, is another frequently used discursive 
strategy. It aims at expressing involvement and positioning the speaker's point of 
view through, for instance, the reporting of an event that the speaker witnessed and 
on which he or she claims to have inside knowledge. Out of all discursive strategies, 
argumentation is possibly the most fundamental. It is used to justify positive or 
negative attributions and to bolster the main message or purpose of a text. 
Argumentation can be studied through an analysis of topoi, namely content-related 
parts of the argumentation that connect the arguments with their logical conclusion 
(Wodak 2002a: 74).  
For instance, in one of the texts analysed the speaker advocated engaging Russia (as 
opposed to marginalising it) and argued that his country (Finland) and Europe would 
obtain economic and security benefits out of cooperation.
27
 He also claimed that 
engaging Russia would have positive effects for the preservation of the Baltic Sea 
and allow his country to fulfil its historical role of bridge builder between Europe 
and Russia. His conclusion was that adequate policies should be taken in order to 
make sure that cooperation takes place. The topoi connecting his arguments and 
conclusion are economic usefulness, security, environmentalism and history, namely 
all the semantic and argumentative fields leading to the conclusion that adequate 
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 Ilkka Kanerva’s speech at the Norwegian Nobel Institute, 22 January 2008, 
http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=108314 (accessed 29/5/2014). 
28
 For a selection of topoi frequently used in discourses, cf. Wodak (2002a: 74). 
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Table 5. Discursive strategies: objectives and devices 
Strategy Objectives Devices 
Nomination/ 
Categorisation 
Construct in-groups (Self) 
and out-groups (Other) 
Inclusive or exclusive metaphors 
and synecdoches  
Predication Label social actors in positive 
or negative terms 
Stereotypical evaluations and 
attributions of negative or 
positive traits 
Perspectivation Expressing involvement and 
positioning the speaker‘s 
point of view 
Personal and strongly subjective 
reporting of an event 
Argumentation Justify positive or negative 
attributions; bolster the main 
message in a text 
Topoi connecting arguments to 
their logical conclusion 
 
Source: own compilation, based on Wodak (2002a) 
 
Once dominant discourses and themes, discursive strategies, linguistic markers and 
topoi have been identified, I interpret the meanings resulting from the analysis and, 
with reference to my theoretical model, I address the research questions. After 
comparing across texts and discourses, I make an extensive interpretation concerning 
the role of national identity and of historically constructed images of Russia in the 
text analysed, thereby assessing their relevance to current foreign policy discourses. 
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Table 6. Steps in the application of the discourse-historical approach 
Applying Discourse-Historical Analysis 
1. Analysis of secondary literature and identification of dominant themes in national 
identity and historical discourses on Russia 
2. Sampling of information on the immediate context of the text (author, target 
audience, events referred to), including its political, historical and sociological 
background 
3. Analysis of text genre 
4. Identification of dominant discourses and themes in the text 
5. Analysis of interdiscursivity and intertextuality 
6. Formulation of text-specific research questions, focussing on linguistic 
constructions 
7. Analysis of discursive strategies and linguistic markers (topoi) 
8. Interpretation of the meanings resulting from the analysis with reference to the 
theoretical model adopted in the dissertation 
9. Based on the analysis of all texts, an extensive interpretation is made concerning 
the role of national identity and historically constructed images of Russia in foreign 
policy discourses 
Source: own compilation, based on Wodak (2002a) 
 
Which discourses? Selection of national discursive arenas 
and case studies 
The selection of case studies for this analysis involves two aspects. Firstly, due to the 
impossibility of investigating national identity construction and discourses on Russia 
in all EU member states within the scope of this work, a few national discursive 
arenas have been selected for in-depth study. Secondly, specific policy areas and 
events have been chosen for the analysis and comparison of national discourses on 
Russia. 
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The discussion of distinct East-Central European narratives concerning Russia in 
chapter 1 highlighted the dangers of assuming the existence of a homogenous EU 
discursive arena. As Iver Neumann (1998) has shown, occasionally it is possible to 
identify similar discourses on Russia across European countries, particularly in 
intellectual circles, which constitute the main subject of Neumann‘s analysis. 
However, a thorough investigation must take into account the national level. The 
history of the European continent is profoundly divided along national lines and 
European countries had remarkably different relations with Russia, which 
presupposes different national discourses. 
Geography and history, particularly the nature of political relations in the past, are 
the main discriminants when examining the interaction between European countries 
and Russia. These two factors are closely interlinked. States that are closer to 
Russia‘s borders also tend to have deeper and more complex historical relations with 
Russia than those that are located further away. There are exceptions to this 
observation: despite its considerable distance from Russia, Britain had intense and 
controversial relations with it from the early nineteenth century until the present, 
mostly due to the two countries‘ great power status and geopolitical competition (cf. 
Ewans 2004, Keith 2006, Siegel 2002). However, this exception does not apply to 
most other West and South European countries. Their historical involvement with 
Russia was much more limited than that of Central and East European states. 
In order to explore the relationship between identity and foreign policy discourses on 
Russia, this work considers national case studies that both had deep historical 
interactions with Russia and are geographically close to it. This is likely to produce 
results that are more relevant analytically and that can be compared more easily. The 
dissertation does not systematically preselect the countries under analysis in order to 
show that national identity has a strong correlation with foreign policy discourses. A 
large body of constructivist literature has already shown that this correlation exists.
29
 
The central questions in the dissertation are more specific: how does this correlation 
manifest itself in selected European countries with regard to Russia? Can European 
foreign policy discourses thus constructed be reconciled at the European level? 
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Since the focus is on the relationship between national identity and discourses on 
Russia, it is best to select countries where Russia is likely to have played a role in 
national identity construction, hence those geographically close to and with deep 
historical interactions with Russia.  Furthermore, as we want to compare different 
foreign policy discourses within the European Union, it is fundamental to focus on 
member states which traditionally have a different foreign policy stance towards 
Russia. The analysis can thus explore how national identity constructions where 
Russia played a role are related to different national foreign policy discourses. 
Conversely, if the investigation focused on countries chosen for their geographical 
spread, it would risk coming to the tautological conclusion that national identity is an 
important factor in foreign policy discourses on Russia only or mostly in states that 
are closer to it. Geography, and not national identity, would likely be the main or the 
only motivational factor.  
This explains why large and influential EU member states such as France, Italy or 
Spain were not included in the analysis. A preliminary consultation of secondary 
sources confirmed that Russia did not play an important role in their national identity 
construction (cf. Bedani and Haddock 2000, Boyd 1997, Gildea 2002 and 2002a, 
Isnenghi 2010, Kamen 2008, Nora 1992). Their cooperative, largely unproblematic 
relations with Moscow are mostly the result of commercial interests, rather than of 
deeply engrained identity narratives (cf. Leonard and Popescu 2007: 31-36). 
Investigating foreign policy discourses in one of these countries could be useful to 
highlight how, by contrast with EU member states that are closer and had deeper 
historical interactions with Russia, national identity and memory do not hamper 
current relations. However, this analysis is beyond the scope of the dissertation, 
which focuses on how different constructions of Russia in national identity influence 
foreign policy discourses. Furthermore, examining more than three national 
discursive arenas in some depth was not possible within the constraints of this work.  
Germany, Poland and Finland have been selected as focus for this analysis because 
they best satisfy the analytical criteria outlined above. Tsarist and Soviet Russia was 
a neighbouring power for most of their modern history, which is still true of Poland 
and Finland today. Russia and Germany shared a border from 1871 (1815, if we 
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consider Prussia as Wilhelmine Germany‘s predecessor) until 1918 and again in 
1939-1941. Although there was no shared border during the Cold War, the presence 
of Soviet troops and political advisors throughout East-Central Europe and in East 
Germany practically meant that Soviet Russia was for Germans both a neighbouring 
and an occupying power from 1945 until the early 1990s. The three countries under 
consideration had deep and controversial historical relations with Russia during their 
modern history, including several armed clashes and the occupation of part of their 
territory by Russian or Soviet troops.
30
 We can thus assume that Russia played a role 
in national identity construction. This assumption is verified through a review of 
secondary literature in chapter 4. 
Furthermore, the countries selected for analysis are particularly active in current 
relations with Russia, both at bilateral level and within the European Union. Their 
actorness vis-à-vis Russia contributes to making them interesting and relevant case 
studies. Within the EU, Germany has had a leading role in shaping energy policy 
towards Russia, which is the most significant commercial and security element of the 
EU-Russia relationship (cf. Högselius 2013). Poland has been one of the most active 
member states in advocating policies concerning the EU‘s and Russia‘s shared 
neighbourhood in Eastern Europe. For instance, it was one of the main supporters of 
the Eastern Partnership, a policy that aims to intensify the EU‘s relations with post-
Soviet countries in Europe (excluding Russia). Finland has been the main promoter 
of the EU‘s Northern Dimension, a framework to address environmental and health 
issues in border areas between Russia and North European EU member states 
(Stewart 2012: 186-187; cf. Haukkala 2010: 152-156). 
Although all countries under analysis had controversial relations with Russia in the 
past, their current foreign policy stance towards Moscow differs considerably. 
German foreign policy makers tend to be less critical and more positive about 
Russia, whereas Polish leaders often have overtly hostile overtones (cf. Krumm 
2012a: 122-123, Reeves 2010). Within the European Union, Germany and Poland 
epitomise the member states‘ two main and contrasting approaches to Russia 
(Stewart 2012: 165). The German approach tends towards accommodating Russia 
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and is followed by West and Central European member states such as France, Italy, 
Spain and Austria. The Polish approach is much more sceptical towards Russia and 
is generally followed by East-Central European member states (particularly the 
Baltic States), occasionally joined by Britain and Sweden. The Finnish position is 
somewhere in between and reflects an apparently neutral pragmatism (cf. Etzold and 
Haukkala 2011: 253-254, Stewart 2012: 187). These divergences may be due to 
dissimilar ways of internalising historical experiences in national identities or to the 
different nuances of past and current bilateral relations with Russia. Hence, a detailed 
analysis of Russia‘s role in national identity construction and of the broader picture 
of bilateral relations is a precondition for the study of current discourses on Russia.  
In order to have a common basis for analysis, the dissertation focuses on national 
policy makers‘ discourses on Russia concerning three major international and 
domestic events in which the Kremlin was directly involved between 2005 and 2012. 
These include the construction of the Nord Stream pipeline (which was announced in 
September 2005), the 2008 Russian-Georgian war and the post-electoral street 
protests that took place in Russian cities from December 2011 until the late spring of 
2012. This selection of events allows studying discourses on Russia in three areas 
that are of utmost relevance to the relationship between the European Union and 
Russia: the security of Russian energy supplies to the EU, the stability of the shared 




Arguably, other international events and Russian domestic developments may have 
provided interesting case studies. For instance, a focus on discourses about the US 
plan to deploy a ballistic missile defence system in East-Central Europe would allow 
to explore different German and Polish perceptions of Russia in the field of 
security.
32
 Nonetheless, this topic was not selected as a case study because it was not 
of direct relevance for Finland. In addition, national security debates concerning 
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 These three policy fields are also emphasised in the EU’s Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013 for the 
Russian Federation, under the heading “Objectives of EU cooperation with Russia”, pp. 4-6; 
http://eeas.europa.eu/russia/docs/2007-2013_en.pdf (accessed 23/6/2013). 
32
 The plan was strongly opposed by Moscow and led to disagreement between the German and 
Polish governments; cf. “Europeans split over U.S. missile defence plans”,  Arms Control Today, April 
2007, http://www.armscontrol.org/print/2333 (accessed 2/10/2014).  
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Russia are examined also in the chapter on the Russian-Georgian war. Narratives 
about Dmitry Medvedev‘s modernisation agenda would offer further material to 
analyse the reception of key Russian domestic developments in the countries under 
investigation. However, by the time the empirical research for the dissertation began 
(late 2012), the modernisation agenda no longer seemed a priority for the Russian 
government.
33
 The authoritarian shift following the Russian parliamentary elections 
of December 2011 appeared as a more topical domestic development; the relevant 
national debates were therefore selected for in-depth analysis. 
The empirical chapters focus on narratives about events that took place in the 
European context. Discourses about Russia‘s involvement in non-European issues, 
such as the negotiations on Iran‘s nuclear programme and the Syrian civil war, could 
be analysed to assess how identities influence perceptions of Russia‘s role in the 
global arena. While this is a promising avenue for further research, the decision was 
made to focus on policy issues that are of immediate relevance to EU-Russia 
relations. The events under investigation were among the most controversial issues in 
EU-Russia relations since Vladimir Putin‘s rise to power in 1999. In the three 
countries selected for analysis, they sparked lively debates on the nature of Russia‘s 
domestic and foreign policies. These debates offer an ideal context to identify 
dominant national narratives concerning Russia‘s political system and international 
posture. If the theoretical model outlined in the previous chapter holds, dominant 
discourses will reflect the main national identity constituents and deep-rooted 
national perceptions of Russia.  
In order to compare national narratives on Russia in the EU discursive arena, the 
dissertation also investigates German, Polish and Finnish leaders‘ discourses during 
their countries‘ most recent EU presidency. The presidency of the European Union 
constituted an opportunity for national leaders to advance their country‘s priorities in 
the EU foreign policy agenda. Consequently, speeches held by leaders of the rotating 
presidency are ideal sources to examine the transposition of national narratives on 
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 See chapter 7 and Stefan Meister, “The failure of managed modernisation”, DGAP Standpunkt 14, 
9 December 2011, https://dgap.org/en/think-tank/publications/dgapviewpoint/failure-managed-
modernization (accessed 2/10/2014). 
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Russia in the EU discursive arena. The study of these texts also allows a comparison 
of national discourses within an EU institutional context. 
 
Types of discourses and source selection 
The dissertation analyses public texts, mostly speeches and interviews of top state 
officials (heads of state or government and foreign ministers) recorded in electronic 
archives of national foreign ministries and in prominent national newspapers. The 
choice of focusing on public texts, as opposed to private or internal documents, is 
motivated primarily by the theoretical foundations of the dissertation. The 
contestation among different national identity discourses and narratives on Russia 
takes place in the public sphere, where their advocates compete for dominance. 
Hence, the dissertation attempts to identify official discourses that are dominant 
there. Discourse analysis is the best methodology for this investigation because it 
focuses on public texts (Waever 2002). 
Focusing on public texts and discourses is a key methodological advantage when 
studying foreign policy. In foreign policy making, a lot tends to be hidden and every 
interpretation of an actor‘s actions and speeches may be subject to questions such as: 
is this what the actor really thinks, or is it just the image that he or she intends to 
convey in public? Actors‘ thoughts, motives and secret intentions would be 
extremely difficult to determine without privileged access to a wide range of reliable 
private sources and people acquainted with the actors in question. As Ole Waever 
(2002: 26) convincingly argued,  
 
If one sticks rigorously to the level of discourse, the logic of the 
argument remains much more clear – one works on public, open sources 
and uses them for what they are, not as indicators of something else. 
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Therefore, the main focus of research is not what actors really believe, but what 
arguments and linguistic codes they use in public and what discourses become 
widely shared or dominant in the public arena. These discourses have practical 
relevance, as they condition possible policies. Policy is strongly related to discursive 
structures because decision makers need to be able to justify policy choices in public 
and reconcile them with the state‘s self-image (Waever 2002: 27). 
Focusing exclusively on discourses of top state officials may result in an analysis that 
does not reflect all the complexities involved in identity construction and the 
formulation of foreign policy. Other actors at lower levels in the power chain or civil 
society also play a role in shaping identity and foreign policy discourses. Business 
and other advocacy groups (such as religious, environmental and pacifist 
organisations) lobby governments to take foreign policy decisions that conform with 
their economic or social objectives. Scholarly literature (cf. Adler 1992, Davis Cross 
2013, Haas 1992 and 2004, Sebenius 1992, Zito 2001) has highlighted in particular 
the role of epistemic communities in influencing decision makers. 
Epistemic communities are networks of professionals with recognised expertise and 
policy-relevant knowledge in a particular area. The members of an epistemic 
community share a set of normative and causal beliefs, which shape their analysis of 
possible policy actions and desired outcomes. Overarching agreement on policies is 
an essential prerequisite for a group of experts to be considered as part of the same 
epistemic community. Prominent think tanks, regulatory agencies or governmental 
policy research bodies provide ideal locations for members of an epistemic 
community to gain leverage over policy choices. Former political leaders, diplomats, 
judges, high-ranking military officials, bankers and international lawyers often 
become part of these expert groups and use their prestige and expertise to influence 
decision makers (Davis Cross 2013: 155-159, Haas 1992: 2-4). 
Epistemic communities are more likely to be persuasive if decision makers are 
confronted with salient issues and are uncertain about future developments (for 
instance, in the wake of a crisis) or if they are unhappy about past policies and are 
trying to develop new ones. Access to top policy makers and the ability to influence 
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the initial terms of the debate (rather than only its final stages) contribute to the 
persuasiveness of an epistemic community (Davis Cross 2013: 144). According to 
Emanuel Adler (1992), US defence experts that argued for arms control in the 1960s 
and 1970s constitute an example of a successful and persuasive epistemic 
community. Their theorisations about international cooperation became the basis for 
Washington‘s negotiations with the Soviet Union and eventually led to the signature 
of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty between the US and the USSR in 1972. Haas 
(2004) cites the network of economists spreading the ideas of Keynesianism as an 
instance of influential transnational epistemic community. 
In the countries under investigation, prominent think tanks that work closely with 
national governments – such as the German Institute for International and Security 
Affairs, the Centre for Eastern Studies in Poland and the Finnish Institute of 
International Affairs – are likely to influence the decision-making process 
concerning relations with Russia. To cite only a few examples regarding Germany, 
former political leaders such as Gerhard Schröder, Joschka Fischer and Helmut 
Schmidt and national advocacy groups that have strong commercial interests in 
Russia (such as the Ost-Ausschuss der deutschen Wirtschaft) have been particularly 
vocal in the debate on German-Russian relations (cf. Meister 2014).  
In order to have a more complete picture of all national identity and foreign policy 
narratives, the discourses of epistemic communities, advocacy groups and civil 
society organisations would have to be investigated. However, covering three whole 
national discursive spaces is practically impossible and a bias towards a selected 
category of actors is inevitable. Within these constraints, the choice of focusing on 
discourses of leading state officials is motivated by the fact that they are the main 
foreign policy actors. Furthermore, through their media and discursive power they 
steer relevant public debates and largely define the cognitive structures within which 
other people argue (Waever 2002: 42). 
The sources selected for this analysis are essentially excerpts of these public debates. 
They are policy makers‘ interviews targeted to a broad audience or transcripts of 
policy makers‘ speeches held in meetings with other state officials and with civil 
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society. All of them were publicly and freely accessible at the time when the 
empirical research for the dissertation was performed. They can be thought of as 
snapshots of dominant discursive constructions concerning national identity, foreign 
policy and relations with Russia.  
The electronic archives of the Finnish, German and Polish foreign ministries proved 
essential to retrieve foreign ministers‘ speeches. Additional sources were 
investigated for transcripts of speeches and interviews given by other top state 
officials who were particularly active in foreign policy making in the case studies 
under consideration. For Finland, the Eilen Archive and Chronology of Finnish 
Foreign Policy (curated by the Finnish Institute of International Affairs) was used to 
retrieve speeches by Finnish prime ministers and presidents of the republic. For 
Germany and Poland, the official online archives of the speeches, interviews and 
press conferences held by the German federal chancellor, the Polish prime minister 
and the Polish president of the republic were consulted. For the analysis of the EU 
presidencies‘ discourses presented in chapter 8, the dissertation relied also on the 
online archives of the Finnish and German presidencies.
34
 Furthermore, several 
interviews and statements made by top German, Polish and Finnish officials were 
retrieved from prominent European and North American mass media. 
In order to identify relevant texts in large databases such as the online archives of the 
German and Finnish foreign ministries, the German federal chancellor, the Finnish 
EU presidency website and the Eilen Archive and Chronology of Finnish Foreign 
Policy, search functions on the websites were used. Texts (articles, interviews, 
speeches, press releases and travel reports) dating from the period 2005-2012 and 
including the terms ―Russia‖, ―Russian‖, ―Nord Stream‖, ―Georgia‖, ―Putin‖ and 
―Medvedev‖ were preselected for further analysis. For smaller archives, such as 
those of the German EU presidency, the Polish prime minister, foreign minister and 
president of the republic, all available online texts concerning foreign policy between 
2005 and 2012 were consulted and those concerning Russia were preselected.  
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 Unfortunately, the online archive of the Polish EU presidency was no longer available when the 
empirical research was performed. 
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This data collection procedure allowed retrieving material from similar databases 
(institutional websites) for the three countries under consideration. However, while 
numerous relevant texts could be retrieved from German and Finnish databases, 
fewer primary sources were available on Polish institutional websites. Hence, in 
order to gather a similar body of material for the analysis of Polish discourses, an 
additional search was carried out. Further texts were found on the international press 
(in English, German and French) by retrieving interviews of Polish foreign policy 
makers that were mentioned in the news section of Polish institutional websites. 
German and Finnish archives normally reported the full text of national leaders‘ 
interviews, whereas Polish archives did not. Therefore, retrieving interviews of 
Polish officials directly from the press compensated for this deficiency, while at the 
same time the scope of the sources under analysis was the same for the three 
countries. All texts thus preselected were analysed following the methodology 
detailed on pages 46-53. 
 
Table 7. Sources for the analysis of foreign policy makers’ discourses on Russia 
between 2005 and 2012 
Germany Poland Finland 
Foreign ministries‘ electronic archives 
Online archive of federal 
chancellor‘s speeches, 
press conferences and 
interviews 
Online archives of prime 
minister‘s and president of 
the republic‘s speeches, 
press conferences and 
interviews 
Eilen Archive and 
Chronology of Finnish 
Foreign Policy 
Online archive of the 2007 
German EU presidency 
Online archive of the 
2006 German presidency 
Newspaper interviews and open letters 
 
Source: own compilation 
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As argued, the texts under investigation date from 2005 to 2012. More specifically, 
the analysis of texts concerning the Nord Stream project starts from 2005, the year 
when the building of the pipeline was agreed upon and started, and stretches until 
2012, when construction works were completed. Between these dates numerous 
international controversies arose concerning the pipeline‘s political and economic 
significance, its security implications and environmental impact. The investigation of 
discourses regarding the August 2008 war in Georgia focuses primarily on texts 
dating from the summer of 2008 (the peak of the crisis), but a few later texts are also 
examined. The analysis of narratives concerning the street protests in Russia centres 
on the period between early December 2011, when the first post-electoral mass 
demonstrations took place, and December 2012. Although the demonstrations 
became smaller after May 2012 (following Vladimir Putin‘s third inauguration to the 
presidency of Russia), the relevant debate continued in some of the countries under 
analysis, mostly due to the repressive measures that Russia adopted in the summer 
and autumn of 2012.
35
 The investigation of national leaders‘ discourses during their 
country‘s EU presidency is also included within the timeframe 2005-2012. The 
Finnish presidency under analysis took place from July to December to 2006, while 
the German and the Polish presidencies followed respectively in the semesters 
January-June 2007 and July-December 2011. 
Undoubtedly, additional or other texts and sources could have been selected for 
analysis if this research had not been limited by time and logistic constraints, such as 
restricted access to the online archives of national newspapers. The researcher‘s lack 
of knowledge of the Finnish and Polish languages was an important limiting factor, 
which restricted the analysis to sources in English and German. However, the 
availability of numerous speeches and interviews of Finnish and Polish foreign 
policy leaders in English, both in national ministerial websites and in English 
language newspapers, allowed the linguistic hurdle to be overcome. Hence, the 
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 As Hansen (2006: 87) argues, the focus on periods of international or domestic crisis, and hence of 
increased political and media activity, is likely to make the selection of texts for discourse analysis 
more manageable. Moreover, it allows studying the evolution of discourse in the face of important 
developments on the ground. 
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selected texts are thought to be sufficiently authoritative and representative of official 
discourses to allow a plausible interpretation of dominant discourses. 
Another methodological concern derived from the fact that some of the texts under 
investigation are translations or statements made by policy makers in a foreign 
language, which may have distorted some of the original linguistic codes and related 
meanings. In order to reduce the possibility of misinterpretation, an analysis of the 
political and social context in which texts originated was conducted. Furthermore, 
many of these texts were addressed to an international audience, which presupposes 
that speakers streamlined their key arguments in order to make them clear to a 
foreign public (cf. Hansen 2006: 83).  
 
Reliability and generalisability of findings  
From a traditionally positivist perspective, the methodology adopted in this study 
may raise issues concerning the reliability of findings. Positivist approaches to social 
sciences tend to stress the existence of a reality that can be disclosed objectively by 
researchers. They usually focus on the demonstration or refutation of falsifiable 
hypotheses that seek to establish causal links between social phenomena, usually 
framed in terms of ―independent‖ and ―dependent‖ variables. Quantitative data are 
often used to argue for the existence or absence of presumed causal concatenations 
(cf. Blaikie 2010: 97-98, Manheim et al. 2012: 24-25, 84-86). 
Interpretive analyses such as the one presented in this work are based on a different 
epistemology. Advocates of interpretive approaches argue that reality is socially 
constructed and relationships between social phenomena are complex and mutually 
constitutive. Therefore, it is difficult to measure them and establish causal links (cf. 
Blaikie 2010: 99, Manheim et al. 2012: 95-96, 352-355). The dissertation is not 
concerned with finding objective truths. Conversely, it attempts to provide plausible 
interpretations of discourses and substantiate them with historical, political and 
sociological analysis, drawing on prominent scholarly works.  
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The plausibility of the arguments made through this hermeneutic approach was 
discussed in regular consultations with analysts and scholars who work in relevant 
fields in leading research institutes in the three countries under consideration. More 
specifically, the researchers consulted are specialists on EU-Russia relations based at 
the Institute of European Politics (IEP) and at the German Institute for International 
and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin, at the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW) in 
Warsaw and at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) in Helsinki. 
Useful advice and guidance on available sources was provided also by participants in 
specialised workshops focusing on identity and foreign policy analysis at 
conferences of the European Consortium for Political Research and the British 
Association for Slavonic and East European Studies. 
Consultations and conference discussions helped sharpen the analysis and evaluate 
the plausibility of arguments, but it would be inappropriate to claim that they ensured 
the reliability of findings in a positivist sense. For positivists, the results of a study 
are reliable if they can be replicated by other researchers using the same 
methodology and data. However, from an interpretive perspective this approach is 
inadequate for the investigation of complex social phenomena that cannot be 
measured easily, such as national identity. For this type of analysis, reliability stems 
primarily from the transparency of research methods and the cogency of arguments 
(Blaikie 2010: 217, Bryman 2008: 380, Yardley 2000: 222). 
In this study, the clarification of methodological procedures and of used sources was 
functional to guaranteeing transparency. In addition, all primary texts referred to are 
publicly available and most of them can be freely consulted online. Easy access to 
sources allows other researchers to check the plausibility of interpretations and the 
cogency of arguments. Furthermore, the methodology adopted in the dissertation is 
applicable also to other texts that were not included in this study. Using the same 
procedures, further research may therefore explore whether the analysis of other 
pertinent sources leads to similar findings regarding dominant discursive structures. 
Social scientists are also interested in the generalisability of findings. In particular, 
positivist research attempts to draw scientifically valid conclusions about the wider 
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population based on the samples under analysis (cf. Blaikie 2010: 192-194, 217). 
However, also in this respect a positivist approach does not seem appropriate for the 
subject under investigation. The dissertation‘s findings concern the relationship 
between identity and foreign policy in the discourses of a restricted group of key 
figures in national executives. As argued, these findings matter because top political 
officials are the main actors in foreign policy making and enjoy considerable 
discursive power in both the national and the international arena. Their discourses are 
representative of official national foreign policy narratives in a specific timeframe, 
but not of all societal discourses concerning foreign policy. The latter are much more 
complex and diverse and cannot be analysed within the scope of this work. 
Another issue concerns the generalisability of findings from national discursive 
arenas to the EU level. As the dissertation inter alia examines the existence of a 
shared discourse on Russia in the European Union, it is important to assess whether 
the focus on the selected countries leads to findings which have EU-wide relevance. 
Due to the restricted focus on three member states, the findings cannot entirely 
reflect the complexity of twenty-eight national discourses on Russia. However, as 
previously argued, the selected countries are representative of the main stances taken 
by most EU member states towards Russia during the last decade. They are also 
significant for their actorness in relations with the Kremlin, both at the bilateral and 
at the EU level. Therefore, their leaders‘ discourses are likely to play an essential 
role also in the EU-wide debate on Russia.  
 
Ethical considerations 
From an ethical point of view, the research did not raise any particular issues. As 
discussed previously, the sources used in the dissertation were publicly available. 
The researcher analysed dominant narratives in national and European discursive 
arenas. There was no direct communication with the policy makers whose discourses 
were examined. Thanks to the abundance of publicly available material, there was no 
need to arrange interviews for further data collection. Private consultations took 
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place with researchers and scholars, but these were only aimed at improving the 
research design and did not generate data for the dissertation. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter highlighted the relevance of a discursive approach to the study of 
national identity, foreign policy and the construction of a country‘s external Others. 
It argued that Ruth Wodak‘s discourse-historical approach, a variant of critical 
discourse analysis, provides an appropriate methodology for the dissertation because 
it focuses on the historical dimension of discourse. It is therefore functional to the 
investigation of the relationship between deep-rooted national identity narratives and 
foreign policy discourses about Russia. In addition, its focus on discursive strategies 
allows for a systematic analysis of the linguistic and rhetorical tools that are used in 
the construction of Russia as the Other. 
Due to the impossibility of investigating all national discursive arenas within the EU, 
three member states (Germany, Poland and Finland) were chosen for closer 
inspection. This selection was based on the depth of the countries‘ historical 
interactions with Russia, actorness in current relations and representativeness of the 
main national stances towards Russia within the EU. Furthermore, three key events 
in which Russia played a major role in recent years were selected in order to provide 
a common basis for the analysis of discourses in each national arena. They included 
the construction of the Nord Stream pipeline, the Russian-Georgian war in August 
2008 and the post-electoral mass demonstrations in Russia in 2011-2012. These 
events concerned key policy areas in EU-Russia relations, namely energy security, 
the security and stability of the shared neighbourhood and the development of 
democratic institutions in Russia. German, Polish and Finnish leaders‘ statements 
during their countries‘ most recent EU presidency are analysed in a final case study 
in order to compare national narratives on Russia in the EU discursive arena. 
The chapter also gave an account of source selection and of limiting factors in the 
research process, notably the lack of access to sources in Polish and Finnish 
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language. It emphasised that the dissertation focuses on the formulation of plausible 
interpretations of discourses, which are substantiated by historical, political and 
sociological analysis. The reliability of interpretations stems primarily from the 
transparency of research methods and the cogency of arguments. Although findings 
do not reflect the whole spectrum of national discourses on Russia, they are 
representative of dominant official narratives. Furthermore, as the selected countries 
play an important role in EU-Russia relations and epitomise the member states‘ main 
stances towards Russia, findings can be generalised to draw conclusions about 
influential discourses on Russia at the EU level. 
Ultimately, this chapter completed the theoretical, conceptual and methodological 
body of the dissertation and set the stage for the ensuing empirical analysis. The next 
chapter provides the essential background and contextual framework to apply theory 
and methodology to the empirical part of this work. 
 
Divisive identity, divided foreign policy? 
 
70 
National identities in historical perspective 
Chapter 4: National identities in historical perspective 
 
Introduction 
As the analysis in chapters 1 and 2 has highlighted, national identity is a complex 
construction that involves a large number of cultural and historical factors. 
Deconstructing national identity and examining its key components is essential in 
order to understand its relationship with a country‘s foreign policy.  This chapter 
analyses the historical construction of German, Polish and Finnish identity, with 
particular focus on discourses that are considered most relevant to national foreign 
policy towards Russia. The key argument is that, in the last two centuries, Russia was 
a prominent Other in national foreign policy discourses and perceptions of Russia 
played an important role in national identity formation. The main questions 
addressed are: how were German, Polish and Finnish identities constructed over 
time? How did national identity interact with dominant foreign policy discourses in 
the last two centuries? What were the dominant national narratives about Russia and 
how were they constructed?  
In order to answer these questions, the chapter draws on some of the most prominent 
works published on the topic and on original material collected during fieldwork in 
the countries under investigation. National identity construction is studied in a 
longue durée perspective. The focus is in particular on the period starting from the 
nineteenth century, when modern national identities began to be constructed. The 
longue durée approach highlights the historical roots of current national identities 
and foreign policy behaviours. It thereby provides a historically grounded and 
substantive interpretive framework for the discourse analysis in chapters 5-8, which 
focuses on speeches, interviews and statements formulated between 2005 and 2012.  
While the discussion below is by no means an exhaustive analysis of the three 
national identities, it hopes to provide the essential framework to understand and 
interpret them, most notably their mutually constitutive relationship with national 
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foreign policy. For each of the three countries under analysis, the dominant themes 
and historical trends of national identity construction are investigated alongside their 
relationship with contemporary foreign policy. The role of Russia as Other in identity 
construction and the evolution of national discourses on Russia are analysed in 
greater depth in distinct, yet strongly interconnected sub-sections. The dominant 
national identity discourses and the discourses on Russia identified through this 
analysis are summarised in illustrative tables. 
 
Democracy, stability, multilateralism: the historical 
construction of German identity 
Well into the second decade of the twenty-first century, Germany appears as one of 
the most successful countries in Europe, with well-established democratic 
institutions, a strong economy and a leading role in the European Union. The Berlin 
Republic seems to have successfully combined political stability and a strong 
economic performance, after nearly a century of wars, dictatorships and territorial 
division.
36
 Democracy, economic prosperity, the respect of human rights and the 
rejection of war as means to solve international disputes have become an integral part 
of German identity (cf. Berger 1996; Bjola and Kornprobst 2007). These values 
influence German foreign policy discourses, notably the country‘s strong support for 
multilateralism and its normative approach to international affairs (Risse 2007). 
Governments in Berlin believe that their foreign policy priorities can be achieved 
best within the framework of the European Union, which explains their strong pro-
European orientation (Banchoff 1999). 
Some International Relations scholars attempted to define the nature of post-
reunification German foreign policy by developing concepts such as that of ―civilian 
power‖ (Harnisch and Maull 2001). Civilian powers are defined as states that 
actively promote the ―civilising‖ of international relations through efforts to 
                                                          
36
 The term “Berlin Republic” is used to distinguish post-reunification Germany from the country’s 
previous republican experiences: West Germany, which had Bonn as its capital (1949-1990), and the 
Weimar Republic (1919-1933) (cf. Wittlinger 2008). 
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constrain the use of force, strengthen the rule of law and promote international 
cooperation. The endorsement of participatory forms of decision-making, social 
equity, sustainable development and interdependence are also important features of 
civilian powers (Harnisch and Maull 2001: 3-4). However, this conceptualisation 
leaves important questions unanswered: how does a country develop a specific type 
of foreign policy discourses? In what historical and cultural context can concepts 
such as that of civilian power be understood? 
The historical construction of German national identity is illuminating in this respect. 
The dominant identity discourses that constitute current German foreign policy have 
been constructed as a rejection of the national experience between 1871 and 1945 
and of the East German dictatorship (Jarausch and Geyer 2003: 235-240). The record 
of united Germany between 1871 and 1945 is widely considered as catastrophic, as it 
is associated with two world wars, economic instability, a brutal dictatorship and, 
most importantly, genocide. Militaristic and chauvinistic Imperial Germany (1871-
1918), the economically and politically unstable Weimar Republic (1919-1933), let 
alone the racist and genocidal experience of the Third Reich (1933-1945), could 
provide no positive reference for the identity of post-1989 reunified Germany. The 
disastrous outcome of the first national unification also diminished the potential 
value of previous events, such as the liberal revolutions of 1848, as founding myths 
for the construction of a positive national identity. Ultimately, nineteenth century 
liberals and democrats had been unsuccessful in their attempts to spearhead the 
national project. Due to the failure of the liberal experiment, political unity had been 
achieved under the lead of Prussian militarism, which shaped profoundly national 
identity until 1945 (James 1989: 35-54, Jarausch and Geyer 2003: 222-231, 358). 
In 1945, the German nation had no ―usable past‖ (Moeller 2003) to reconstruct its 
political identity.
37
 Foreign occupation and the existence of two radically different 
German states after 1949 further complicated the emergence of a new sense of 
national identity. East German authorities drew a thick line between the Third Reich 
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 While in 1945 Germany had no “usable past” in political terms, a large part of German cultural and 
artistic heritage was not discredited by the catastrophic outcome of national unity until 1945 and – 
together with the shared language - continued to constitute a powerful unifying factor in the 
following decades. 
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and the newly-founded German Democratic Republic (GDR). Official rhetoric 
portrayed GDR citizens as either anti-fascist heroes or victims of the Nazi regime, 
who had finally been united under the first socialist state in German history 
(Fulbrook 1999: 55-59, Naimark 1995). It also attempted to construct a separate 
identity based on anti-fascism and hostility to the capitalist Western world. However, 
most East German citizens never fully accepted the official narrative. In fact, East-
West competition and the GDR authorities‘ obsession with defining their country in 
opposition to West Germany acted as a constant reminder of all-German 
commonalities among East German citizens (Fulbrook 1999: 198). 
In West Germany, the dynamics of national identity construction were more 
complex. In the first post-war decade, the focus was on material and economic 
reconstruction. The swift achievements in these fields, including the so-called 
economic miracle (Wirtschaftswunder), created a feeling of identity based on 
collective working ethics and the resolve to rebuild a country that lay in ruins (James 
1989: 177-195). In foreign policy, alignment with the United States and support of 
European integration were seen as absolute priorities in order to be accepted as a full 
member of the Western community. The issue of coming to terms with German 
history, particularly with the recent past, proved more controversial. Although the 
Bonn Republic accepted to pay reparations to Israel in 1952, public debates on the 
Nazi past did not gain momentum until the early 1960s. When they did, it was mostly 
as a reaction to developments abroad (Adolf Eichmann‘s capture and trial in Israel 
1961-1962) and to non-institutional, civil society initiatives, first and foremost the 
1967-1968 protest movement (Herf 1997: 334-372). 
From the 1960s onwards, memory of the Holocaust became a dominant public and 
institutional discourse, as well as a crucial constitutive element of West German 
identity and foreign policy. The sense of responsibility for genocide undermined 
attempts to positively define West German identity and to reassess German history in 
less negative or exculpatory terms.
38
 The impracticability of positive identification 
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 Conservative historians Ernst Nolte and Andreas Hillgruber attempted to relativise German 
responsibility for the Holocaust by presenting it as a reaction to Bolshevism (Nolte 1986) and by 
comparing it to the suffering of German expellees from East-Central Europe (Hillgruber 1986). Their 
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with the nation led to a revival of regional allegiances, which had been very strong 
both before and during the process of nation-formation in the nineteenth century 
(Jarausch and Geyer 2003: 228). In foreign policy, the rejection of unilateralism and 
the support of European and Western integration appeared even more as the only 
possible course of action to re-establish the country‘s reputation (Banchoff 1999: 
273-274). West German attitudes to national identity and foreign policy choices led 
many intellectuals to argue that, by the 1970s, the country had become a post-
national democracy. According to this view, West Germans had learnt from the past 
and moved beyond the ideas of nation and nationalism (Berger 1997: 77-108, 
Jarausch and Geyer 2003 240, Winkler 1996). 
This interpretation was seriously challenged by events in East and West Germany in 
1989-1990. Reunification brought about attempts to renationalise German history 
and identity (Berger 1997: 198-221). The fall of the Berlin Wall clearly showed that 
a German nation had survived Cold War divisions. Undeniably, the existence of two 
German states with different political and economic systems left material and 
cultural traces in post-1990 united Germany (cf. Arnold-de Simine 2005, Herf 1997, 
Kocka 1996, Weidenfeld 2001). The Wall fell when East and West Germans were 
growing apart in practice, but the West German government and the majority of 
GDR citizens still believed in the unity of the nation in principle (Fulbrook 1999: 
23). Trade and cultural contacts preserved a sense of shared identity. Even GDR 
leader Erich Honecker, in spite of all official efforts to create a distinct East German 
identity, made a distinction between East German citizenship and nationality, 
considering the latter as simply ‗German‘ (Jarausch and Geyer 2003: 236). Although 
elements of a distinct GDR identity survived among its former citizens and 
sometimes resurface in nostalgic filmic and cultural representations, they do not 
overshadow dominant identity discourses and are contested by competing narratives 
that focus on the authoritarian and repressive nature of the East German regime 
(Arnold-de Simine 2005, Sabrow 2009). 
                                                                                                                                                                    
claims sparked a vitriolic exchange with left-leaning intellectuals such as Jürgen Habermas and Hans-
Ulrich Wehler, known as Historikerstreit (historians’ quarrel). The debate took place on the pages of 
prominent national newspapers (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Die Zeit) and was followed with 
great interest by the West German public (Berger 1997: 91-92, Knowlton and Cates 1993). 
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While reunification revived the feeling of a German national identity, it neither 
reawakened the extreme nationalism that had characterised the history of Germany in 
1871-1945, nor did it mark a sudden departure from pre-1989 West German identity 
and foreign policy discourses. The latter became dominant also in reunified 
Germany. Memory of the Holocaust and the suffering inflicted upon other nations 
during the Second World War play a central role in united Germany‘s collective 
identity (Langenbacher 2010: 43-49, Wilds 2010, Wittlinger 2011: 139-140). If 
anything, debates on these issues have become deeper and more prominent since the 
1990s, including social groups that had been neglected earlier (such as Soviet 
prisoners of war and forced labourers, Roma and Sinti, homosexuals).
39
 The erection 
of numerous monuments commemorating the victims of National Socialism in 
reunified Berlin has led some authors to label it as ―the capital city of remorse‖ (in 
German, Hauptstadt der Reue; cf. Reichel 2005). 
The experience of the East German dictatorship constituted a further controversial 
issue which the Berlin Republic had to come to terms with in order to forge a united 
national identity. The trials of GDR officials and border guards in the 1990s, the 
social issues and the economic difficulties resulting from reunification ensured that 
the East German past was present in public debates in both the 1990s and the 2000s 
(Ahonen 2011, Gellner and Douglas 2003). Despite the already cited nostalgia for 
some aspects of life in the GDR, dominant discourses and historical analyses have 
drawn an unequivocally negative balance of the East German regime (cf. Fulbrook 
1995, 2011, Hodgin and Pearce 2011, Jarausch 1999, Jarausch and Geyer 2003: 77-
81, Langenbacher 2010: 54-57). This contributed to reinforcing the stress on 
democracy and human rights and the rejection of any form of totalitarianism in 
German identity discourses. The dominant narrative now tends to portray the GDR as 
―the second German dictatorship‖, thereby emphasising authoritarian and totalitarian 
similarities with the Third Reich (Klessmann 1999).  
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 These debates were fuelled by the appearance of new studies, films, documents and exhibitions. 
Among the most important are the Goldhagen controversy concerning the responsibility of ordinary 
Germans in the Holocaust, the exhibition on the crimes of the German army in the Soviet Union 
organised by the Hamburg Institute of Social Research and the Walser-Bubis quarrel over the 
building of the Holocaust memorial in central Berlin (cf. Weidenfeld 2001: 30-32). 
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Although the national past has remained mostly a source of remorse and collective 
responsibility for the perpetration of unprecedented crimes, in the second post-
reunification decade the Berlin Republic felt confident enough to address the issue of 
German suffering during and in the aftermath of the Second World War. This 
concerned in particular the expulsion of approximately twelve million ethnic 
Germans from East-Central Europe between 1945 and 1950, the rape of thousands of 
German women in the last months of the war by Allied soldiers, the carpet bombing 
of all main German cities and the internment of millions of Wehrmacht soldiers in 
Soviet camps (Langenbacher 2010: 49-54, Moeller 2003). German suffering had 
been largely a taboo in mainstream public and institutional debates since the 1960s. 
It returned forcefully to mainstream discourses in 2002 with the publication of 
Günter Grass‘s novel Crabwalk and Jörg Friedrich‘s The Fire: The Bombing of 
Germany 1940-1945. During the following years, a lively memory debate on German 
suffering took place, fuelled by numerous television productions and new 
publications (Langenbacher 2010: 51, Wittlinger 2008: 10, Zehfuss 2006: 222-226).  
This memory received institutional endorsement in 2008 through the creation of the 
Bundesstiftung Flucht, Vertreibung, Versöhnung (Federal Foundation Flight, 
Expulsion, Reconciliation). The foundation was given the task of setting up and 
curating a museum that will commemorate the expulsion of ethnic Germans from 
East-Central Europe in the wider context of Nazi racial policies and of other forced 
resettlements in twentieth century Europe.
40
 Chancellor Merkel‘s endorsement of the 
project and her simultaneous, unambiguous acknowledgement of Germany‘s 
historical responsibility reflect her willingness to encourage a discussion of multiple 
national memories and identities, without relativising the role of the Holocaust and 
Germany‘s criminal policies in the Second World War (Wittlinger 2008: 22). The 
focus on German suffering during the last decade has not significantly altered the 
nature of dominant German identity and foreign policy discourses. If anything, it 
strengthened their pacifist and anti-totalitarian components by emphasising the 
pernicious consequences that aggressive and unlawful policies may have on the state 
unleashing them (cf. Langenbacher 2010: 50).   
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 Details are available on the foundation’s website, http://www.sfvv.de/ (accessed 18/12/2012). 
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The long way to Ostpolitik: Russia in German identity and 
foreign policy discourses 
During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Russia was a significant Other in 
German identity construction. German perceptions of Russia were predominantly 
negative, emphasising its presumed social and economic backwardness and 
threatening military power. However, a counter-narrative that relativised these 
negative views also existed, notably in particular social milieux and historical 
periods.  A significant strand of German official discourses emphasised the necessity 
of a cooperative approach to Russia that took into account its strategic importance for 
Germany and in the international arena. From the late 1960s onwards, these 
discourses constituted a cooperative West German foreign policy stance towards the 
Soviet Union that has become enshrined in the concept of Ostpolitik. The term 
literally means ―Eastern policy‖ and generally refers to Germany‘s foreign policy 
towards its Eastern neighbours (cf. Ash 1993: 34-35). It acquired a more specific 
meaning in the context of Cold War detente, when West German Ostpolitik 
established a tradition of cordial bilateral contacts that has remained an important 
element of reunified Germany‘s policy towards Russia. The coexistence of deeply 
rooted stereotypes and the Ostpolitik tradition has resulted in an ambiguous 
relationship, which Russia‘s role in German identity discourses can help to 
understand. 
Negative perceptions of Russia in German intellectual and policy making elites date 
back at least to the sixteenth century. In 1549 German diplomat and writer Sigmund 
von Herberstein published a book describing the country as a brutal authoritarian 
regime and its people as backward and wretched. As Russia was largely unknown in 
Western Europe at the time, the book became a major source of knowledge (von 
Herberstein 2010; cf. Schröder 2012: 97). Criticism of Russia in German discourses 
became dominant in the nineteenth century and was fuelled by popular publications 
such as Astolphe de Custine‘s Empire of the Czar. Published in 1839, it portrayed the 
Tsarist Empire as a corrupt, inefficient and despotic police state (de Custine 1989). 
Contemporary German liberals were particularly critical of Russian autocracy and of 
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the overall backwardness of the Tsarist Empire. For them, Russia was a threat to 
German and European liberal values (Schröder 2012: 99).   
Conservatives tended to be less contemptuous of the Tsarist political system. 
Between 1847 and 1852, Prussian agricultural expert August von Haxthausen 
published a report on his trips to Russia, describing it as a well-ordered patriarchal 
monarchy. Von Haxthausen‘s (1972) publication promoted a competing, more 
positive discourse on Russia and was particularly popular among German 
aristocracy, which considered the Tsarist Empire as a bulwark against revolution and 
democracy. However, sympathetic conservatives were also convinced of Germany‘s 
cultural superiority and looked down on the Russian social and economic model. 
Stereotypes about Russia, such as its image as an underdeveloped and uncivilised 
country, were widespread throughout German society. Negative views were only 
partially mitigated by the appreciation of Russian literature, music and art (cf. 
Schröder 2012: 99-100).  
At the end of the nineteenth century, the Tsarist Empire‘s alliances with France and 
Britain led to a shift in perceptions also among German conservatives, who no longer 
considered Russia as a political ally. Dominant discourses in political and intellectual 
circles portrayed it as a backward colossus that threatened German culture and 
simultaneously offered a vast expanse for the extension of German power and 
civilisation.
41
 These discourses provided the rationale for Berlin‘s annexationist 
policy during the First World War and, in a more extreme and racist variant, during 
the Nazi-Soviet war (cf. Liulevicius 2000). 
Racial arguments about Russia were widespread already before the Nazis‘ rise to 
power. In Wilhelmine Germany, publicist Johannes Haller (1917) described the 
Tsarist Empire as an Asiatic, Tatar state, a true heir of the Golden Horde poised for 
war of conquest and pillage. After the Bolshevik revolution, racial discourses 
intertwined with political ones. The German elites and middle class associated the 
―Bolshevik threat‖ with Jewish commissars and savage Slavs that were keen to 
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 Until 1945, German academia contributed to this line of thought. The scholarly discipline of 
Ostforschung, focusing on the European territories east of Germany, justified Berlin’s expansionist 
aims in East-Central and Eastern Europe with pseudohistorical arguments (Mühle 2003a). 
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commit atrocious crimes and enslave Europe. On the other hand, a sizeable minority 
(mostly radicals and communists) viewed the Soviet Union as an economic and 
social model. From the opposite side of the political spectrum, some conservatives 
remained sympathetic to Russia, in spite of its communist regime, because they saw 
it as a partner in their fight against the Versailles system. These competing and more 
positive views resulted in the coexistence of diverse discourses and approaches to 
Russia also in Weimar Germany (cf. Schröder 2012: 100-103). 
Following Hitler‘s rise to power, racist and anti-Bolshevik discourses became 
omnipresent; the Nazis silenced all competing views. From the start of the war with 
the Soviet Union (June 1941), the Nazi regime incessantly disseminated propaganda 
that described Russians and other peoples of the Soviet Union as ―sub-humans‖ 
(Untermenschen). German racial policies in the East built on and radicalised pre-
existing anti-Russian stereotypes. The Third Reich‘s military defeat frustrated Nazi 
plans to enslave and exterminate Slavic peoples. However, Goebbels‘ propaganda 
had a longer lasting impact on German mindsets. The image of Russians as 
uncivilised Asians, threatening German and European values, persisted in post-war 
West German discourses (Schildt 2003: 158).  
In the 1950s and 1960s, the Soviet Union was the main Other against which West 
German identity was constructed. The Bonn Republic pursued transatlantic 
integration and shifted Germany‘s geopolitical self-perception from being part of 
Central Europe to full membership of  the capitalist and democratic West (cf. 
Schröder 2012: 106). As West Germany left behind the historical enmity with France 
and Britain, the Soviet Union and its satellites became the only neighbouring foes. 
Perceptions of Russia were not positive in the German Democratic Republic either. 
East German official discourses on Soviet-German friendship were considered 
hollow also by most GDR citizens, particularly after the Soviets used tanks to repress 
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 Furthermore, the violence of Soviet soldiers against German citizens, especially in the first months 
of occupation, left many East Germans embittered (Naimark 1995: 470). 
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The presence of Soviet troops and Moscow-friendly regimes on German soil and in 
bordering countries allowed West German politicians to focus public debates on the 
contemporary communist and Russian threat and avoid confrontation with the Nazi 
past. Soviet Russia was described as a totalitarian state that menaced the West with 
both its military might and its alleged cultural backwardness (cf. Schröder 2012: 107-
109). Overtly racist discourses on Russia of the early post-war years lost momentum 
only gradually from the 1960s onwards, when the focus of West German debates 
shifted to Nazi crimes, most of which had been committed in Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union. Chancellor Willy Brandt‘s genuflection in the former Warsaw ghetto 
in 1970 and his cooperative Ostpolitik with the Soviet Union epitomise the shift in 
official West German identity discourses and policies towards the Soviet bloc (cf. 
Ash 1993: 298-300).  
Brandt‘s Ostpolitik enhanced trade exchanges between West Germany and the 
Eastern bloc and resulted in a series of treaties, signed between 1970 and 1973, that 
improved diplomatic relations between Bonn and Soviet Russia. Negative discourses 
on Russia did not disappear among West German political elites (Hildermeier 2003: 
41; cf. Satjukow 2008). However, the Soviets were no longer perceived as aggressive 
and uncivilised Bolsheviks; the image of a peaceful neighbour that could become an 
economic partner gained momentum (Schildt 2003: 169; cf. Albert 1995, Thumann 
1997). Ostpolitik created a new, powerful discourse showing that cooperation was 
possible and beneficial to both Moscow and Bonn. It marked a turning point in West 
German policies towards Russia that was eventually endorsed by all political forces. 
Leaders of the conservative opposition to Willy Brandt declared their approval of 
Ostpolitik in the mid-1970s and did not change course when they won elections and 
became the ruling majority in the 1980s (Schildt 2003: 171; cf. Marx 1990).  
A further positive turn in German discourses on the Soviet Union took place in the 
late 1980s, when Mikhail Gorbachev‘s reforms in Moscow improved dramatically 
the USSR‘s image in the West. Dominant West German discourses about the Soviet 
Union abandoned the emphasis on economic and social stagnation, which had 
characterised the Brezhnev years, and stressed profound change. West German 
politicians and German civilians on both sides of the Iron Curtain acclaimed 
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Gorbachev for his role in ending the Cold War and allowing Germany‘s 
reunification. West German leaders took pride in arguing that peaceful 
transformation in Eastern Europe had taken place also as a result of their cooperative 
Ostpolitik with the Soviet Union. Furthermore, chancellor Helmut Kohl developed a 
personal friendship with Gorbachev, thereby establishing a tradition of cordial 
relationships between Russian and German leaders that lasted for nearly two 
decades. In the euphoria of reunification, the image of Russia as the aggressive Other 
disappeared and left room to optimism and hope for further democratic change in the 
Eastern bloc (Ahrens and Weiss 2012: 149-150, Krumm 2012a: 115-117). 
The collapse of communism in Russia and East Germany brought the end of 
ideological controversies, but Russian capitalism and democracy turned out to be 
very different from the German variant. Boris Yeltsin‘s violent confrontation with 
the Russian parliament in October 1993 and the beginning of the war in Chechnya a 
year later ended German optimism about democratisation and rule of law in Russia. 
The image of destitute masses of Russian citizens, juxtaposed to that of a few opulent 
oligarchs who had enriched themselves with shady privatisations of state-owned 
assets, became prominent in German media. Russian politicians were also perceived 
with increasing scepticism (Krumm 2012a: 118-119). By the mid-1990s, the 
euphoric German discourse about Gorbachev‘s and Yeltsin‘s reforms gave room to 
the realisation that Russia was failing to democratise (Ahrens and Weiss 2012: 153)  
As the First Chechen War (1994-1996) unmistakably showed, mass violations of 
human rights were commonplace also in post-communist Russia. In this context, 
deep-rooted German discourses on Russia as a socially and economically backward 
state became dominant again. In addition, the discourse on Russia as a chaotic 
country with a corrupt government and a crumbling social structure gained 
prominence. From a German viewpoint, the Cold War-time military and political 
threat was replaced by the risk of Russia‘s complete economic and social collapse, 
with spill-over effects that would reach far beyond the country‘s borders (Ahrens and 
Weiss 2012: 150). As Yeltsin‘s health worsened and Russia was hit by a disastrous 
financial crisis in 1998, critical perceptions overshadowed the positive image that 
Moscow had acquired by facilitating German reunification and ending the Cold War.  
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Vladimir Putin‘s rise to power in 1999 and Russia‘s economic growth during his first 
two presidencies was accompanied by a new shift in German perceptions. Critical 
discourses about the lack of democracy, the maltreatment of journalists and gross 
violations of human rights in Chechnya remained prominent in the German press. 
However, Putin was also ascribed the merit of economic and political stabilisation, 
an achievement that is valued highly in Germany due to the deeply engrained 
memory of the consequences that instability had on the country in the 1920s and 
1930s (cf. Ahrens and Weiss 2012: 152). Hence, negative perceptions were 
accompanied by a more positive discourse about Russia‘s economic and social 
development, which was exemplified by chancellor Gerhard Schröder‘s friendly 
approach to Moscow and personal relationship with Putin. As was shown by a study 
of articles published in 2003 in Spiegel and Stern, the two main German weekly 
magazines, German news coverage of Russia became more differentiated (Daniliouk 
2006). Optimistic evaluations of Russia were juxtaposed to critical assessments, 
particularly in the conservative press. 
A study of editorials on Russian domestic and foreign policy published between 
2001 and 2008 in the two most widely read and authoritative German dailies, 
Süddeutsche Zeitung and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, provides further evidence 
for diversity in German discourses about Russia (Ahrens and Weiss 2012). Overall, 
assessments remained negative, particularly on issues such as Chechnya, democracy, 
freedom of the press, the rule of law and Russia‘s handling of Islamic terrorism 
within its borders. However, the theme of Russia as a stable and important actor in 
the international arena was dominant in 40 per cent of foreign policy editorials. The 
dominant discourse that emerges from the editorials describes Russia as an 
undemocratic country with internal problems, but also with a key international and 
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Table 8. Dominant themes in German identity discourses 
National identity discourses Discourses on Russia 
Democracy and human rights Ostpolitik 
Economic prosperity and stability Authoritarian, corrupt, socially and 
economically backward 
Rejection of war as means to solve disputes Economic partner 
Pro-European Union and multilateralism Key actor in international arena 
 
Source: own compilation 
 
Martyrdom and heroism: the historical construction of Polish 
identity 
After two centuries of foreign occupation and tutelage, Poland recovered its full 
independence in 1989. Since then, the country has pursued a West-oriented foreign 
policy that led it to join NATO and the European Union (in 1999 and 2004 
respectively). However, the long periods of foreign occupation have left a profound 
impact on the construction of Polish identity. Post-1989 identity and memory 
discourses have focused on themes such as the suffering and heroic resistance of the 
Polish nation under the German and Russian yokes (Orla-Bukowska 2006). 
Discourses constructed during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries frequently re-
emerge in current public discussions and interact with debates concerning Poland‘s 
foreign policy. 
In 1990, the decision to restore 3 May as a national holiday established an ideal link 
between post-communist Poland and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth of the 
eighteenth century. On 3 May 1791 the Commonwealth adopted a constitution that 
can be regarded as Europe‘s first democratic constitution (Davies 1996: 699). Four 
years later, the Commonwealth was partitioned between Austria, Prussia and Russia 
and ceased to exist. It took 123 years before an independent Polish state re-emerged. 
During this period, a modern Polish national identity was constructed and many 
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debates that still characterise Poland‘s self-image as an international actor were 
started (Porter 2000). 
In the early nineteenth century, Polish intellectuals relocated the idea of the nation on 
a spiritual plane, where it could survive also in the absence of a nation-state. 
According to contemporary romantic nationalists, Poland was a community defined 
by moral principles, rather than by political structures. This conception of the nation 
was inclusive and left room for cultural, religious and ethnic diversity. Tyranny, 
rather than a specific country or nation, was identified as Poland‘s and Europe‘s 
main enemy. Catholic Poland was also considered as a Christian rampart 
(antemurale christianitatis), ready to sacrifice itself for Western civilisation (―for 
your freedom and ours‖, as a contemporary Polish romantic motto emphasised).
43
 
These ideas provided the foundations for the 1830 uprising in the part of Poland 
occupied by the Russian empire, while Russia came to be seen as an embodiment of 
tyranny (Porter 2000: 16-22, Prizel 1998: 40-41). 
The failure of the 1830 uprising was the first major defeat for Polish romantic 
nationalists. Although the Poles considered their fight against Tsardom fundamental 
for Western civilization, other European nations did not join in the battle. The 
commitment that Poles had shown in the fight for the freedom of other nations (for 
instance, during the American Revolution and the Napoleonic wars) remained 
unreciprocated. The theme of unrequited commitment to the Western cause was 
dominant in Polish identity discourses well into the twentieth century, when it was 
further radicalised into accusations of outright betrayal addressed to the West (Prizel 
1998: 41-42, 72-73). Poland started seeing itself as the ―Christ of nations‖, an image 
propagated in particular by the national poet Adam Mickiewicz after the 1830 
uprising (cf. Mickiewicz 1833). According to this interpretation, the Polish nation 
sacrificed itself for the sake of all other nations; one day, like Jesus Christ, it would 
resurrect. 
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 This discourse emphasised the role of Polish troops in the successful defence of Vienna from 
Muslim Turks in 1683 and motivated Polish romantics to fight in the American Revolution and to join 
Napoleon’s armies (Prizel 1998: 41). 
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Mickiewicz‘s metaphor appealed to the Poles‘ deep religious sentiment and aptly 
combined political and religious imagery to foster faith in national rebirth. However, 
the hopes of romantic nationalists suffered a fatal blow in 1863, when another major 
uprising was crushed in Russian Poland and the Tsar launched policies of cultural 
and linguistic Russification.
44
 The ideals of Polish romantics seemed to be negated, 
particularly because they had failed to arouse most of the Polish nation. In the 
nineteenth century, national identity debates were confined to a small fraction of the 
population, notably the aristocratic gentry and the intellectual elites. The peasantry 
was excluded from these deliberations and was even hostile to the idea of an 
independent Poland, which it associated with the feudal system of the 
Commonwealth. Only at the end of the century did a sizeable part of it become 
politicised and start to share a national sentiment (Stauter-Halsted 2001: 244-246, 
Porter 2000: 15). 
Furthermore, due to its emphasis on freedom and justice, romantic nationalism 
appeared as too revolutionary for many Polish conservatives, who refused to support 
it. For the same reasons, both the Polish Catholic Church and the Vatican denounced 
the national struggle (Porter 2000: 29-31). After 1863, the ideals of Polish romantics 
were gradually displaced by those of positivists. According to positivists, patriots 
would serve the nation best by focusing their attention on solving problems of 
administration, economics and education. Prominent writer Bolesław Prus went as 
far as arguing that the Polish nation could survive without a state if it had a strong 
economy (Prus 1883). Economic development would allow Poland to emancipate 
itself from the backwardness of the Tsarist Empire. For positivists, political 
independence was only a matter of time, as Russian tyranny was considered 
temporary and doomed eventually to retreat back to Asia (Porter 2000: 46-82, Prizel 
1998: 48). 
With the advent of Positivism, the definition of nation became more focused on 
Polish culture and language. Positivists believed that national minorities in the 
former territories of the Commonwealth (notably Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Jews and 
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 In 1866-1867 Russian was established as mandatory language for the teaching of all subjects in all 
Polish secondary school, with the exception of religion (Porter 2000: 79-80). 
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Belarusians) would converge towards Polish culture and language due to Poland‘s 
cultural superiority. In this conception, the nation was no longer an ideal and spiritual 
entity (as for romantics), but rather an ethnic and linguistic community. The 
positivist reconceptualization of the nation paved the way for ethnonationalism, 
namely the aggressive and more exclusive form of nationalism that became 
widespread at the end of the nineteenth century and in the first half of the twentieth 
century (Prizel 1998: 40-50). 
Ethnonationalism was advanced by political organisations that originated in the 
1880s, most notably the National League of Roman Dmowski. In the 1890s a 
political party representing the views of ethnonationalists was also created, Endecja 
(National Democracy). Thanks to the gradual politicisation of the peasantry in the 
last years of the nineteenth century and the appeal of ethnonationalism, Endecja 
quickly became a mass movement. Its nationalist discourse was authoritarian, 
xenophobic and anti-Semitic. Power and discipline were the key tenets for the 
internal organisation of the nation. Particularly after the 1905 revolution in the 
Tsarist Empire, Endecja became preoccupied with disunity and disobedience within 
the Polish nation. Instead of striving for better social conditions, the Polish masses 
had to put themselves at the service of the ethnic nation, which was seen as the 
supreme ideal. By co-opting the masses to their nationalist ideas, Endecja leaders 
were able to claim a popular foundation while simultaneously controlling peasants 
and workers as they joined the political process (Porter 2000: 125-126, 136-155). 
In the period when ethnonationalism was dominant in Polish discourses (from the 
late 1890s until the 1940s), it influenced dramatically the relationship between Poles 
and neighbouring nations. Jews, who numbered several million in the former 
territory of the Commonwealth, were depicted as an alien body that had to be either 
expelled or polonised. They were the first community to be considered as 
irredeemable Others, but by the end of the nineteenth century Polish nationalists 
applied similar discourses also to Germans, Russians, Lithuanians and Ukrainians 
(Porter 2000: 158-177). Ethnonationalists became convinced that a Polish state had 
to be rebuilt within the Commonwealth boundaries (stretching over most of today‘s 
Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine), but with the Poles as a dominant ethnic group. 
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Poles were also seen as having the messianic task of educating ethnic Ukrainians, 
Belarusians and Lithuanians, with the ultimate objective of polonising them (Prizel 
1998: 52-67). 
Between 1918 and 1939 Poland temporarily became independent and, as Endecja 
leaders were appointed to leading positions in the new state, their nationalist 
narrative became dominant in official discourses. Although national minorities 
constituted one third of Poland‘s interwar population, they were marginalised and 
had hardly any representation in political institutions (Prizel 1998: 62-67; cf. 
Brubaker 1996: 416-430). Ethnonationalist policies irremediably soured relations 
between Poles and neighbouring nationalities. In the 1990s, when Poland finally 
regained full independence, its foreign policy with Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine and 
Russia was still constrained by the image that the country had projected towards its 
Eastern neighbours in the heyday of ethnonationalism (Snyder 2003; cf. Fedorowicz 
2007). 
The interwar Polish state was dismantled abruptly in 1939, when Nazi Germany and 
the Soviet Union partitioned the country. The brutal Nazi and Soviet war occupations 
strengthened and radicalised Polish perceptions of Germany and Russia as hostile 
Others. Since the Second World War is the key episode in current national memory, 
resentment towards both Germany and Russia has been perpetuated in dominant 
discourses until today (Ruchniewicz 2007). Polish characterisations of their Second 
World War experiences can be clustered around the themes of suffering and heroism. 
Discourses on suffering stress that Poland was the first country to be attacked by 
Nazi Germany (and simultaneously by the Soviet Union), experienced the longest 
foreign occupation in the war and endured enormous material losses and the worst 
human losses as a proportion of its total population (nearly 6 million deaths out of a 
pre-war population of nearly 35 million). This discourse was influenced by and 
perpetuated nineteenth century narratives on national martyrdom that portrayed 
Poland as the ―Christ of nations‖. 
The discourse on Polish heroism is closely linked to that of suffering and stresses 
that the nation did not remain passive or collaborate with the Nazis during the 
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occupation. As the dominant narrative goes, Poles never formally surrendered to the 
Nazis, kept fighting with the Allies on all fronts, organised a powerful network of 
domestic resistance and rose against the Germans in the Warsaw uprising, fighting 
for two months against a militarily superior enemy (Ruchniewicz 2007: 19). The 
opening of the Warsaw Rising Museum, which was inaugurated in the Polish capital 
in 2004 and immediately drew thousands of visitors every month, highlights the 
enduring relevance of the discourse on heroism. As the official website states, the 
museum is ―a tribute of Warsaw‘s residents to those who fought and died for 
independent Poland and its free capital‖.
45
 The historical event is turned into a 
founding myth of post-1989 Poland, regardless of its disappointing outcome, the 
large number of civilian casualties and the ensuing destruction of Warsaw. 
Poland‘s wartime experience also led to a revival of the discourse on Western 
betrayal and the unreciprocated support to the cause of freedom. Poles felt betrayed 
in 1939, when the United Kingdom and France provided no military assistance 
during the German invasion, and particularly at the Yalta conference in 1945, when 
the Western Allies agreed to leave Poland in the Soviet sphere of influence (Prizel 
1998: 73-74). The Western decision of accommodating Moscow‘s requests left Poles 
with the conviction that the United States‘ foreign policy would always prioritise the 
Soviet Union. This fear motivated Polish foreign policy makers swiftly to use the 
window of opportunity of the 1990s and apply for NATO integration, while Russia 
was focusing mostly on internal problems and could not exert sufficient diplomatic 
pressure on the Atlantic Alliance to make it reconsider its membership offer to 
Poland (Snyder 2003: 110-111). 
The outcome of the Yalta conference and Poland‘s swift Sovietisation after the 
Second World War led Polish intellectuals and political opposition to reassess the 
country‘s role in the international scenario. Poland had unmistakably become hostage 
of great power politics and it was clearly anachronistic to believe that it could have 
an independent role as ―Christian bulwark‖ or as ―civilising force‖ in Eastern 
Europe, as Polish interwar leaders had thought (Prizel 1998: 75-87). Poland‘s 
communist leaders attempted to develop a socialist, pro-Soviet identity, but were 
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 See website of the Warsaw Rising Museum, http://www.1944.pl/en/ (accessed 5/2/2013). 
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perceived as alien and imposed on the country by a foreign power. Next to the 
official communist discourse, prominent oppositional discourses originated in the 
underground and in émigrés communities. The literary-political émigré magazine 
Kultura was one of the leading forums for the discussion of Polish identity and 
Poland‘s future role in the international arena. From the 1970s onwards it prepared 
the conceptual background for the foreign policy of post-communist Poland (Snyder 
2003: 220). 
In a fundamental break with Poland‘s interwar foreign policy, Kultura advocated the 
acceptance of existing borders (even though Poland had lost most of its pre-1939 
Eastern provinces, the so-called kresy), the recognition of post-communist Ukraine, 
Lithuania and Belarus as equal nations and the rejection of any division of Eastern 
Europe in spheres of influence with Russia. By accepting its post-war territorial 
losses in the East, Poland would be less exposed to German territorial claims in the 
West based on 1939 borders.
46
  By the late 1980s, Kultura‘s foreign policy ideas had 
become widely accepted among Poland‘s opposition politicians, who were about to 
become the country‘s new leadership (Snyder 2003: 220-225).  
The success of Kultura‘s ideas had been made possible also by the fact that a 
significant part of the Polish Catholic Church and the Vatican endorsed them and 
encouraged reconciliation with Poland‘s Eastern and Western neighbours. This 
endorsement was fundamental to promote the new international self-image of Poland 
among the masses, as the Church enjoyed widespread support in civil society. Due to 
the protracted lack of independent state structures, the Polish Catholic Church 
became the main repository of the country‘s national identity, particularly during 
communism (Prizel 1998: 90-91, 229-230). As a result, the Church influenced 
identity discourses for most of Poland‘s history, retaining a prominent role in identity 
politics also after the recovery of full independence in 1989. According to a 2005 
survey, Catholicism in Poland is linked to national pride; Poles are very religious and 
trust the Church more than any other institution, except for the army (McManus-
Czubinska and Miller 2008: 147-148; cf. Sidorenko 2008: 119). 
                                                          
46
 In 1945, the former German provinces of Silesia, most of Pomerania and part of East Prussia were 
annexed to Poland; ethnic Germans living there were expelled. 
Divisive identity, divided foreign policy? 
 
90 
National identities in historical perspective 
According to popular perceptions, the Polish Catholic Church was one of the main 
factors leading to the end of communist rule in Poland. With the support of the 
Vatican, where Polish cardinal Karol Wojtyła became Pope in 1978, the opposition 
Catholic trade union Solidarity became a mass movement and challenged the regime, 
eventually leading to its demise in 1989 (Ash: 2002). Between the late 1970s and the 
1990s the Catholic Church, the intelligentsia and the working class, under the banner 
of Solidarity, shared a common vision and purpose that marginalised the communist 
regime and led the country to regain full independence (Prizel 1998: 92-93). The 
metaphor of Poland as the ―Christ of nations‖ gained momentum once again: after 
decades of martyrdom, the nation finally resurrected. 
After 1989 the theme of the ―return to Europe‖, meant as joining the achievements of 
post-war Western Europe (Snyder 2003: 291), became dominant. Poland made EU 
and NATO integration its primary foreign policy goals. In order to achieve these 
aims, Warsaw adopted the policy of reconciliation with its neighbours conceptualised 
by Kultura and embraced a rhetoric that stressed so-called European standards 
(territorial integrity and minority rights) for Eastern Europe (Snyder 2003: 256-258; 
cf. Curry 2008: 186-187). The ethnonationalist, xenophobic and anti-Semitic 
discourses of the interwar period lost dominance, but they did not disappear and 
remained widespread in important sections of the Catholic Church, right-wing 
political parties and public opinion in general (Bikont: 2012). 
The fact that by 1990 Poland was almost a mono-ethnic state, having lost most of its 
interwar national minorities, made previous ethnonationalist discourses about 
threatening internal Others anachronistic. However, deep-seated perceptions of 
Western Europe as a treacherous ally and of Germany and Russia as Poland‘s 
historical enemies survived (Orla-Bukowska 181-187). Between 2005 and 2007, 
when the right-wing party Law and Justice formed a coalition government with the 
far right, these perceptions constituted the backbone of a virulent official discourse 
(Reeves 2010). The strong anti-German and anti-Russian rhetoric of the mid-2000s 
showed that, for a considerable part of its leadership, Poland still lived in an insecure 
international environment, where it was threatened by its historical Others. 
Divisive identity, divided foreign policy? 
 
91 
National identities in historical perspective 
 
Russia in Polish identity discourses: the eternal Other? 
Throughout Poland‘s modern history, Polish identity discourses constructed Russia 
and Germany as aggressive and threatening Others. Poland‘s post-1990 
rapprochement to Germany and European integration have not cancelled negative 
images of the Western neighbour, which are strongly rooted in national memory. 
However, they have contributed to reconciliation and to the belief that a new era in 
Polish-German relations has begun (cf. Langenbacher 2008: 74-75). In this context, 
Russia has become the dominant Other in current official Polish discourses. 
Russian domination over Poland was the longest the country ever experienced, 
stretching from 1795 to 1918 and then again (under the Soviet banner) from 1939 to 
1941 and from 1945 to 1989.
47
  It was also the one that ended most recently and is 
generally considered by Poles as the most economically damaging for the country. 
Dominant Polish discourses describe the Russian partition zone in 1795-1918 as the 
least developed (by contrast with the German and Austrian zones) and blame the 
Russians for having imposed a repressive and inefficient economic and political 
model after 1945 (Zarycki 2004: 604). In the dominant Polish narrative, Soviet 
tutelage during the Cold War is seen as the continuation of Tsarist domination and 
the terms ―Russia‖ and ―Russians‖ are used as metonymies for ―Soviet Union‖ and 
―Soviets‖ (Orla-Bukowska 2006: 203). 
Russia plays a key role in identity discourses portraying Poles as either martyrs, 
sacrificing themselves for Europe‘s freedom, or as heroes, never surrendering to 
foreign occupiers. The discourse on Polish heroism was constructed mostly in the 
context of wars and uprisings against Russian domination. The 1830 and 1863 
uprisings against the Tsarist Empire, the Polish-Soviet war of 1920 and the anti-
communist uprisings of 1956, 1968, 1970 and 1980 are considered as a continuum in 
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 By contrast, the German occupation of Western Poland lasted from 1795 until 1918, with a second 
short, but very brutal spell during the Second World War (1939-1945); Austrian domination over 
Southern Poland lasted from 1795 until 1918. 
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a two century-long tradition of anti-Russian struggle (Loew 2008: 87-95, 
Ruchniewicz 2007: 11-12).  
Particular importance is attributed to the 1920 Polish-Soviet war.
48
 The decisive 
battle of the war, fought at the gates of Warsaw, is commonly referred to as ―the 
miracle at the Vistula‖, as it averted a Bolshevik victory that had seemed inevitable 
(cf. Orla-Bukowska 2006: 204). It is commemorated every year on 15 August, which 
is also Army Day and Assumption Day. Due to the concurrence of the ―miracle‖ with 
the religious festivity, for Poles the victorious battle has acquired a quasi-religious 
significance. It also fosters the romantic image of Poland‘s resurrection after it 
sacrificed itself to defend Europe and Christianity, and hence the themes of Poland as 
―Christ of nations‖ and as antemurale christianitatis. 
Within the context of the martyrdom discourse, Russia plays a key role as the 
oppressor that crushed nearly all Polish attempts to regain freedom. Most notably, it 
is portrayed as the brutal, dictatorial power that partitioned Poland with the Nazis in 
1939 and exterminated nearly 22,000 Polish officers at Katyn in April 1940.
49
 The 
Katyn massacre and the Nazi-Soviet (or Ribbentrop-Molotov) Pact have been widely 
discussed in public only in post-1989 Poland, as both topics were taboo under 
communism (Paul 2010). According to surveys conducted in 2006 and 2007, most 
Poles consider the events of 1939-1940 as the main reason why Russia should feel 
guilty and issue an official apology to Warsaw (Levintova 2010: 1357).  
Post-Soviet Russia, however, has refused to take responsibility for Stalinist crimes. 
In 2010 Russian president Dmitri Medvedev suggested that Warsaw lacked moral 
grounds to demand an apology for Katyn, as interwar Poland had been responsible 
for comparable crimes against the Soviet Union, such as the death of 16,000-20,000 
Soviet prisoners of war in Polish detention camps (cited in Feklyunina 2012: 444). 
Polish narratives reject such comparisons and the dispute concerning responsibility 
for Katyn has not ended. In fact, the death of former Polish president Lech 
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 Most recently, memory of the 1920 Polish-Soviet war was fostered by Jerzy Hoffman’s movie 
Bitwa Warszawska, released in September 2011. 
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 The killings were perpetrated not just at Katyn, but also at other sites near Tver, Minsk, Kiev, 
Kharkov and Kherson. However, the phrase “Katyn massacre” is generally used in dominant 
discourses to refer to all the killings.  
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Kaczynski in a plane crash in April 2010, while he was going to commemorate the 
seventieth anniversary of the Katyn massacre, contributed to the topic‘s continued 
prominence in public discourse. The ensuing debate on who was responsible for the 




Indeed, Russia‘s enduring role as Poland‘s threatening Other has turned the country 
into a negative reference point for the construction of the Polish Self and for 
Poland‘s understanding of its role in the international arena. According to Tomasz 
Zarycki (2004), in Polish discourses Russia fulfils the function of relativising 
Poland‘s distance from the West. Russia is perceived as inherently undemocratic and 
as an inferior imitator of European civilisation (cf. Prizel 1998: 82-85). Polish 
discourses orientalise Russia; they describe it as a less civilised and backward 
country, with a tradition of despotism linked to strong Asiatic influences. The 
ensuing feeling of cultural superiority allows Poland to strengthen its European 
identity, to construct itself as Central Europe and feel closer to Western European 
civilisation (Zarycki 2011: 132-134; cf. Said: 1978). 
Polish identity narratives also use Russia as a unifying threat. They portray it as 
imperialist and aggressive, both in the past and in the present. Post-communist 
Russia‘s use of energy politics to achieve geopolitical objectives is constructed as a 
continuation of Tsarist and Soviet expansionist policies by different means. Zarycki 
(2004: 607-614) went as far as to argue that the image of Russia as a potential threat 
was the backbone of Polish foreign policy after 1989 and the main reason behind 
Poland‘s pursuit of EU and NATO membership.  
After the collapse of communism, relations between Moscow and Warsaw improved 
only slightly and briefly when Red Army soldiers left their bases in Poland and 
Russian president Boris Yeltsin initially agreed to Polish NATO membership 
(Snyder 2003: 245-246). By September 1993, Yeltsin had changed his position and 
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 Cf. Simon Shuster, “Russia–Poland tensions rise with crash report”, The Time, 19 January 2011, 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2043130,00.html (accessed 3/2/2013). 
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vehemently opposed Warsaw‘s accession to the Atlantic Alliance.
51
 Poles perceived 
his volte-face as the demonstration that post-Soviet Russia was still imperialist and 
wanted to retain a sphere of influence by constraining Polish foreign policy choices 
(Zarycki 2004: 609). Furthermore, the Russian parliamentary crisis of October 1993, 
which Yeltsin ended by having tanks fire at the Parliament, revived the argument that 
Russia was inherently undemocratic and would not change course despite the end of 
communism. After the crisis, a survey showed that 70 per cent of Poles considered 
Russia a military threat (Snyder 2003: 278). 
For the rest of the 1990s, while Poland prepared for Western integration and Russia 
faced repeated economic crises, Polish-Russian diplomatic relations were restricted 
to the bare minimum. In 2002 Vladimir Putin finally travelled to Poland, nine years 
after the last official visit of a Russian president (Feklyunina 2012: 438). However, 
the renewed activism of Russia‘s foreign policy under Putin, combined with the rapid 
economic growth that the country experienced in the years 2000-2008, reawakened 
deep-seated Polish fears of the powerful Eastern neighbour.  
In 2004, Poland and Russia got involved in the dispute between pro-Western Viktor 
Yushchenko and pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovich for the post of president in 
Ukraine. Warsaw and Moscow resented each other‘s attempts to influence political 
developments in a neighbouring state (cf. Minton 2006). The following year was 
marred by a series of bilateral crises, culminating in a Russian ban on the import of 
Polish meat and dairy products. In response, Poland (an EU member since 2004) 
vetoed the start of EU-Russia negotiations on a new Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement (Feklyunina 2012: 439). Furthermore, Putin‘s invitation of his Polish 
counterpart Aleksander Kwasniewski to the May 2005 celebrations of the Soviet 
victory in the Second World War revived the Polish public debate on Soviet crimes 
in Poland during the war (cf. Onken 2007). 
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 Furthermore, the Liberal Democratic Party of Vladimir Zhirinovsky, who strongly opposed Poland’s 
NATO membership, became the largest party at the December 1993 parliamentary elections and 
seemed poised to take over power in Russia. Zhirinovsky publicly referred to Poland as “NATO’s 
whore” (cited in Snyder 2003: 278). 
Divisive identity, divided foreign policy? 
 
95 
National identities in historical perspective 
Polish official discourses about Russia became further radicalised due to the 2005 
electoral victory of the profoundly anti-Russian and anti-German party Law and 
Justice of Lech and Jaroslaw Kaczynski. The Law and Justice governments made 
constant use of historical analogies to address foreign policy issues with Germany 
and Russia. In 2006 Polish defence minister Radoslaw Sikorski dubbed the Nord 
Stream gas pipeline connecting Russia to Germany via the Baltic Sea (thereby 
circumventing Poland) a ―new Molotov-Ribbentrop pact‖.
52
 A year later, Law and 
Justice foreign minister Anna Fotyga publicly called Russia and Germany Poland‘s 
―historic enemies‖ (cited in Reeves 2010: 522). The government‘s decision to host 
elements of the US anti-missile shield on Polish territory, describing them as an anti-
Russian guarantee, further spoiled relations with Moscow (Ozbay and Aras 2008). 
A study of articles concerning Russia published between 2000 and 2007 on Gazeta 
Wyborcza, the largest-circulation Polish daily, and on Rzeczpospolita, the third-
largest, reveals that historical stereotypes and rivalry were still dominant in Polish 
discourses (Levintova 2010). Russia was described mostly as an aggressive power, 
authoritarian, corrupt and xenophobic. Bilateral relations were framed negatively, 
particularly in the energy sector, where Russia was considered as an unreliable 
supplier. The worst criticism concerned the field of memory politics, most notably 
Russia‘s refusal to condemn the Yalta agreement and take responsibility for the 
Katyn massacre and the 1939 invasion of Poland. Furthermore, Russian political 
elites were portrayed very negatively and identified with the whole country. Only 
under themes such as culture and arts, Russia was portrayed in a more positive light 
(cf. Zarycki 2011). 
After the end of the Law and Justice governments, Polish-Russian relations started to 
improve. In October 2007, centre-right candidate Donald Tusk won the elections and 
became prime minister. The Tusk government sought partial reconciliation with 
Russia by adopting a pragmatic approach on economic issues and by fostering 
dialogue on sensitive topics such as the Katyn massacre. Anti-Russian discourses did 
not disappear but were toned down, at least at the official level. The Russian ban on 
the import of Polish meat and dairy products was swiftly lifted and Poland removed 
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its veto on the negotiations of the EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement. Some progress was made also in discussions regarding historical 
controversies. In 2010 a forum of prominent Russian and Polish experts appointed by 
their respective governments produced a joint publication addressing sensitive issues, 
including the Katyn massacre and the origins of the Second World War (Feklyunina 
2012: 438-441).
53
 According to surveys, the number of ordinary Poles seeing Russia 
as friendly modestly rose from 9 per cent in 2005 to 19 per cent in 2011 (Feklyunina 
2012: 445). 
For the first time in the history of Polish-Russian relations, in April 2010 the two 
countries‘ prime ministers jointly commemorated the Katyn massacre (Schwirtz 
2010). However, the atmosphere of reconciliation generated by the joint 
commemoration was marred only a few days later by the plane crash in which Polish 
president Lech Kaczynski died. In the months following the accident, the Polish right 
overtly blamed Russia for the plane crash and constructed a discourse stressing 
Russian past and (alleged) present crimes, which swiftly became dominant. This 
discourse was strengthened further in 2011, when a Russian enquiry commission 
published a report exculpating the Russian authorities from responsibility for the 
accident. Conspiracy theories blaming Russia for a ―new Katyn‖ became 
omnipresent in Polish media.
54
 
Hence, Poland‘s reconciliation with Russia under Tusk was only partial and has 
proven to be fragile. Virulent anti-Russian discourses have remained prominent both 
at official and unofficial level and are often voiced by Law and Justice, which enjoys 
the support of approximately one-third of the electorate and is one of the two largest 
parties in the country. Furthermore, relations with Moscow were tense during the 
2008 Russian-Georgian war and its aftermath. Apart from some tentative 
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 The forum was named “Group on difficult issues” and their work was published under the title 
White Spots – Black Spots: Difficult Issues in Russian–Polish Relations (Feklyunina 2012: 440). 
Furthermore, Andrzej Wajda’s movie on Katyn, produced in Poland, was shown on Russian 
television, which greatly contributed to ordinary Russians’ awareness of the massacre. Cf. Timothy 
Garton Ash, “This tortured Polish-Russian story is something we can all learn from”, The Guardian, 23 
February 2011, www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/feb/23/tortured-polish-russian-story 
(accessed 4/2/2013). 
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 Cf. Simon Shuster, “Russia–Poland tensions rise with crash report”, The Time, 19 January 2011. 
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reconciliatory steps, historical contentions are far from resolved and are likely to 
retain their prominence in official discourses in the near future (Feklyunina 2012: 
441-444).  
 
Table 9. Dominant themes in Polish identity discourses 
National identity discourses Discourses on Russia 
National martyrdom (Christ of nations) Imperialist and aggressive 
National heroism Brutal occupying power for most of 
Poland‘s modern history 
Catholicism Oriental, undemocratic and corrupt 
Euro-Atlanticism Relativising Poland‘s distance from the 
West 
Unreciprocated commitment to the West Partner in pragmatic foreign policy 
 
Source: own compilation 
 
 
Nordicity along the East-West continuum: the historical 
construction of Finnish identity 
Finnish national identity has been constructed around the concepts of marginality, 
Nordicity and the historical necessity to locate the country along an East-West 
continuum. These conceptualisations do not merely concern geography; they have 
profound cultural and political significance and have shaped the way Finns perceive 
their country and its role in the international arena. They were constructed during the 
last two centuries within historical frameworks that allowed Finland to become first 
an autonomous entity within the Russian empire, then a fully independent country. 
The year 1809 marks a key date in the construction of Finnish national identity. After 
nearly six centuries of Swedish control, the Grand Duchy of Finland was created as 
part of the Tsarist Empire, with autonomous institutions and a distinct legal and 
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administrative system (Tiilikainen 1998: 120-122). Within this political context, 
Finns could develop for the first time a feeling of national belonging based on a 
common language and the rediscovery of their cultural heritage.
55
 The lack of full 
political independence was not perceived as an obstacle to the emergence of the 
nation at this stage. Finland was considered as a young nation in the process of 
maturation. Within this discourse, the autonomy acquired under Russian tutelage was 
seen as a considerable step forward from the period of Swedish domination. Key 
figures of the Finnish national movement such as Yrjö Sakari Yrjö-Koskinen and 
Johan Vilhelm Snellman argued that the nation could be constructed also within 
Russian imperial structures by focusing on the cultural sphere and temporarily 
renouncing ambitions of independence (Browning and Lehti 2007: 697). 
The dichotomy between the cultural and the political conception of the nation, each 
gaining the upper hand in different historical periods, has remained a key element of 
Finnish identity until today (Joenniemi 2002). In the nineteenth century, the 
emphasis on cultural identity was also part of a discourse portraying Finland as a 
small nation that needed the protection of a stronger, benevolent Other while it 
developed a distinct identity. Simultaneously, Finnish nationalists used the Grand 
Duchy‘s peripheral location in the Tsarist Empire and its administrative autonomy to 
relativise Finland‘s political dependence on Russia. Being marginal meant being 
distinct from the rest of the empire. Marginality and the notion of being a small 
country at the mercy of neighbouring great powers became dominant traits of Finnish 
identity and of Finland‘s self-image in the international arena (Browning and Lehti 
2007, Tiilikainen 2006). 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the central government‘s Russification 
campaigns and increasing repressiveness led to a gradual rethinking of Finland‘s 
national identity construction and relationship with Russia. While the Finnish 
leadership attempted to accommodate Russian requests and retain political 
autonomy, a new conception of national identity, based on ethnicity and exclusive 
boundaries, became widespread (Joenniemi 2002: 198). According to this view, 
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literature. It had a profound impact on virtually all aspects of Finnish cultural life. 
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national identity could not be based simply on cultural distinctiveness and political 
autonomy; Finns had to strive for full independence and the creation of a nation-
state. The Russian revolution provided the opportunity to disentangle the country 
from the crumbling Tsarist Empire. In December 1917 Finland proclaimed its 
independence. 
The newly-born Finnish state immediately experienced a bloody civil war between 
the political right and the left, which led to a radicalisation of national identity 
discourses. The victory of the right in Finland and the success of the Bolsheviks in 
the Russian civil war brought about fundamental changes in Finnish self-images and 
perceptions of the country‘s international role. The Soviet Union was orientalised 
and constructed as the main national threat, while Finland was portrayed as an 
outpost of Western civilisation (Joenniemi 2002: 199). From this time, locating 
Finland somewhere along a continuum between East and West became a permanent 
feature of national identity discourses (Browning and Lehti 2007: 691). In the 
following decades, the country was alternatively depicted as a Western, anti-Soviet 
bastion or as a bridge between East and West, with the function of bringing Russia 
closer to the latter. 
In the interwar period, ethnonationalism dominated Finnish political discourses and 
was accompanied by the formulation of expansionist foreign policy ideas, such as the 
creation of a Greater Finland extending to Eastern Karelia and Siberia. Confidence in 
the country‘s ability to stand on its own and confront larger neighbours was 
temporarily bolstered by the successful defensive campaigns of the Winter War 
against the Soviet Union (1939-1940). Eventually, such confidence was however 
shattered by Finland‘s entanglement in the broader geopolitical struggle between 
Nazi Germany and the USSR and its defeat in the Second World War (cf. 
Vehviläinen 2002). The harsh conditions imposed by the Soviets at the end of the 
war, including the loss of considerable portions of national territory and a large 
indemnity, led Finnish leaders to reject the political course of the interwar years and 
reformulate the country‘s foreign policy (Browning 2008: 169-178). 
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Dominant discourses stressed that involvement in great power politics had had 
catastrophic consequences for Finland. The idea of Finland as a small nation that 
should adopt a pragmatic policy and stay aloof from geopolitical struggles as much 
as possible remained central in foreign policy making throughout the Cold War. 
Pragmatism in foreign policy meant primarily accommodating the requests of the 
Soviet Union, the powerful neighbour with which Finland shared a border of over 
1,000 kilometres in length. In 1948 a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual 
Assistance with the Soviet Union was signed. While maintaining good relations with 
the USSR, Finland became a neutral state. This pragmatic foreign policy doctrine 
became known as Paasikivi-Kekkonen line, from the names of Juho Paasikivi, who 
became president in 1946 and is credited with having started it, and his successor 
Urho Kekkonen, who was in office from 1956 until 1981 (Browning 2008: 169-171; 
cf. Tiilikainen 1998: 146-151). 
The key objective of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line was the preservation of 
independence and territorial integrity, which appeared seriously threatened at the end 
of the Second World War. The idea of the nation as sovereign and linked to a 
specific territory survived the defeat in the war against the USSR and was a key 
foreign policy tenet throughout the Cold War. This conception also constituted the 
pragmatic essence of ―Finlandisation‖, a termed coined in the German scholarly 
debate during the Cold War referring to the policy of securing sovereignty through 
appeasement of the Soviet Union (Jokela 2010: 56).
56
 Following this policy line, 
Finland would accommodate Soviet requests and obtain in return Soviet acceptance 
of its independence, political system and free market economy (Browning 2008: 
176). 
The choice of neutrality in the East-West confrontation was also pragmatic and 
functional to the country‘s foreign policy interests. It sent a positive message to both 
Cold War camps. For the communist world, it meant that Finland would stay neutral 
in international crises, despite its adherence to Western values. The 1948 treaty with 
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 In Finland the term “Finlandisation” has acquired a negative meaning, indicating an excessive 
willingness to appease the Soviet Union also at times when Moscow no longer seemed poised to 
threaten Finnish sovereignty (cf. Browning 2008: 207, Jokela 2010: 56). 
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the Soviet Union was a further guarantee that Helsinki was interested in maintaining 
good relations with the Eastern bloc. For the West, neutrality was a message of 
belonging: it could be read as evidence that Finland had been forced to accommodate 
Soviet interests, but while doing so it kept Western political and economic structures. 
As the Cold War unfolded, Finnish neutrality evolved from a defensive policy for the 
preservation of sovereignty to an opportunity to acquire an active role in mediating 
the East-West conflict. Finland was constructed as a successful bridge builder within 
the framework of detente between the two blocs. The 1975 summit of the Conference 
on Security and Co-operation in Europe, which was held in Helsinki, was arguably 
the greatest success of the Finnish policy of bridge building between East and West 
(Tiilikainen 1998: 153-156). 
The policy of neutrality allowed Finland to become active and construct a distinct 
identity also in other fields of world politics where some room for manoeuvre existed 
outside the East-West conflict. Most notably, the country became a prominent 
supporter of ―internationalist solidarism‖ (Browning 2007: 33), namely the efforts to 
bridge the economic gap between rich and poor states. Finland was a fervent 
advocate of the United Nations and, together with the other Nordic countries 
(Sweden, Norway and Denmark), provided 25 per cent of the military personnel 
deployed in UN operations during the Cold War (Browning 2007: 35). Alongside the 
focus on international solidarity, Finland shared with its Nordic neighbours the 
domestic model of egalitarian social democracy (portrayed as a third way between 
communism and capitalism) and the international image of being a peaceful and 
highly modern society. These three elements became the foundations of a Nordic 
identity through which Finland constructed its international role during the Cold War 
(Browning 2007: 32-35). 
When the Cold War ended, the main tenets of Nordic identity and of Finland‘s self-
image were challenged by the new geopolitical reality. The idea of the Nordic 
countries as the most peaceful region of Europe and as the main supporters of 
international solidarity became somewhat anachronistic, particularly as the European 
Union started to be constructed as the main guarantor of peace in the continent and 
became the largest provider of development aid. Most importantly, the end of the 
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East-West confrontation questioned the significance of a model that was alternative 
to the Cold War‘s blocs. Domestically, it made little sense to define the Nordic social 
democratic model as a middle way between Western European capitalism and 
Eastern European communism, as the latter no longer existed. In foreign policy, 
Finland had to face the fact that it appeared no longer useful to define its identity in 
terms of an East-West continuum. The changed international scenario caused a 
temporary identity crisis in the country (Browning 2007: 36-43, Tiilikainen 1998: 
159; cf. Waever 1992). 
The crisis was however solved in a relatively short period through the combination of 
a new identity discourse and the adaptation of pre-existing discourses. The new 
narrative argued that Finland could finally return to the West and to Europe, after 
being forced to stay at their margins in order to retain its sovereignty during the Cold 
War (Browning and Lehti 2007: 704). This was exemplified by the country‘s first 
foreign policy moves after the end of the Cold War. The 1948 treaty with the Soviet 
Union expired in 1992 and Finland applied for membership in the European Union, 
which was granted after nearly 57% of Finns expressed their approval in a 
referendum held in October 1994 (Joenniemi 2008: 186). 
The shift in Finland‘s foreign policy identity brought about by accession to the 
European Union could be reconciled with pre-existing identity discourses. The EU 
was conceptualised as an entity that did not intrude on the Finnish social model and 
on the country‘s security policy. Hence, it could coexist with Finland‘s Nordic 
identity (Joenniemi 2002: 204). Within the European Union, Finland also attempted 
to keep its Cold War role as bridge builder to Russia. The Northern Dimension, a 
Finnish initiative launched in 1998 to coordinate the Union‘s cross-border policies 
with Norway, Iceland and particularly Russia, provides the best example of these 
attempts (cf. Haukkala and Ojanen 2011: 159-161).  
By stressing interdependence and the need for cooperation among the countries 
involved, the Northern Dimension sought to blur the boundaries between the 
European (and Finnish) Self and the Russian Other. In particular, it endeavoured to 
harmonise the EU‘s views and policies with those of its partners. For instance, during 
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the 1999 Finnish presidency of the European Union, Northern Dimension partners 
were invited to present position papers prior to the European Council summit in 
Helsinki; their stance influenced the drawing up of a relevant EU action plan 
(Haukkala 2005: 287-288).  
Despite the EU‘s declared objective of creating a common foreign and security 
policy for its members, Finland did not relinquish its neutrality in the military field. 
The Finnish security discourse was partially reframed in terms of alignment. Helsinki 
conceded that it had aligned with the West and the EU politically and economically, 
but continued to adhere to military non-alignment (Jokela 2010: 61). This position 
has constantly enjoyed the support of the majority of Finns, which highlights how 
strongly the country‘s public opinion has internalised military neutrality as part of 
national identity. Surveys conducted in the years 1996-2008 revealed that a 
proportion of Finns oscillating between 58 and 79 per cent believed that Finland 
should remain neutral (Möller and Bjereld 2010: 371). 
The ease with which Finland adapted its foreign policy identity to the new post-Cold 
War conditions may be understood through the country‘s historical tendency to 
adjust itself to changing foreign policy scenarios in order to survive (Joenniemi 
2002: 209). The awareness of being a small nation with limited room for independent 
manoeuvre in foreign policy has continued to be a key characteristic of Finnish 
political identity (Tiilikainen 2006). However, Finnish policy makers have justified 
the country‘s foreign policy flexibility also in more positive terms. A discourse on 
Finland as a young, future-oriented nation that quickly adapts itself to the challenges 
of the modern world has emerged, somewhat in continuation with the country‘s early 
nineteenth century depictions (cf. Joenniemi 2010: 56). Locating Finland at the 
economic centre of the globalised world, in spite of its small size and geographic 
marginality, is the main aim of the current discourse (Browning and Lehti 2007: 
708). 
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Russia in Finnish discourses: economic partner and 
“security deficit” 
The discussion of Finnish national identity construction has highlighted Russia‘s and 
the Soviet Union‘s prominent role in Finland‘s history and foreign policy choices. By 
contrast with dominant Polish narratives, Russia has not always been portrayed as a 
threat in Finnish discourses. In fact, for most of the nineteenth century a majority of 
Finns considered the Tsarist Empire as a benevolent Other that allowed Finnish 
culture and national identity to blossom (Joenniemi 2010: 48). Russia‘s benevolence 
was contrasted with the previous period of Swedish government, during which Finns 
had enjoyed much less autonomy and cultural independence. The positive experience 
under the Tsarist Empire constituted an important precedent for later Finnish leaders 
who made the case for peaceful coexistence and close cooperation with Russia 
(Browning 2003: 53). 
The positive memory of the early Tsarist period is however counterbalanced by that 
of the conflicts that characterised bilateral history in the first half of the twentieth 
century. The Russian Revolution allowed Finland to break off the Tsarist Empire and 
acquire full political independence, but it also created an ideological and military 
threat east of the newly-born Finnish state. With the rise of Finnish ethnonationalism 
in the 1920s and 1930s, a new narrative depicting Russians in overtly racist terms (as 
evil, treacherous and culturally inferior) became prominent. The border with the 
Soviet Union was considered a civilizational demarcation between European and 
Asian culture (Browning 2007: 700). 
The radicalisation of negative discourses on the Soviet Union reached a peak during 
the Winter War (1939-1940), when the Red Army attempted a full-scale invasion of 
Finland. The unexpected and strenuous Finnish defence saved the country‘s 
independence and became one of the key national myths. In this narrative, the 
Russians play the role of brutal aggressors against whom the whole country united. 
The loss of the region of Karelia to the Soviet Union and the resettlement of its 
inhabitants to other areas of Finland were constant reminders of the pain inflicted by 
the Soviets (cf. Forsberg 1995, Vehviläinen 2002). The desire to avenge Soviet 
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aggression led Finland to participate in the German attack against the Soviet Union 
in 1941.  
Military defeat eventually stimulated a reconsideration of Finland‘s stance towards 
its powerful Eastern neighbour. The virulent anti-Soviet discourses of the interwar 
years were considered responsible for the outbreak of a war that Finland could not 
win. They had also legitimised Soviet security concerns and subsequent military 
action. Finland‘s post-war leaders concluded that criticism of the USSR had to be 
curtailed in order to avoid a new confrontation (Browning and Lehti 2007: 700-701). 
Since the Soviet victory and the geopolitical realities left no alternative, the majority 
of Finns supported this policy line. Finland‘s economic success, the development of 
an alternative social model and its global role as a peace-maker translated into 
constant support for the neutral, Soviet-friendly foreign policy throughout the Cold 
War. Criticism of the Soviet Union was self-censored and the country was publicly 
described as an important partner for Finland (cf. Vihavainen 2006: 31). Threat 
perceptions did not disappear, but they were not voiced at official level. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the expiry of the 1948 treaty have changed the 
nature of Finland‘s relations with its Eastern neighbour. Finnish media and public 
opinion have often openly criticised Russia in the post-Cold War period. The post-
war policy of appeasement towards the USSR no longer provides a model for Finnish 
foreign policy and has been retrospectively condemned by some politicians. 
However, at official level rhetoric has not changed dramatically. There are no 
prominent bilateral controversies left unsolved from the past; even the wartime loss 
of Karelia, which has remained part of Russia, is no longer considered as an 
important issue by the majority of Finns. When Finnish politicians refer to their 
country‘s historical relationship with Russia, they almost always emphasise positive 
moments, such as the development of Finnish national identity under Russian rule in 
the nineteenth century and the ―special‖ Finnish-Soviet relationship during the Cold 
War (Vihavainen 2006). 
Finnish perceptions of a security threat emanating from Russia still exist. Evidence 
for this is provided by Finland‘s continued reliance on territorial defence and a 
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relatively large army of reservists. Finnish political and military leaders do not 
openly mention Russia as a threat, but they refer to it indirectly, often speaking in 
code and with euphemisms such as ―Finland‘s security deficit‖ (Forsberg 2006: 143). 
Some scholars go as far as arguing that the image of a Russian threat is still present 
in Finnish psyche and is an essential component of the grand national narrative (cf. 
Medvedev 1999: 104). However, a majority of Finns is in favour of friendly relations 
with Moscow (Forsberg 2006: 148). After the crises and instability of the 1990s, 
Russia has become again a key trade partner for Finland. Within the European 
Union, Finland is one of the main advocates of a policy of constructive engagement 
with Russia. Finns consider maintaining a positive dialogue with Moscow essential 
in order to avoid confrontation at their country‘s borders (Etzold and Haukkala 2011: 
253-254). 
Furthermore, Helsinki has retained positive bilateral relations with Moscow, which 
guarantee a safe channel of communication whenever the European Union proves 
unable to formulate a shared policy towards Russia (Haukkala and Ojanen 2011: 
165; cf. Vihavainen 2006: 45). Finland‘s reluctance to abandon its military non-
alignment and join European or Transatlantic security structures is evidence of the 
importance that is still attributed to bilateral relations with Russia. Finnish leaders 
and public opinion believe that a change in the country‘s security policy would 
alienate Russia, thereby producing more security drawbacks than benefits for Finland 
(cf. Giles and Eskola 2009). Hence, Finland has upheld its constructive policy 
towards Moscow and has reconciled EU membership with its traditional role as 
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Table 10. Dominant themes in Finnish identity discourses 
National identity discourses Discourses on Russia 
Moving along an East-West continuum 
(bridge builder to East / Western outpost) 
Benevolent Other 
Marginality Economic partner 
Nordicity (egalitarian social model, 
international solidarity, multilateralism) 
Finland‘s ―security deficit‖ 
Neutrality  
Finland as a young and modern nation  
 
Source: own compilation 
 
Conclusion: national identities and historical discourses as 
interpretive frameworks 
This chapter showed that current German, Polish and Finnish national identities are 
the result of a longue durée process of construction that extends well into the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The analysis emphasised that, following the 
experience of National Socialism and of GDR Soviet-style communism, German 
identity has been constructed around the rejection of authoritarianism and war. 
Economic prosperity, political stability, democracy and multilateralism in 
international politics (notably the advocacy of policies agreed upon at EU level) have 
become key tenets of German identity.  
In Poland, national identity narratives have focused on the themes of martyrdom and 
heroism. The martyrdom narrative focuses on the country‘s loss of independence and 
foreign occupation from 1795 until 1918, during the Second World War and 
throughout the Cold War. The heroism narrative stresses that Poland never accepted 
its loss of independence and consistently fought for its freedom, in spite of 
overwhelming hostile forces and the indifference of Western democracies. During 
the periods of foreign occupation and tutelage, the Catholic Church and Catholicism 
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acquired fundamental importance as key constituents of Polish identity, providing 
ideological and institutional support for the political forces fighting for 
independence.  
Finnish identity construction was profoundly influenced by the country‘s 
geographical location and its geopolitical implications. Narratives of marginality and 
Nordicity played an essential role, with the latter acquiring particular importance 
during the Cold War. In this historical phase, Finland closely identified with the 
Nordic countries‘ egalitarian social model, support for international solidarity and for 
multilateralism as a way to address international disputes. Most importantly, Finland 
was conceptualised as a country moving along an East-West continuum, belonging to 
the West ideologically but simultaneously acting as a bridge builder towards the 
East, namely Russia and the Soviet Union. This self-perception as mediator between 
East and West also contributed to turning neutrality into a key factor of the country‘s 
post-1945 identity. 
Russia emerged as an important Other in national identity narratives in the three 
countries under investigation. However, constructions of Russia varied significantly 
from country to country and over time. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
through to the Cold War, most German discourses dismissed Russia as authoritarian, 
corrupt and backward. While these narratives still play a role in post-reunification 
Germany, new dominant discourses have emerged, portraying Russia as an essential 
economic partner and as a key international actor that Germany must engage. The 
Ostpolitik discourse, advocating dialogue and partnership with Russia, has been 
particularly influential from the 1970s onwards. 
By contrast, Russia was constructed as the main negative Other in Polish identity 
throughout Poland‘s modern and contemporary history (sharing this role with 
Germany until 1945 and for brief spells in the early 1990s and mid-2000s, at times of 
tension between Poland and Germany). Dominant Polish narratives portrayed Russia 
as imperialist, aggressive, undemocratic, oriental and therefore unaware of the 
Western values that Poles claimed to cherish. Only recently, following the election of 
Donald Tusk to the post of prime minister (in 2007), a more positive discourse on 
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Russia has emerged, highlighting its role as potential partner in a pragmatic foreign 
policy. 
Dominant Finnish narratives alternated positive and deeply negative representations 
of Russia over time. In the early nineteenth century, Russia was considered mostly as 
a benevolent Other that liberated Finland from Swedish oppression and allowed it to 
become autonomous. As a result of the policies of Russification in the latter part of 
the century and the Bolshevik revolution, dominant discourses changed radically. 
Soviet Russia was seen as the most formidable threat to Finnish independence, a 
perception that was strengthened after the Soviet aggression in 1939. Both positive 
and negative discourses survived after the Second World War, but were reformulated 
in more moderate terms. Russia was portrayed both as an essential economic partner 
and, due to its military might, as the chief source of Finland‘s ―security deficit‖. 
Hence, the analysis of national identity and historical narratives on Russia revealed 
considerable differences across the three countries under investigation. Table 11 
below summarises the dominant discourses, as they emerged from the analysis in this 
chapter. In the following chapters, these findings are used as an interpretive 
framework to examine foreign policy makers‘ speeches and statements on Russia 
between 2005 and 2012. It is possible that some of the identity constituents and 
narratives listed in table 11 may have a stronger reflection than others in the foreign 
policy speeches under analysis. With the passage of time, some identity discourses 
that played a role in foreign policy making in the past may have lost importance, 
while others may have emerged in a slightly different form, adapted to present 
circumstances. While allowing for these eventualities, the analysis refers to key 
elements in longue durée national identity formation and historical discourses on 
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Table 11. Dominant themes in German, Polish and Finnish identity discourses 
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This chapter presents the first of the three case studies examining German, Polish 
and Finnish foreign policy makers‘ discourses on Russia. It investigates discourses 
on the Nord Stream pipeline project and, more broadly, on the energy relationship 
between the European Union and Russia in the years 2005-2012. The analysis shows 
that national narratives diverged considerably and that identity provides a useful 
interpretive framework to explain this diversity. The key questions addressed are: 
how are the Nord Stream pipeline and energy relations with Russia portrayed in 
foreign policy makers‘ discourses? What are the main discursive strategies and 
linguistic devices used in each discourse? How do these discourses relate to national 
identity and to the constructed images of Russia therein? How do different national 
discourses relate to each other? 
In order to answer these questions, the dissertation applies the theoretical and 
methodological framework outlined in chapters 2 and 3. Foreign policy makers‘ 
statements on Nord Stream and energy relations with Russia are deconstructed and 
examined within their political, historical and sociological background through 
discourse-historical analysis. The chapter then investigates the relationship between 
dominant discourses and national identity. In particular, dominant narratives are 
related to the key elements of national identity construction and to the historical 
perceptions of Russia that were discussed in chapter 4. 
The chapter opens with a concise survey of the broad policy context in which 
discourses on Nord Stream and energy relations with Russia were formulated. The 
main factors that motivated the construction of the pipeline and the stance of the 
European countries affected by the project are reviewed briefly. This background 
contextualises the case study and shows its significance for both the EU‘s and its 
member states‘ relations with Russia. In the following sections, the main German, 
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Polish and Finnish discourses are analysed. Each section includes a brief introduction 
of the national political context and of the main actors (heads of state or government 
and foreign ministers) that were involved in the construction of dominant discourses 
on Nord Stream and energy relations with Russia. 
Ultimately, this chapter allows for a comparison of national discourses on one of the 
most important and controversial aspects of EU-Russia relations, namely the energy 
partnership. The main insights emerging from this comparison are outlined in the 
concluding section of the chapter. The choice of a particularly contentious policy 
field as case study allows an assessment of whether divergent perceptions of Russia 
and of its policies can be interpreted and understood through the prism of national 
identity. 
 
The framing of the Nord Stream project 
The debate concerning the European Union‘s and its member states‘ energy security 
was one of the liveliest in European foreign policy circles during the period under 
consideration. The demand of fossil fuels in EU member states is much larger than 
domestic production. In 2005, EU member states imported most of their gas and oil 
from several neighbouring countries, including Russia, Norway and Algeria. Russia 
was the EU‘s main energy partner, accounting for 40 per cent of the Union‘s total 
gas imports and 36 per cent of its oil imports (Aalto and Westphal 2008: 7). Faced 
with declining domestic production and increasing demand, most EU member states 
were concerned with securing energy imports from non-EU countries. Due to the 
EU‘s plans to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide, gas (as a less polluting fossil fuel 
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 The European Commission website argues that “natural gas, the cleanest fossil fuel, is a vital 
component of the world's energy mix *…+ At a time when European reserves are being depleted and 
consumers' appetite continues to increase, natural gas is becoming critically important to the EU”; 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/observatory/gas/gas_en.htm (accessed 29/5/2014). 
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As the longest standing gas provider to Europe and holder of the world‘s largest gas 
reserves, in 2005 Russia was an essential energy partner for most European countries 
(Högselius 2013). Most Central and Eastern European states were heavily reliant on 
imports of Russian gas. In the three countries under analysis, this reliance varied. It 
was highest in Finland, where 100 per cent of imported gas came from Russia, and 
lower but nevertheless very significant in both Poland and Germany, with 
respectively 63 and 45 per cent of total gas imports coming from Russia (Aalto and 
Westphal 2008: 8). The share of gas in total national energy consumption was 
particularly high in Germany (23 per cent), followed by Poland (13 per cent) and 
Finland (10 per cent).
58
  
Russian gas was channelled to EU member states through pipelines. However, 
among the EU countries only Finland, Estonia and Latvia had direct pipeline 
connections with Russia. Russian gas reached the markets of other EU member states 
after transiting the territory of Ukraine and Belarus, two former Soviet republics that 
were also heavily dependent on imports of Russian energy supplies. Most of the gas 
(around 100 billion cubic meters a year) was channelled to Central Europe via the 
Brotherhood (Bratstvo) pipeline in Ukraine, which had been built in the late 1960s 
and expanded over the subsequent decades. The Yamal-Europe pipeline, built in the 
late 1990s to transport Russian gas to Poland and Germany via Belarus, provided an 




As long as Russia‘s relations with Ukraine and Belarus were good, Russian gas 
supplies to Europe via the Brotherhood and Yamal-Europe pipelines were 
undisrupted and secure. The situation changed in the mid-2000s, when diplomatic 
relations between Russia and Ukraine became tense and Russia‘s state-owned energy 
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 The data on the share of gas in total national consumption refer to 2004 and is available in the 
European Commission’s Energy Mix Fact Sheets for Germany 
(http://ec.europa.eu/energy/energy_policy/doc/factsheets/mix/mix_de_en.pdf), Poland 
(http://ec.europa.eu/energy/energy_policy/doc/factsheets/mix/mix_pl_en.pdf) and Finland 
(http://ec.europa.eu/energy/energy_policy/doc/factsheets/mix/mix_fi_en.pdf, all accessed 
29/5/2014). 
59
 In 2005 the Yamal-Europe pipeline transported 20 billion cubic metres of gas a year, less than one 
fifth of the total gas shipped through the Brotherhood complex of pipelines (Högselius 2012: 213). 
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company Gazprom announced its intention to gradually increase the price of gas sold 
to Belarus and Ukraine.
60
 Until then, Russia had sold gas to both countries at prices 
far below market levels (cf. Balmaceda 2012: 138). The Ukrainian and Belarusian 
governments attempted to resist price increases and their frequent disputes with 
Gazprom led to several disruptions in the flow of Russian gas to the European Union, 
starting with the January 2004 Russia-Belarus gas dispute.
61
 Most of these disputes 
followed a similar pattern: when the Ukrainian or Belarusian governments refused to 
accept Gazprom‘s price increases, the Russian company stopped gas supplies. 
Belarus and Ukraine then siphoned off the Russian gas transiting their territory 
directed to the European Union for national consumption. As a result, the security of 
Russian gas supplies to Central and Western Europe became increasingly dependent 
on the status of Russian-Ukrainian and Russian-Belarusian relations (cf. Balmaceda 
2012, Pirani 2012). 
Both Russia and EU member states investigated possible solutions to strengthen the 
security of Russian gas supplies. On 8 September 2005 Gazprom and the German 
energy companies BASF and E.ON signed an agreement for the construction of a 
North European gas pipeline (renamed Nord Stream in 2006) connecting Russia and 
Germany via the Baltic Sea. The planned pipeline bypassed Ukraine, Belarus and all 
other East-Central European countries (see map 1).  
 
                                                          
60
 Tensions were due mainly to the Orange revolution in Ukraine in November 2004 and Viktor 
Yushchenko’s election to the Ukrainian presidency in January 2005. The Russian leadership 
considered Yushchenko hostile to Russia’s interest and backed then Kremlin-friendly candidate 
Viktor Yanukovych. 
61
 Further disputes on the price of energy between Russia and Belarus took place in January 2007 
and June 2010, whereas the main Russian-Ukrainian disputes happened in January 2006 and January 
2009. 
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The government of German chancellor Gerhard Schröder was particularly 
enthusiastic about the project and gave financial guarantees to cover part of its cost. 
In December 2005, a few weeks after the end of his mandate as chancellor, Schröder 
became chairman of the Nord Stream consortium‘s board.
62
 Nord Stream thus 
appeared as a German-Russian corporate project with strong governmental backing 
in both countries. However, both before and after the Russian-German deal of 
September 2005 the project saw the involvement of other European actors. The 
planning for a pipeline connecting Russia to Central Europe via the Baltic Sea started 
in the mid-1990s as a Russian-Finnish initiative. Finnish companies Neste and 
Fortum were involved in the planning process until 2004. In 2000 the European 
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 Following his appointment to the Nord Stream board, Schröder was heavily criticised both in 
Germany and abroad for having obtained private gains out of his political support for the pipeline 
when he was chancellor; cf. “Schröder attacked over gas post”, BBC News, 10 December 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4515914.stm (accessed 29/5/2014). 
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Commission declared the North European gas pipeline one of the key energy projects 
involving European interests and included it in the Trans European Natural Gas 
Network guidelines. Between 2007 and 2010 the Dutch company Gasunie and the 
French GDF Suez also acquired stakes in the project, thereby making it a joint 
Russian-German-Dutch-French endeavour (cf. Smith 2012: 122-123).
63
 
The Nord Stream project involved key energy companies of Western and Central 
European EU member states but had no stakeholder in the East-Central European 
countries that joined the EU in 2004. In fact, the pipeline was designed and built 
following a route that circumvented not only Belarus and Ukraine, but also the three 
post-Soviet Baltic republics (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) and Poland. Despite 
Gazprom‘s argument that this choice had been made in order to avoid transit fees, the 
governments of Poland and the Baltic republics considered the pipeline‘s route to be 
politically motivated. Russia and the EU member states supporting Nord Stream, 
particularly Germany, were accused of making deals that were detrimental to the 
interests of East-Central European states and to EU plans to build a shared European 
energy policy (Westphal 2008: 109). According to this argument, Nord Stream 
would create a preferential energy corridor from Russia directly to Germany and 
Western Europe. Russia would then be able to use its gas exports to East-Central 
Europe as a political lever, reducing supplies and increasing costs at its discretion 
while leaving gas flows to West European countries unaffected.
64
 Poland and the 
Baltic states feared that they would be increasingly exposed to Russian political and 
economic influence, a prospect that awakened anti-Russian collective memories and 
parallels with their subjugation to the Soviet Union during the Cold War (cf. Grigas 
2013). The debate on Nord Stream became heavily politicised, with identity and 
memory politics playing a major role in its development. 
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 Following the entry of GDF Suez in the consortium in March 2010, Nord Stream stakes were 
divided as follows: Gazprom 51%, Wintershall (subsidiary of BASF) 15.5%, E.ON 15.5%, Gasunie 9% 
and GDF Suez 9%. 
64
 Polish officials strongly advocated the expansion of the Yamal-Europe pipeline’s capacity as an 
alternative to the construction of Nord Stream. This would have allowed Poland to acquire a key role 
as transit country of Russian gas to Central Europe and to earn transit-related revenues (cf. Gorska 
2010: 107-134, Westphal 2008: 110). 
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In the Nordic coastal states of the Baltic Sea, the public debate focused primarily on 
the environmental consequences of the pipeline. Nord Stream was to transit the 
Finnish, Swedish and Danish exclusive economic zones and posed a potential threat 
to the already fragile Baltic Sea ecosystem.
65
 In October and November 2009, after 
four years of analyses concerning the pipeline‘s environmental impact, the Danish, 
Swedish and Finnish authorities granted the Nord Stream consortium the 
authorisations to build the necessary infrastructure in their exclusive economic zones 
(Smith 2012: 124-126; cf. Aalto and Tynkkynen 2008). The construction of the 
pipeline began in early 2010 and gas started flowing through the first of the four 
planned lines in September 2011. On 8 November 2011, Nord Stream‘s official 
inauguration took place in the presence of German chancellor Angela Merkel, 
Russian president Dmitri Medvedev, French and Dutch prime ministers François 
Fillon and Mark Rutte and European Commissioner for Energy Günther Oettinger. 
The expansion of the pipeline has continued since then, with the inauguration of the 
second line in October 2012 and preparatory work for the construction of a third and 
fourth line.
66
 While the pipeline was under construction, Gazprom signed long-term 
contracts to supply gas via Nord Stream to customers in Germany, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, France and the United Kingdom (Smith 2012: 121). 
  
A pipeline in Europe’s interests: German leaders’ discourses  
The Nord Stream pipeline and energy relations with Russia are a central theme in 
numerous speeches and newspaper interviews of German political leaders throughout 
the period under analysis. Between 2005 and 2012 Germany had three governments. 
The first one had a centre-left majority, with social democrat Gerhard Schröder as 
chancellor and Green Party leader Joschka Fischer as foreign minister; its mandate 
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 An exclusive economic zone is an area of the sea over which a state has special rights for the 
exploration and use of resources. For a more technical definition of the term, cf. article 55 of the 




 If built, the third and fourth lines will double Nord Stream’s current capacity, reaching 110 billion 
cubic metres a year (cf. Socor 2013). 
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ended in November 2005. Angela Merkel, a member of the centre-right Christian 
Democratic Union, was chancellor in the second and third cabinets, covering the 
whole remaining timeframe of analysis (November 2005-December 2012). During 
her first government, which lasted until October 2009, Merkel was in a coalition with 
the centre-left Social Democratic Party. Frank-Walter Steinmeier, a leading member 
of the social democrats, covered the post of foreign minister. In October 2009, 
following new parliamentary elections, Merkel formed a coalition with the centre-
right Free Democratic Party (FDP). FDP leader Guido Westerwelle became foreign 
minister in the new cabinet.  
The analysis focuses on speeches and interviews held by Merkel, Steinmeier and 
Westerwelle. Schröder was still in power when the agreement on the construction of 
Nord Stream was signed (8 September 2005). However, his party lost the 
parliamentary elections only ten days later (18 September) and his government had 
to step down the following November. The archives that were consulted do not 
include any statements on Nord Stream by Schröder or Fischer dating back from the 
period September-November 2005 (between the signature of the construction 
agreement and the end of their mandate). Hence, the analysis starts from the speeches 
and interviews given by chancellor Merkel and foreign minister Steinmeier after the 
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 The speeches and statements of German federal presidents were not included in the analysis 
because the federal president does not play a major role in foreign policy making. The German 
constitution only gives the federal president ceremonial functions in foreign policy, such as the 
conclusion of international treaties and the accreditation of foreign envoys; cf. Article 59 of the Basic 
Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, full text available at https://www.btg-
bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf (accessed 15/5/2013). Furthermore, no speeches or statements 
on Nord Stream were found in the electronic archive of the German presidency, neither in the 
English nor in the German version. 
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Table 12. German foreign policy leaders in the period under investigation 
Chancellor Foreign Minister 
 
Angela Merkel  
(November 2005 – December 2012) 
Frank-Walter Steinmeier  
(November 2005 - October 2009) 
Guido Westerwelle 
(October 2009 – December 2012) 
 
Source: own compilation 
  
Three broad discourses emerged from the analysis of German leaders‘ speeches on 
Nord Stream and energy relations with Russia in the period under analysis. The first 
one emphasised that Russia was a reliable energy partner and referred to the long 
history of German-Russian energy cooperation, which started in the late 1960s and 
became a key component of West German chancellor Willy Brandt‘s Ostpolitik (cf. 
Högselius 2013, chapter 7; Lippert 2011).
68
 This discourse advocated a pragmatic 
approach to German-Russian energy relations: as Russia was a reliable partner and 
could export the gas that Germany and the European Union needed, projects such as 
Nord Stream contributed to Europe‘s energy security. It also argued that the EU and 
Russia were interdependent in the energy sector: Russia needed the European export 
markets just as much as the EU needed Russian gas. The second discourse stressed 
the European dimension of Nord Stream and of German energy policy towards 
Russia. Within this narrative, German initiatives were presented as consistent with 
EU policies and objectives. The third discourse took a normative approach and 
linked themes such as the respect of human rights, democratic freedoms and 
European values to the debate on German-Russian and EU-Russian energy relations.  
The next sections investigate these three broad discursive areas. The analysis follows 
a chronological order (starting from earlier texts), which allows studying the 
development of discourses over time. However, relationships among different texts 
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 On Ostpolitik, see chapter 4. 
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developing the same discourse (intertextuality) and between the three discourses 
outlined above (interdiscursivity) are also examined. 
 
Russia as reliable energy partner: history, pragmatism and interdependence 
The discourse on Russia‘s reliability as energy partner was prominent throughout the 
period under analysis, regardless of the speaker‘s political affiliation. The case for 
Russia‘s reliability tended to be constructed through the discursive strategy of 
argumentation and was bolstered by references to German-Russian energy 
cooperation from the 1970s until today. As the argument went, Russia had been a 
reliable energy partner for decades, even at the height of the Cold War, when Europe 
was divided into competing political and military blocs; hence, there was no reason 
to doubt Russia‘s reliability in much less strained times. In this discourse, history is 
the topos that connects the argument (Russia is a reliable energy partner) to its 




In the texts retrieved, the discourse on Russia‘s reliability appeared first in an 
interview of foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier with the German news 
broadcasting radio RBB Inforadio, dated 14 October 2006.
70
 Steinmeier was asked 
whether he considered Russia an ―absolutely reliable energy supplier‖, in the context 
of a discussion on the 2006 Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute and the criticism of 
Poland and the Baltic States against the Nord Stream project. He argued that 
Germany never had any reason to claim that Russia was an unreliable energy 
supplier. Furthermore, in the same interview Steinmeier highlighted the German 
tradition of Ostpolitik towards Russia and argued for ―Annäherung durch 
Verflechtung‖ (convergence through economic interlocking), a phrase that is 
reminiscent of Willy Brandt‘s Ostpolitik motto ―Wandel durch Annäherung‖ (change 
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 As explained in chapter 3, topoi are content-related parts of the argumentation that connect the 
arguments with the conclusion. 
70
 Frank-Walter Steinmeier’s interview with RBB Inforadio, 14 October 2006, 
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Infoservice/Presse/Interviews/2006/061014-
SteinmeierRBB.html (accessed 15/5/2013). 
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through rapprochement). Hence, Steinmeier justified his cabinet‘s energy policy 
towards Russia by building parallels with the German Ostpolitik of the 1970s, which 
in German foreign policy identity is positively framed as a historical example of 
constructive cooperation with Russia.
71
  
Steinmeier made selective use of the history of German-Russian energy relations by 
evoking exclusively the memory of peaceful cooperation in the latter part of the Cold 
War and after the fall of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, he harshly criticised 
arguments comparing his government‘s Russia policy to that of interwar Weimar and 
Nazi Germany. This became particularly clear in his speech at Viadrina European 
University on 26 October 2006.
72
 A few months before the speech was held, Polish 
defence minister Radoslaw Sikorski had compared the Nord Stream pipeline to the 
Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939.
73
 With implicit reference to Sikorski‘s statements, 
Steinmeier emphasised the inappropriateness of using catchwords such as ―Rapallo‖ 
(an allusion to the German-Soviet treaty signed in 1922, when both Germany and the 
USSR had revanchist aspirations in Eastern Europe) and ―Hitler-Stalin pact‖ to 
describe present German-Russian relations. The symbolic location where 
Steinmeier‘s speech was held, a European university founded on the German-Polish 
border shortly after the end of the Cold War, was functional to his argument: it 
suggested that Germany was seeking reconciliation with all its Eastern neighbours 
within, as he put it, ―a united Europe that has learned from past experiences‖. 
Steinmeier‘s references to the history of German-Russian relations aimed at 
providing evidence for Russia‘s reliability as energy partner. This emerged, for 
instance, in his interview with the German business news magazine 
Wirtschaftswoche on 22 January 2007.
74
 In this interview, the German foreign 
minister talked of the ―long tradition in energy and economic cooperation‖ between 
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 See chapter 4. 
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 Cited in Stephen Castle, “Poles angry at pipeline pact”, The Independent, 1 May 2006. 
74
Frank-Walter Steinmeier‘s interview with Wirtschaftswoche, 22 January 2007, 
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Infoservice/Presse/Interviews/2007/070122-WiWo.html 
(accessed 15/5/2013). 
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his country and Russia. He also used the discursive strategy of predication, most 
notably through stereotypical evaluations, to label Russians in positive terms, namely 
as reliable partners (―the Russians are partners with whom you can speak frankly and 
who keep their word‖). 
Positive references to the history of German-Russian energy relations surfaced also 
in later speeches held by chancellor Angela Merkel. In a joint press conference with 
Russian president Vladimir Putin on 1 June 2012, Merkel stated that Russia was ―a 
reliable [energy] supplier‖ and that Germany ―experienced this for decades‖.
75
 
Merkel‘s argumentation aimed at strengthening the case for Germany‘s energy 
partnership with Russia and for the construction of the Nord Stream pipeline, which 
she described as a successful ―German-European project‖. In a speech held in 
October 2012 at the German Committee on Eastern European Economic Relations
 
(Ost-Ausschuss der deutschen Wirtschaft), an influential business group advocating 
the interests of German companies in Eastern Europe, Merkel went as far as claiming 
that the gas deals between West Germany and the Soviet Union in the 1970s greatly 
enhanced German-Soviet relations. Moreover, she portrayed German economic 
involvement in the USSR as a ―success story‖.
76
 
The history of successful German-Russian energy cooperation was used also as an 
argument in favour of adopting a pragmatic approach in relations with Russia. In the 
interview with Wirtschaftswoche, Steinmeier argued that relations with Russia had to 
be assessed in ―realistic‖ rather than ―overly emotional‖ terms, bearing in mind both 
past cooperation and Europe‘s future energy needs. The argument was sustained by 
the use of perspectivation, a discursive strategy through which the speaker adopts a 
strongly subjective rhetoric and clearly positions his point of view.
77
 In order to 
advocate pragmatism in relations with Russia, Steinmeier stressed the ―undisputable 
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fact‖ that Russia ―is and will remain Europe‘s neighbour‖. Furthermore, he argued, 
Europeans had to confront the reality that Russian energy supplies would acquire 
increasing importance for the EU due to the depletion of other import sources. 
Hence, as he aptly summarised in an article published on the German magazine 
Internationale Politik in March 2007, ―for the EU Russia is an indispensable partner 
of strategic significance‖ and ―the key factor in our energy supply, above all in the 
field of gas‖.
78
 Following from this line of argument, Steinmeier described the Nord 




The German foreign minister was careful not to describe Europe‘s reliance on 
Russian gas in terms of a threatening strategic dependence. Conversely, Steinmeier 
portrayed EU-Russia energy relations as an example of positive interdependence, a 
relationship from which both sides could benefit. This view was best articulated in 
his speech at the French Institute of International Relations (an influential, Paris-
based think tank) in February 2008.
80
 Steinmeier argued that Russia and Europe were  
 
economically dependent on each other […] Russia needs the income 
from fossil fuels exports to the EU and the EU needs secure and stable 
energy supplies from Russia. 
 
According to Steinmeier, the Russian pipeline system was ―geared so much towards 
Europe‖ that Russia was ―as – or even more – dependent on exports to Europe as is 
Europe on imports from Russia‖. Following this argument, Nord Stream 
strengthened the current interdependence and was ―a very important contribution to 
Europe‘s energy security‖. Through the use of perspectivation, Steinmeier expressed 
his personal conviction that Russia and the EU were interdependent (―I feel very 
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inclined to follow the reasoning of interdependency supporters‖) and again referred 
to ―historical experience‖ to bolster his view. 
Interdependence and pragmatism retained their prominence in German foreign policy 
makers‘ discourses about energy relations with Russia also after the end of 
Steinmeier‘s mandate as foreign minister (October 2009). On 8 November 2011, at 
the inauguration ceremony of the Nord Stream pipeline, Angela Merkel argued that 
EU gas importers and Russia would ―benefit equally from the pipeline‖.
81
 The 
pipeline itself was the ―expression of a long-lasting cooperation that offers great 
economic opportunities‖. These opportunities, as Merkel explained in a joint press 
conference with Putin in June 2012, were particularly important ―for many German 
companies that have signed long-term contracts with Russia‖.
82
 Merkel highlighted 
German corporate interests in energy relations with Russia in many other public 
speeches. During a press conference held in July 2011, for instance, she publicly 
endorsed the business strategy of BASF/Wintershall, one of the main German 
companies involved in the Russian gas sector.
83
  
The strong, long-term German economic interests in the Russian energy market 
contribute to explaining the pre-eminence of pragmatism and of a cooperative 
approach in German official discourses on Russia throughout the period under 
analysis. However, most of the speeches under investigation did not overstress the 
bilateral dimension of German-Russian economic relations. German foreign policy 
makers juxtaposed national interests to European interests and, consistently with 
Germany‘s pro-European and multilateral foreign policy identity, they attempted to 
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Europeanising Nord Stream and German-Russian energy relations 
In the texts analysed, German foreign policy makers portrayed the Nord Stream 
project as an European endeavour and rebuffed criticism describing it as a German-
Russian pipeline. Argumentation was the main discursive strategy used to emphasise 
Nord Stream‘s European and multilateral nature. The key argument was that, next to 
Germany and Russia, other countries and foreign companies had become involved in 
the Nord Stream project. It was claimed that the pipeline would bring profits to a 
diverse group of European actors and contribute to European energy security, hence 
it was a European endeavour. Economic usefulness is the topos that connects the 
argument (Nord Stream is a profitable European project) to its logical conclusion 
(Nord Stream should be supported by the EU and its member states).  
This discursive strategy emerges in Steinmeier‘s interview with RBB Inforadio on 14 
October 2006. Steinmeier argued that Germany‘s energy policy with Russia was 
functional to European interests and cited the Nord Stream pipeline as an example. 
According to him, the participation of a Dutch company in the Nord Stream 
consortium and Britain‘s interest in extending the pipeline to its territory 
demonstrated that the project ―does not just satisfy a specific German interest but 
also strengthens European energy policy‖.
85
 The same argument was repeated in his 
interviews with the prominent Polish daily Gazeta Wyborcza on 10 December 2007
86
 
and on 17 June 2009.
87
  
In other speeches, Steinmeier stressed the European dimension of Nord Stream by 
presenting foreign companies that were only indirectly linked to the project as its 
supporters. In his talk at the French Institute of International Relations in February 
2008, he suggested that French, Dutch, British and Danish companies were 
supporting the pipeline‘s construction because they had already ordered large 
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quantities of gas that would be channelled through it.
88
 Furthermore, in an interview 
held in February 2009 with another large-circulation Polish daily, Rzeczpospolita, 
Steinmeier stated that Nord Stream was originally a Finnish project, thereby 
implying that German companies merely took over a corporate initiative started in 
another EU member state.
89
 
Steinmeier‘s successor as German foreign minister, Guido Westerwelle, continued to 
portray German energy policy with Russia as consistent with EU policy. In a speech 
delivered in October 2010 at a prominent German think tank, the German Council on 
Foreign Relations, Westerwelle argued that Germany‘s policy towards Russia was 




The old and persistent suspicion that Germany was implementing its 
policy on Russia without consulting our [Germany‘s] immediate 




As emerges from this passage, Westerwelle advocated Germany‘s policy towards 
Russia by minimising the criticism directed at it. The argument (stressed inter alia by 
Polish leaders) that Germany‘s policy towards Russia pursued unilateral interests 
was negatively qualified as ―old and persistent suspicion‖.
92
 In a speech held a few 
days earlier at the German Committee on Eastern European Economic Relations, 
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 For an extensive discussion of Polish criticism of Germany’s energy policy towards Russia, see 
section on Poland below, in chapter 5. 
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Merkel used an even harsher tone, defining criticism against Nord Stream as 
―multifarious stereotypes‖ that her cabinet had managed to ―dismantle‖.
93
 
By contrast, in most of the German policy makers‘ speeches under investigation the 
semantic field associated with Nord Stream was unambiguously positive and 
emphasised its correlation with European policies. This emerged with utmost clarity 
in Merkel‘s talk at the pipeline‘s inauguration ceremony, in November 2011. 
Through the discursive strategy of predication, she qualified Nord Stream as a 
―strategic project […] exemplary for the cooperation between Russia and the 
European Union‖, an ―outstanding example‖ for the construction of a ―robust 




The Europeanness of Nord Stream was constructed also through the discursive 
strategy of categorisation, which aims at defining in-groups and out-groups through a 
selective use of language and figures of speech. In German foreign policy makers‘ 
speeches on Nord Stream, categorisation was used to construct a European energy 
community as an in-group that included both the European Union and Russia. Within 
this framework, the Nord Stream pipeline was categorised as European in spite of the 
fact that it was mostly a German-Russian project (Russian and German companies 
control 82 per cent of the consortium) and some EU member states were vocally 
opposed to it.  
In the speeches under analysis, this categorisation was built up progressively and 
became more forceful over time. In the earlier texts, Steinmeier emphasised the 
pipeline‘s European nature by stressing that it was not a national or bilateral project, 
as argued by its critics. In his speech at the French Institute of International Relations 
of February 2008, Steinmeier claimed that Nord Stream was ―a European, not a 
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German project‖
95
. He reiterated this point also in an interview with Gazeta 
Wyborcza in June 2009, when he stated:  
 
I hear time and again that Nord Stream is a German-Russian project. No, 




In later texts, criticism of the pipeline‘s bilateral nature was ignored and Nord Stream 
was defined exclusively in positive terms. In October 2010, Merkel described it as a 
―European-Russian project‖
97
 and in, June 2012, as ―a German-European project‖
98
, 
thereby simultaneously emphasising the European dimension of the project and 
Germany‘s leading role in it.  
In Merkel‘s later speeches, the tone and content of the discourse on Nord Stream‘s 
European nature became more assertive. The chancellor went as far as arguing that, 
if the pipeline did not fully comply with EU standards, the latter should be adjusted 
accordingly. This argument was made in particular with reference to the EU‘s third 
energy package, namely the legislation that stipulates a different ownership for 
energy production and energy transmission networks (a controversial provision for 
Nord Stream, as Gazprom is both the gas producer and main owner of the pipeline).
99
 
In her speech at Nord Stream‘s inauguration in November 2011, Merkel raised this 
issue before EU Energy Commissioner Günther Oettinger (sitting in the audience):  
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The third energy package is not immediately understandable for someone 
outside Europe […] And, dear Günther Oettinger, perhaps we should 




Merkel reiterated this point in October 2012, during her speech at the German 
Committee on Eastern European Economic Relations. Addressing once again 
Commissioner Oettinger, who was sitting in the audience, she argued:  
 
Indeed, dear Günther Oettinger, we must admit: also the European 
Union‘s actions sometimes confuse our partners. I am thinking about the 
legendary discussions on why someone who owns a pipeline […] cannot 




Using the discursive strategy of perspectivation, Merkel clearly positioned herself 
against the application of the EU‘s third energy package to the Nord Stream pipeline. 
However, she was not dismissive of European rules and attempted to reconcile them 
with the project. For instance, in a joint press conference with Putin in November 
2012, she argued: ―[…] I will continue to lobby, also in Brussels, for using the 
pipelines we have, rather than ending up – so to speak - without gas‖.
102
 In 
accordance with Germany‘s pro-European foreign policy identity, Merkel attempted 
to keep her policy on Nord Stream within the EU framework. 
 
Energy, democracy and European values 
In many of the speeches under analysis, German policy makers discussed the issue of 
democracy and human rights in Russia alongside or within the context of energy 
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relations. This is particularly true of speeches held in the period until late 2010, 
which attempted to reconcile the view of Russia as an economic partner with 
Germany‘s concern for the respect of democratic values and human rights. This 
approach to relations with Russia reflected the interaction of two key components of 
German national identity, as seen in chapter 4: both narratives on Russia as an 
economic partner and on the centrality of democracy and human rights are key 
constituents of Germany‘s foreign policy identity. In the speeches in question these 
two discourses were reconciled with the argument that energy cooperation between 
the EU and Russia was functional to the strengthening of democracy and human 
rights in Russia, as it created both the economic prosperity in which these principles 
could be implemented and a positive atmosphere for dialogue.
103
 Hence, the German 
identity narrative advocating democracy and human rights was used instrumentally 
to support economic cooperation with Russia. Humanitarianism and economic 
advantage are the topoi that connect the argument with its logical conclusion: the EU 
should support energy cooperation with Russia. 
This line of argument emerged clearly in foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier‘s 
interviews and speeches. In his interview with RBB Inforadio of October 2006, 
Steinmeier argued that the EU-Russia energy partnership should lead to the 
strengthening of democracy and ―European values‖ in Russia.
104
 In the same 
interview, he claimed that ―a wise and correct policy‖ towards Russia had to address 
both human rights and business, which in his opinion were not mutually exclusive. 
This argument was further developed in an article on EU-Russia relations published 
on the German magazine Internationale Politik in March 2007. In the article, 
Steinmeier claimed that there was ―no contradiction between our [the EU‘s] interest 
in expanding economic relations and the respect of human rights and the rule of 
law‖. Energy cooperation, he argued, could be developed into a much broader 
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partnership where it was possible to address also ―issues on which we [the EU] do 
not always share the same opinion [with Russia]‖.
105
 
On the question of reconciling the energy partnership with the promotion of 
democracy and human rights in Russia, foreign minister Guido Westerwelle adopted 
the same approach as his predecessor. In his speech at the German Council on 
Foreign Relations in October 2010, Westerwelle stated that ―regarding Russia as a 
partner is the best way to solve problems‖, including ―shortcomings in Russia‘s 
society and mode of governance‖.
106
 Furthermore, in an interview with the German 
daily Der Tagesspiegel in November 2010 Westerwelle argued that the economic 




In the speeches held by the German policy makers under analysis after 2010, energy 
cooperation and the question of democracy and human rights in Russia tended to be 
discussed separately, with very few exceptions. This might be due to the 
deterioration in democratic and human rights standards in Russia following the 
parliamentary elections of December 2011, which may have made German leaders 
reluctant to discuss the energy partnership within the context of Russia‘s increasing 
authoritarianism. Internal developments in Russia from December 2011 seemed to 
refute the argument previously made by German leaders that increasing economic 
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From Molotov-Ribbentrop to economic nonsense: Polish 
leaders’ discourses  
The Nord Stream project sparked a heated debate in Polish society and among the 
country‘s political leaders, most of whom argued that the pipeline undermined 
Poland‘s interests. The analysis focuses on discourses of Polish prime and foreign 
ministers who were in power from the signing of the Nord Stream agreement until 
the end of 2012. Furthermore, the speeches of president of the republic Lech 
Kaczynski are also investigated, as he was very vocal and prominent in the debate on 
energy relations with Russia throughout his mandate (2005-2010). Conversely, his 
successor Bronislaw Komorowski (in power since August 2010) did not become 
significantly involved in the debate on Nord Stream; none of the 323 entries on the 
Polish presidential website concerning Komorowski‘s speeches and activities refers 
to the pipeline.
109
 When specifically asked about Nord Stream in media interviews, 
Komorowski adopted the same political line and arguments as the contemporary 
Polish government headed by Donald Tusk. 
In the period under analysis, Poland had four prime ministers and four foreign 
ministers. The mandates of the first two prime ministers (Marek Belka and 
Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz) and foreign ministers (Adam Rotfeld and Stefan Meller) 
were very short, covering only the period until May-July 2006.
110
 Since the archives 
consulted had no speeches by these policy makers addressing Nord Stream or energy 
policy towards Russia, the analysis will focus on discourses of their successors. 
These include prime minister Jaroslaw Kaczynski and foreign minister Anna Fotyga, 
both members of the right-wing party Law and Justice, which in May 2006 formed a 
coalition government with the far right parties Self-Defence of Polish Farmers and 
League of Polish Families. Following the October 2007 parliamentary elections, 
Jaroslaw Kaczynski and Anna Fotyga were succeeded respectively by Donald Tusk 
and Radoslaw Sikorski, both members of the more moderate centre-right party Civic 
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Platform. Tusk and Sikorski were re-elected for a second mandate in October 2011 
and stayed in power throughout the remaining period under analysis. 
 
Table 13. Polish foreign policy leaders in the period under investigation  























Source: own compilation 
  
The main discourse in Polish foreign policy makers‘ speeches between 2006 and 
2007 emphasised that Russian leaders used fossil fuel resources to achieve political 
aims, notably to strengthen their influence on the countries that depended on energy 
imports from Russia. It stressed Russia‘s historical role as a geopolitical threat for 
Poland and constructed parallels between Russia‘s past and present policies. During 
the same period, another dominant narrative focused on the lack of solidarity among 
EU member states with regard to their energy policy towards Russia. As the 
argument went, the agreement to build Nord Stream highlighted the self-serving 
logic guiding the policies of some EU member states, which supported the pipeline 
in spite of its negative impact on the energy security of other members. The 
discourse on the lack of EU solidarity is reminiscent of a dominant theme in Polish 
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identity narratives, namely Poland‘s unreciprocated commitment to the Western 
cause.
112
 In the context of the Nord Stream debate, Polish leaders argued that their 
commitment to build a shared EU energy policy was not reciprocated by Germany 
and other EU members supporting the pipeline‘s construction. 
The two discourses introduced above played an important role also in Polish policy 
makers‘ speeches and interviews held after 2007, particularly in president Lech 
Kaczynski‘s statements. However, following the change of government in November 
2007, another dominant discourse emerged. Tusk and Sikorski adopted a more 
pragmatic tone with regard to energy relations with Russia and emphasised the need 
for cooperation. In their public speeches, opposition to the Nord Stream project was 
voiced mostly with economic arguments, while references to historical rivalries and 
Russia‘s hostile geopolitical intentions were downplayed. The next sections in this 
subchapter analyse more in detail the three dominant discourses in Polish leaders‘ 
statements concerning Nord Stream and energy relations with Russia. 
 
History, geopolitics and the political use of energy 
The discourse on Russia‘s political use of energy was ubiquitous in Polish leaders‘ 
speeches during the right-wing government of Jaroslaw Kaczynski (July 2006 – 
November 2007). In this period, all the main institutional posts concerned with 
Poland‘s foreign policy making (prime minister, foreign minister and president of the 
republic) were held by members of the ultraconservative and deeply anti-Russian 
Law and Justice party (cf. Reeves 2010). The main argument within this discourse 
emphasised that Russia abused its role as chief energy supplier of Eastern European 
countries in order to exert political pressure on them. In particular, it was argued that 
Russia made energy deals with Central and Western European EU member states 
(most notably Germany) undermining the interests of East-Central European 
members. According to this view, Nord Stream was one of such deals. Memory 
politics played a prominent role in this discourse, as comparisons with Soviet 
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Russia‘s former domination of Poland and with Nazi-Soviet plans to partition 
Eastern Europe were made in order to bolster the main argument. History is the topos 
linking the argument with its logical conclusion, namely the claim that Russia 
intended to re-establish a sphere of influence over Eastern Europe. 
Radoslaw Sikorski‘s interview with the German magazine Der Spiegel on 1 May 
2006 exemplifies the prominence of memory politics in this discourse.
113
 Sikorski, 
then the defence minister in Jaroslaw Kaczynski‘s right-wing government, argued 
that the Nord Stream agreement was reminiscent of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact 
because it was ―geopolitically targeted against Polish interests‖. The comparison 
with the Nazi-Soviet agreement to partition Poland, an event deeply engrained in 
Polish identity as one of the worst national catastrophes, highlights both the deeply 
anti-Russian posture of Kaczynski‘s government and the strong interaction between 
Polish identity and foreign policy discourses on Russia. Sikorski made instrumental 
use of the national identity narrative of Polish victimhood in the Second World War 
to pursue current political interests, namely discrediting and opposing the Nord 
Stream project.  
The analogy between Russia‘s energy policy and past Soviet policies towards Poland 
emerged very clearly also in prime minister Jaroslaw Kaczynski‘s interview with the 
German daily Handelsblatt in October 2006.
114
 Kaczynski claimed that Poles  
 
do not want to be afraid that, at some point, someone will shut off our 
[Poland‘s] supply [of gas]. The older and adult generations of Poles can 
still remember well that, 25 or 30 years ago, they were asking themselves 
the question: will the Russians invade us or not? 
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Kaczynski‘s reasoning suggested that, for many Poles (including himself, as a 
member of the older generation), Russia appeared as threatening to Poland‘s 
independence as the Soviet Union in the 1980s, when they feared an imminent Soviet 
military invasion to crush the anti-communist opposition movement.
115
 Russia‘s 
energy power was juxtaposed to the military threat emanating from the Soviet Union. 
Linguistically, the analogy between Soviet and Russian foreign policy is emphasised 
by Kaczynski‘s metonymic use of ―Russians‖ in lieu of ―Soviets‖. 
Sikorski‘s and Jaroslaw Kaczynski‘s line of argument and discursive strategy were 
echoed by president Lech Kaczynski in an interview for Der Spiegel, published in 
March 2006.
116
 In the interview, Lech Kaczynski stated that the reasons for building 
the Nord Stream pipeline were ―purely political‖ and that the project ―starkly 
contrast[ed] with Polish interests‖. Although the historical interpretive framework 
was not as explicit as in Sikorski‘s and Jaroslaw Kaczynski‘s interviews, it can be 
inferred easily also in Lech Kaczynski‘s statements. For instance, the Polish 
president argued that he was ―very vigilant when it comes to the German-Russian 
relationship‖ and, when asked whether Russia and Germany posed the greatest 
danger for Poland, he replied: ―That‘s certainly a true statement if you look at history 
books‖. 
Polish foreign policy makers‘ perception of Russia as a historical and geopolitical 
threat influenced also their assessments of EU-Russia energy relations. In a letter to 
The Financial Times published in May 2007, Sikorski stated that the Nord Stream 
pipeline was ―the most outrageous attempt by Mr Putin to divide and damage the 
EU‖ because it gave Russia the ―ability to decouple old and new members by 
differentially turning off the tap‖.
117
 Through the use of perspectivation and a harsh 
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anti-Russian rhetoric, Sikorski argued that Nord Stream would enable Russia to keep 
gas flows to Central and Western Europe unaltered while it simultaneously used its 
energy power to re-establish a sphere of influence in East-Central Europe. Hence, the 
pipeline was ―an economic and geopolitical disaster for the Union‖. According to 
Sikorski, EU member states could avert the threat of Russia‘s ―divide and rule‖ 
policy only by showing solidarity to each other. 
  
Nord Stream and European solidarity 
The discourse on European solidarity played a central role in Polish leaders‘ 
speeches criticising the Nord Stream pipeline, particularly during 2006 and 2007. 
Within this discourse it was claimed that, although Poland had joined the EU and 
was fully committed to its values, it was still not treated as an equal by other EU 
members.
118
 This criticism was addressed particularly to Germany, which was 
blamed for supporting the Nord Stream project in total disregard of Polish interests. 
In its handling of the Nord Stream question, it was argued, Germany showed no 
European solidarity to Poland and prioritised its partnership with Russia. Russia was 
portrayed merely as a negative factor, hostile to EU principles and eager to disrupt 
European solidarity. This discourse aimed at exposing the irreconcilability of Nord 
Stream and German-Russian energy policy with the European Union‘s values. 
Europeanism, meant as the commitment to EU values and policies, is the topos 
linking the key argument (Nord Stream undermines EU values) with its logical 
conclusion (Germany and the EU should withdraw their support of Nord Stream).  
The discourse on European solidarity featured prominently in Lech Kaczynski‘s and 
Sikorski‘s interviews in 2006 and 2007. The arguments of both politicians were 
based on the presumption that Russia used gas as a political instrument. In an 
interview with The Financial Times in November 2006, Kaczynski claimed that 
Russia‘s political use of energy was inherent in its possession of vast natural 
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resources (―Russia has enormous energy resources, and it is difficult not to take 
advantage of them‖).
119
 Hence, Russia‘s energy policy and the Nord Stream pipeline 
were portrayed as a test for European solidarity.
120
 In their comments on Nord 
Stream, Sikorski and Kaczynski concurred in the opinion that there was not enough 
solidarity in the EU on energy relations with Russia and put the blame on Germany. 
For instance, Sikorski argued that 
 
[…] To first make a decision and then offer consultations is not our idea 
of European solidarity […] We are shocked that Germany would do 




Kaczynski made a similar argument in his interview with the Financial Times.  
 
Question: do you expect that Germans will understand Poland‘s issues 
when it comes to energy? 
Lech Kaczynski: We do understand the need for compromise, but it 
cannot be that in this area a single European country, even a very 
powerful one, decides on a particular solution, almost as if it had stepped 
momentarily outside of the Union, and then says it will not change even 




To convey their criticism of Germany, both Sikorski and Kaczynski resorted to the 
discursive strategy of perspectivation, which is particularly evident in phrases such 
as ―we are shocked‖ or ―we do understand‖. Kaczynski did not mention Germany 
explicitly, but his allusion to it appears obvious in the light of the journalist‘s 
question. In spite of this reticence, Kaczynski‘s criticism was very harsh. His 
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reasoning suggested that Germany‘s support of the Nord Stream pipeline had placed 
the country outside the framework of the European Union. This assessment stands in 
complete contradiction to German foreign policy makers‘ discourse Europeanising 
Nord Stream and German-Russian energy relations and epitomises the conflict 
between contemporary German and Polish discourses on the pipeline. 
The narrative on European solidarity continues to play a role in Polish foreign policy 
makers‘ speeches on energy policy after the change of government in 2007. For 
instance, in an interview with the Financial Times in January 2010 Tusk defined 
Nord Stream ―an example of lack of energy solidarity‖
123
. Moreover, in an article 
published in July 2010 on the New York Times, Sikorski lamented that ―in areas like 
energy and military cooperation, some EU members act unilaterally‖.
124
 However, 
references to the lack of European solidarity became less frequent and were framed 
within a more moderate rhetoric. Russia was no longer portrayed exclusively as a 
hostile country trying to disrupt Polish interests and European solidarity. For 
example, in January 2010 Tusk adopted an unusually positive tone to describe 
relations with Russia. 
 
While we [the Polish government] say that there is a need for maximum 
European solidarity in the area of energy security, we do not have any 
particular problems ourselves. Relations with Russia and with Gazprom 
are very correct.
125
 (Donald Tusk, Financial Times, 27 January 2010) 
 
Polish criticism of Nord Stream continued also during Tusk‘s government but it no 
longer focused on claims of betrayed European solidarity. Pragmatic arguments such 
as the pipeline‘s economic cost became dominant. 
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Economics and pragmatism: Tusk’s Poland and Nord Stream 
As discussed in chapter 4, improving Poland‘s relations with Russia was one of 
Tusk‘s main foreign policy preoccupations after his election. Tusk attempted to 
pursue this objective by adopting a more pragmatic approach and rhetoric to address 
contentious issues in the relationship, including the Nord Stream question. His 
statements at the joint press conference with Putin in Gdansk in September 2009, 
during the commemoration of the seventieth anniversary of the outbreak of the 
Second World War, best summarise his change of rhetoric on Nord Stream.  
 
Concerning our position on Nord Stream, Poland is not suspicious on this 
issue. We do not suspect any evil political intentions [from Russia]. 
However, we evaluate this project sceptically from an economic and 




Tusk rejected the argument that Russia made a political use of energy, which had 
been a leitmotif in Polish leaders‘ speeches on Russia during Jaroslaw Kaczynski‘s 
government. Moreover, he did this on the occasion of a symbolic joint 
commemoration of a highly contentious historical event, on which Polish and 
Russian official memory narratives diverge (cf. Ruchniewicz 2007, Siddi 2012). This 
contrasts strikingly with previous Polish discourses that used memory politics to 
discredit Nord Stream as a political project. 
Tusk‘s criticism of Nord Stream was voiced in more moderate terms than in previous 
discourses (―we evaluate this project sceptically‖) and, most importantly, it was 
grounded on economic and environmental issues. This line of argument is 
representative of Polish foreign policy makers‘ discourse on Nord Stream during 
Tusk‘s cabinet. Economic advantage is the key topos of a discursive strategy that 
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attempted to accommodate opposition to Nord Stream with a milder rhetoric, 
conducive to reconciliation with Russia. 
The economic discourse against Nord Stream focused on the higher cost of laying an 
underwater pipeline rather than building a land connection. Before the start of Nord 
Stream‘s construction, Tusk argued that building an alternative pipeline via the 
Baltic countries and Poland was much cheaper.
127
 Furthermore, in an interview with 
the Financial Times in January 2010 he stated that he did not understand the 
―economic rationale for a decision whose outcome is a much more expensive transit 
of gas than by the traditional land route‖.
128
  
The economic argument was reiterated in both Bronislaw Komorowski‘s and in 
Radoslaw Sikorski‘s remarks on Nord Stream in 2010 and 2011. In an interview with 
the European news channel Euronews shortly after his election as Polish president, 
Komorowski argued that ―the building of a more expensive pipeline via the Baltic 
[…] is the fruit of a decision that was taken too rapidly several years ago‖.
129
 In 
November 2011, commenting on Nord Stream‘s inauguration, Sikorski stated that 
the pipeline was ―a waste of money‖.
130
 In spite of this criticism, neither 
Komorowski nor Sikorski portrayed Nord Stream as a major threat for Poland. In the 
same interviews quoted above, Sikorski argued that Poland‘s energy security was not 
affected by the pipeline because gas was not very important in the country‘s energy 
mix. Komorowski maintained that Poland should strengthen its ties with Russia and 
Germany ―without concentrating too heavily on the Baltic gas pipeline‖. 
As Sikorski‘s and Komorowski‘s reasoning highlights, economic rationalisations on 
Nord Stream enabled Polish leaders to downplay the pipeline‘s actual importance for 
Poland. This approach was functional to the Polish government‘s overarching 
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objective of improving relations with Germany and Russia after 2007. Although 
Polish foreign policy makers remained critical of Nord Stream, they increasingly 
considered it as an old controversy that should not be allowed to disrupt present 
relations. This attitude was reflected, for instance, in Sikorski‘s statements during a 
joint interview with German foreign minister Westerwelle in November 2010. Asked 
whether Nord Stream was still a contentious issue in Polish-German relations, 
Sikorski briefly argued that the controversy belonged to the past and suggested 




Environmental challenges and a norm-based partnership: 
Finnish discourses 
In Finnish foreign policy making circles, the debate on Nord Stream was particularly 
lively between September 2005 and November 2009, when the Finnish authorities 
allowed the laying of the pipeline through Finland‘s exclusive economic zone in the 
Baltic Sea.
132
 Nearly all the Finnish policy makers‘ speeches and statements on Nord 
Stream that were retrieved date back from this period. During this timeframe, 
Finland had two governments, both headed by prime minister and Centre Party 
leader Matti Vanhanen. Social democrat Erkki Tuomioja was foreign minister under 
the first government (until April 2007), which was supported by a predominantly 
centre-left parliamentary coalition. Ilkka Kanerva (until April 2008) and later 
Alexander Stubb, both members of the centre-right National Coalition Party, were 
foreign ministers during Vanhanen‘s second government, which had a centre-right 
political orientation. 
Tarja Halonen was the president of Finland throughout the period when Nord Stream 
was a prominent topic in Finnish foreign policy makers‘ discourses. Since the 
Finnish president is responsible for the conduct of foreign policy (together with the 
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government)
133
 and Halonen played an important role in the Finnish debate on Nord 
Stream, her speeches are also analysed. On the other hand, no references to Nord 
Stream were found in either the speeches of Halonen‘s successor, Sauli Niinistö, or 
in those of prime ministers Mari Kiviniemi and Jyrki Katainen, who were in office 
after Matti Vanhanen. This may be because Nord Stream lost prominence in the 
Finnish political debate after the country agreed to the laying of the pipeline in its 
exclusive economic zone. 
 
Table 14. Finnish foreign policy leaders in the period under investigation 





(September 2005-April 2007 






 Mari Kiviniemi 
(June 2010-June 2011) 
Ilkka Kanerva 










Source: own compilation 
 
Two key discourses emerged from Finnish policy makers‘ speeches on Nord Stream 
and energy relations with Russia. The first one stressed that Finland and the EU 
should continue to foster energy relations with Russia because they needed Russian 
gas and Russia had proven to be a reliable supplier. Nord Stream was seen as a 
positive development for European energy security because, it was argued, more 
infrastructure was necessary to meet the EU‘s increasing energy demand. This 
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discourse also had a strong normative focus, as it argued that energy relations with 
Russia should take place in accordance with a clear regulatory framework that was 
compatible with EU energy market rules.
134
 The second discourse contended that, 
while a positive development for European energy security, Nord Stream also 
constituted an environmental challenge for Finland and other Baltic Sea countries. 
Within this discourse, Finnish policy makers claimed that Finland‘s support of the 
pipeline was conditional to the respect of environmental standards.  
The two dominant Finnish discourses on Nord Stream reflect both Finnish historical 
perceptions of Russia as an important economic partner and as Finland‘s ―security 
deficit‖.
135
 Russia‘s importance as an economic partner emerged from the first 
discourse, which portrayed it as a key energy provider. The perception of Russia as 
Finland‘s ―security deficit‖ appeared in the second discourse; the ―security deficit‖ 
stemmed from the environmental risks concerning the construction of Nord Stream. 
Both discourses can be found in speeches of policy makers with different political 
orientations. Hence, the texts under investigation suggested that political allegiance 
did not play an important role in shaping Finnish foreign policy makers‘ stance 
towards energy relations with Russia. 
 
Market and norms: Russia as a key energy partner 
In most of the speeches under analysis, Finnish policy makers argued that the EU and 
Russia should cooperate in the energy field because they were interdependent. In 
particular, the EU needed to engage Russia because of its dependence on Russian 
gas. Cooperation should be based on clearly established norms, which would allow 
the formation of a united European energy market, including Russia. Economic 
advantage, legality and Europeanism are the topoi in this argumentative strategy. 
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They connect the argument (the EU should engage Russia with a normative 
approach) to its logical conclusion that a norm-based cooperation will lead to mutual 
benefits and create a European energy market. 
This discourse emerged clearly in prime minister Vanhanen‘s speech at the European 
Business Leaders Convention (a forum of top business leaders, experts and political 
decision makers) in Saint Petersburg, in July 2006.
136
 Vanhanen called Russia ―a 
strategic partner for the EU‖ and claimed that, in the energy field, ―Russia and the 
EU have complementary needs – the EU as a customer and Russia as supplier‖. 
Moreover, he argued that EU-Russia energy cooperation should be developed in 
institutionalised frameworks (in particular, he referred to EU-Russia and G8 
summits) and be based on international and European law.
137
 A norm-based 
cooperation with Russia and other EU partners would allow the creation of ―truly 
European energy markets‖. 
 
We need truly European energy markets. European not in the EU 





Vanhanen thus substantiated his argument for cooperation with Russia by 
constructing European energy markets as an in-group of which Russia was a 
member. This inclusive discourse was grounded on economic considerations, which 
Vanhanen attempted to make more forceful through the use of perspectivation. 
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I am convinced that market logic means that the EU will remain Russia‘s 
main energy customer and Russia the EU‘s main supplier. Demand and 




Vanhanen‘s emphasis on market principles as the basis for EU-Russia cooperation 
was echoed in a speech held by foreign minister Tuomioja in May 2006.
140
 
According to Tuomioja, ―Finnish experiences of energy cooperation with Russia 
have been positive‖ and ―Russia has proved to be a reliable supplier‖ because 
Finland ―has always followed the market principles […] in its energy relations with 
Russia‖. He also stressed that 100 per cent of Finnish gas was imported from Russia 
and implied that this dependence did not constitute a problem because market rules 
were respected. 
Tuomioja‘s emphasis on economic arguments may also be due to the context in 
which his remarks were made. The speech was held at a seminar co-organised by the 
embassies of the Visegrad Group countries (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Hungary) in Helsinki. The leaders of some of these countries, most notably Poland, 
considered Russia‘s contemporary energy policy as an instrument to achieve 
geopolitical goals in East-Central European countries that depended on Russian 
energy supplies.
141
 Hence, Tuomioja‘s statements may have also been intended to 
convey to the Visegrad Group countries‘ representatives that positive energy 
cooperation was possible, in spite of energy dependence, if relations with Russia 
were based on market principles, rather than on geopolitical arguments. According to 
Tuomioja, the market would also ensure that, in spite of Nord Stream‘s construction, 
the Visegrad countries remained ―important transit routes for Russian energy 
supplies further to the West‖. 
The argument in favour of fostering energy relations with Russia and basing them on 
mutual confidence and market rules however appeared also in speeches held before 




 Erkki Tuomioja’s speech at the seminar "Visegrád Group and Finland", 31 May 2006, 
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audiences that were likely to be more sympathetic to Russia and Nord Stream than 
the Visegrad countries. President Tarja Halonen‘s speech at the Federation of 
German Industry in June 2006 provides a good example.
142
 Halonen argued that 
energy trade was beneficial for both buyers and sellers only if it was clearly 
regulated. According to her, EU-Russia energy dialogue had to be based on ―mutual 
interest and confidence‖. In this context, she stated that she considered the Nord 
Stream pipeline ―an acceptable development‖, thereby suggesting that she had no 
reason to doubt the economic rationale of the project.
143
 
Nord Stream‘s economic significance was emphasised also by prime minister 
Vanhanen in a speech held during a state visit to Japan in June 2008.
144
 In his 
remarks, Vanhanen positively characterised Russia as ―the most important energy 
supplier for the EU‖ and ―a reliable supplier of gas and electricity‖, using the 
discursive strategy of predication. If, occasionally, Russia had not managed to 
deliver the agreed quantities of gas, it was due to the lack of generating capacity and 
infrastructure. According to Vanhanen, Nord Stream contributed to addressing these 
deficiencies because it improved the infrastructure to transport Russian gas. 
Furthermore, he dismissed claims according to which the pipeline was a political 
project. 
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The main question to be raised in this context is not whether energy 





Vanhanen focused his assessment of Nord Stream and energy relations with Russia 
on economic and technical issues, such as Russia‘s export capacity. He believed that 
Russia had a genuine economic interest in the construction of Nord Stream and that 
its energy policy was the logical consequence of market structures. 
 
Russia is clearly interested in exporting more energy to Europe. The 
reason is simple: there is a buyer and there is a seller. Europe needs the 




According to Vanhanen, energy trade with Russia should be secured through 
investments in European and Russian energy production and transport, namely in 
projects such as Nord Stream. The argument that the EU should engage Russia to 
obtain the energy it needed is reiterated in foreign minister Alexander Stubb‘s 
statements. In an article published on his personal website in October 2009, Stubb 
went as far as arguing that Nord Stream would not suffice to satisfy the EU‘s 
increasing energy demand and the implementation of other energy projects involving 
Russia would be necessary.
147
 
Echoing Vanhanen‘s argument, Stubb claimed that Nord Stream was ―a commercial 
European energy security project‖ and that ―it gained a more political character than 
was probably intended‖.
148
 According to Stubb, the European countries that opposed 






 Alexander Stubb, “Europe’s gas dilemma”, October 2009,  
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the project could have taken a different stance if more discussions and closer 
cooperation had taken place. Hence, he advocated further institutionalisation of EU 
energy relations with Russia in order to promote cooperation and dialogue.
149
 This 
approach reflected the belief, recurrent in the Finnish foreign policy makers‘ 
speeches under analysis, that a European energy market including Russia could be 
created through the establishment of adequate institutions and norms. 
 
Nord Stream as an environmental challenge 
Although Finnish foreign policy makers were generally favourable to the Nord 
Stream project, most of them emphasised the respect of environmental standards as a 
fundamental prerequisite for its implementation. As the argument went, Nord Stream 
was a contribution to European energy security, but it should not affect negatively 
the Baltic Sea environment, which was Finland‘s primary interest. As the pipeline 
was to be laid in Finland‘s exclusive economic zone and an authorisation of the 
Finnish authorities was necessary for its construction, the debate on its 
environmental impact became dominant in the country. The stance of Finnish foreign 
policy makers on the issue is best summarised in the speech president Tarja Halonen 
gave in May 2008 at the Überseeclub in Hamburg, a German cultural and debating 
society. 
 
Finland considers the project [Nord Stream] a way of improving energy 
security in Europe. The pipeline in itself is a safe way of conveying gas, 
but we want – and indeed our legislation requires – that all environmental 
factors involved in the project will be carefully studied. When Finland 
decides on whether to allow the use of her sea areas, the decisions will be 
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Environmentalism and legality are the topoi that connect the argument (Nord Stream 
must respect environmental standards) to its logical conclusion (Finland will 
authorise the construction of Nord Stream only if it complies with its environmental 
legislation). Also in this discourse, Finnish foreign policy is framed within a strong 
normative dimension: decisions concerning Nord Stream are contingent upon the 
respect of environmental norms during the construction of the pipeline. 
Halonen‘s line of argument was reiterated in most other speeches under analysis in 
which Finnish policy makers referred to the Nord Stream project, irrespective of the 
audience to which they were addressed. In his remarks before the representatives of 
the Visegrad Group countries, foreign minister Tuomioja argued that Finland‘s 
interest was ―to ensure the fulfilment of environmental requirements‖.
151
 In a speech 
at the Norwegian Nobel Institute, Tuomioja‘s successor Ilkka Kanerva referred to 
Nord Stream within the context of an analysis of ecological threats in the Baltic 
Sea.
152
 He lamented that the Baltic was ―one of the most polluted seas‖ and had been 
―transformed into an energy supply route‖. He then stated that Finnish authorities 
would examine an environmental impact assessment before making decisions on 
Nord Stream. Along the same lines, foreign minister Stubb claimed that Nord Stream 
was ―largely an environmental issue‖.
153
 
Despite their reservations on the environmental impact of Nord Stream, Finnish 
foreign policy makers maintained a positive attitude towards both the project and 
energy cooperation with Russia. In fact, the controversy about the environmental 
impact of the pipeline ended in November 2009, when the Finnish authorities granted 
the authorisation to lay it in Finland‘s exclusive economic zone. Subsequently, 
references to Nord Stream‘s environmental impact were framed in more positive 
terms. For instance, in a speech held in May 2010 Halonen suggested that the 
planning of Nord Stream was an example of good cooperation with Russia because 
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Halonen‘s remark reflected the belief that Finland could best achieve its foreign 
policy objectives with Russia through dialogue and norm-based cooperation, 
particularly in such sensitive areas as environmental security. This belief emerged 
most clearly in Ilkka Kanerva‘s speech at the Norwegian Nobel Institute, when he 
argued for the ―need to engage Russia in addressing global challenges and encourage 
full implementation of international commitments‖.
155
 In the field of energy and 
environment, cooperation should lead to the ―sustainable utilisation of natural 
resources‖. In this context, Kanerva claimed that ―for Finland, Russia represents both 
an opportunity and a challenge that are worth seizing‖, a statement that mirrors 
Finnish historical perceptions of Russia as both a partner and a threat.
156
 Kanerva‘s 
remark also suggested that, if Finland did not seek cooperation, Russia might turn 
into a menace. Finnish foreign policy makers‘ statements on Nord Stream generally 
reflected this underlying logic. Russia tended to be referred to as a partner and was 
never openly criticised. As shown, also the environmental controversy concerning 




This case study exposed the diversity of national discourses on the Nord Stream 
project and energy relations with Russia, a highly relevant policy field for the EU 
and its member states. Most importantly, it showed that these discourses can be 
better understood through an analytical framework that takes into account national 
identity construction and Russia‘s role therein. For instance, German leaders‘ 
positive attitude to energy cooperation with Russia was explained within the context 
of the long-standing energy partnership between the two countries, which dates back 
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 Tarja Halonen’s speech at the Estonian parliament, 5 May 2010, 
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156
 See chapter 4. 
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to the Ostpolitik of the early 1970s and has become part of Germany‘s foreign policy 
identity. On the other hand, Polish leaders‘ strong criticism of Nord Stream was set 
against the background of Poland‘s troubled historical relations with Russia and 
Germany, which influenced profoundly their perceptions of both countries as foreign 
policy actors. 
German discourses emphasised Russia‘s reliability as an energy partner and cited the 
history of German-Russian energy cooperation as evidence. They also stressed that, 
in the energy field, the European Union and Russia were interdependent and had a 
mutual interest in cooperating. According to German leaders, the Nord Stream 
pipeline strengthened the partnership with Russia, contributed to European energy 
security and hence met the interests of the whole EU (rather than just German 
national interests). This discourse reflected the high relevance of the European Union 
in German national identity. Furthermore, German policy makers argued that energy 
cooperation had positive repercussions for democracy and the human rights situation 
in Russia because it created favourable conditions for dialogue with the EU and 
hence for the implementation of these principles. This narrative mirrored the 
Ostpolitik tenet according to which economic cooperation had positive repercussions 
on Russia‘s domestic development.  
Polish foreign policy makers‘ discourses were antithetical to German discourses in 
several respects. Like their German counterparts, also Polish leaders made reference 
to history in order to justify their stance on energy relations with Russia. However, in 
Polish discourses references to history were entirely negative and served the purpose 
of opposing energy cooperation. Russia was portrayed as the heir of Soviet Cold War 
policies, notably as an imperialist country that used its energy resources to pursue 
geopolitical objectives in East-Central Europe. Furthermore, Polish leaders took a 
diametrically opposite stance on the significance of Nord Stream for European 
energy security. Contrary to German policy makers, they argued that Nord Stream 
was a bilateral project that affected negatively the security of East-Central European 
EU members. Accordingly, the support of some EU countries for the pipeline 
showed the lack of solidarity within the European Union. 
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The clash between German and Polish discourses on Nord Stream was particularly 
strong in the years 2005-2007, when the far right Law and Justice party was in power 
in Poland. It lost impetus after 2007, following the election of centre-right leader 
Donald Tusk as Polish prime minister. Tusk adopted a more moderate discourse and 
a pragmatic approach to Poland‘s controversies with Germany and Russia. While the 
previous Polish government had made use of highly emotionally charged memory 
politics, Tusk focused his criticism of Nord Stream on economic arguments and 
simultaneously sought reconciliation with Germany and Russia.  
Finnish leaders‘ discourses tended to be in line with those of German policy makers 
on issues such as the necessity to foster the energy partnership with Russia and 
Russia‘s reliability as an energy supplier. However, Finnish discourses put a stronger 
emphasis on norms (market rules, European and international law) as the basis of the 
EU‘s partnership with Russia. Moreover, Finnish leaders were more critical than 
their German and Polish counterparts on the question of Nord Stream‘s 
environmental impact, which they considered a potential security threat. Finnish 
discourses on energy cooperation with Russia and Nord Stream reflected constructed 
images of Russia that are deeply rooted in Finnish identity. Consistently with its 
traditional image as Finland‘s key economic partner, Russia was portrayed as an 
essential energy supplier. On the other hand, long-standing Finnish fears of the 
security threat emanating from Russia emerged in the discourse on Nord Stream‘s 
environmental impact. 
Hence, the chapter revealed considerable diversity in German, Polish and Finnish 
discourses on Nord Stream and energy relations with Russia. Divergences were 
particularly marked as long as Polish narratives emphasised constructed images of 
Russia as a security threat, while German discourses simultaneously depicted it as a 
reliable partner. Following the departure from power of the Polish right in 2007, 
Polish official discourses became more moderate and more compatible with German 
narratives. Furthermore, after Finland granted environmental permits for the building 
of Nord Stream in its exclusive economic zone (November 2009), Finnish discourses 
ceased to present the pipeline as a potential threat. From 2010 onwards, Nord Stream 
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no longer appeared as a major contentious issue across the three national discursive 
arenas under analysis. 
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Chapter 6: The August 2008 Russian-Georgian war  
 
Introduction 
This case study investigates German, Polish and Finnish foreign policy makers‘ 
discourses on Russia during the August 2008 Russian-Georgian war, against the 
broader background of contemporary European security. It shows how national 
identity permeated different national readings of the crisis and of Russia‘s role in it. 
However, the chapter also reveals that national discourses during the August 2008 
crisis were less discordant than those concerning Nord Stream in the previous two 
years (2005-2007). The analysis focuses mostly on statements, speeches and 
interviews dating back from August 2008 and the following months of the year. 
Some previous and later texts are also included in the study in order to assess the 
nature of security discourses on Russia prior to the August 2008 crisis and its long-
term impact. The main questions addressed are: how is Russia depicted in foreign 
policy makers‘ discourses during the August 2008 crisis? How do these discourses 
relate to national identity and deep-rooted national perceptions of Russia? What 
discursive and linguistic techniques are used to convey the main arguments? To what 
extent are national discourses similar or dissimilar? 
As with the investigation of discourses on Nord Stream and energy relations, the 
analysis of national identity and dominant historical discourses on Russia in chapter 
4 provides the interpretive framework. The main events and actors discussed in this 
chapter are briefly introduced and contextualised in the opening section. This 
includes a concise account of the origins of the Georgian-Ossetian and Georgian-
Abkhaz conflicts, as well as an overview of the geopolitical background in which 
tensions between Georgia and Russia escalated. The description of the August 2008 
crisis is based mostly on the report of the EU‘s fact-finding commission concerning 
the conflict and on some of the most eminent scholarly works published on the topic 
thus far. While it is by no means an exhaustive account of the crisis, this section 
hopes to provide an objective contextualisation of the ensuing discourse analysis. 
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The following three subchapters have a similar structure: they introduce the top 
foreign policy makers that formulated official national discourses on the Russian-
Georgian war and then analyse dominant discourses in Germany, Poland and 
Finland. The concluding section summarises the main findings and compares 
national discourses. Ultimately, this chapter allows an analysis of different national 
reactions to a conflict that arguably marked the highest peak in tensions between 
Russia and NATO in the first two post-Cold War decades. This context also provides 
an opportunity to assess the contemporary relevance of historically constructed 
national images of Russia as a security threat in official foreign policy discourses. 
 
The August 2008 war: context and European response 
In Europe and the United States, the five-day conflict between Georgia and Russia in 
August 2008 caused a vibrant debate about the nature of Russia‘s foreign policy and 
its role in the international arena. In the Western press, Russia was largely portrayed 
as an aggressive country with imperialist ambitions in its neighbourhood (Heinrich 
and Tanaev 2009, Sakwa 2012: 593-595, 601-603). Numerous journalists and 
academics spoke of a ―return to the Cold War‖ between Russia and the West.
157
 
Within the European Union, the leaders of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and 
Sweden were particularly vocal in their criticism of Russian policies, whereas other 




The causes, development and consequences of the August 2008 Russian-Georgian 
war have been analysed in depth in a large body of literature (Asmus 2010, Cornell 
and Star 2009, Forsberg and Seppo 2011, Jones 2013, Rich 2010, Sakwa 2012). 
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 Richard Sakwa (2008) offers a thorough analysis of how Cold War patterns of thinking resurfaced 
in debates about Russia’s foreign policy during Putin’s first and second presidency. Edward Lucas’s 
2008 book The New Cold War provides a good example of this thinking (cf. Braithwaite 2008). 
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 At the other end of the spectrum, Italian officials seemed to side with Russia. Italian foreign 
minister Franco Frattini argued: “We cannot create an anti-Russia coalition in Europe, and on this 
point we are close to Putin's position *…+ This war has pushed Georgia further away *from the EU and 
NATO+” (cited in Katrin Bennhold, “Differences emerge in Europe of a response to Georgia conflict” 
The New York Times, 12 August 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/08/12/world/europe/12iht-
diplo.4.15218653.html?_r=0, accessed 30/5/2014). 
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Moreover, a fact-finding mission appointed by the EU compiled a detailed, three-
volume report on the conflict, which was based on extensive fieldwork conducted in 
the months after the war (IIFFMCG 2009). Drawing from these sources, the 
following paragraphs summarise very briefly the main phases of the conflict in order 
to outline the essential factual background and contextualise the ensuing discourse 
analysis. 
The conflicts between Georgia and its separatist regions of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia date back to the Russian Civil War (1917-1922), when the newly-
independent Georgian state clashed with Ossetian and Abkhaz Bolsheviks. During 
the Soviet period, the two conflicts remained dormant, but re-escalated into armed 
hostilities during and in the years immediately following the dissolution of the USSR 
(1991-1994). Under the Soviet Union, Abkhazia and South Ossetia were granted 
autonomous status within the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic; the two entities 
however refused to become part of an independent, post-Soviet Georgian state (cf. 
Suny 1994, Zürcher 2007: 115-151).  
The military conflicts that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in the 
de facto independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia. However, the 
independence of the two separatist entities was not recognised by any country. 
Russia played a key role in mediating a cease-fire and in the subsequent international 
peacekeeping missions, which were organised under the auspices of the Organisation 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (in South Ossetia), the United Nations and 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (in Abkhazia). Despite the involvement of 
international organisations, conflict resolution efforts between 1994 and 2008 were 
not successful (IIFFMCG 2009: vol. 2, 74-118).  
In January 2004, following the Rose Revolution, Mikheil Saakashvili was elected 
president of Georgia with a programme that included the return of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia to Georgia as a key point. Relations between the new Georgian 
government and Russia quickly deteriorated as Saakashvili made clear that he would 
seek NATO and EU integration, demand the withdrawal of Russian troops from 
Soviet-time bases in Georgia and increase cooperation with the United States. 
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Saakashvili also accused Russia of implementing policies that would lead to its 
annexation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, such as the distribution of Russian 
passports and the payment of pensions to the local population. Between 2006 and the 
spring of 2008, incidents at the Abkhaz-Georgian and Ossetian-Georgian borders 
became more and more frequent, while tensions between Russia and Georgia steadily 
increased  (cf. IIFFMCG 2009: vol. 2, 2-32, 200-208, March 2011: 195-196). 
The wider geopolitical scenario contributed to exacerbate tensions. From the early 
2000s onwards, Georgia acquired importance as a strategic transit country in the 
Southern oil and gas corridor, a route that was not controlled by Russia and would 
allow exporting the abundant resources of the Caspian Sea basin to the European 
Union. Russia drew large profits from its dominant position as EU energy supplier 
and considered the implementation of a competing Southern energy corridor as a 
threat to its economic interests. The inauguration of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil 
pipeline and of the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline in 2005-2006, both following 
the route of the Southern corridor, contributed to increasing Russian concerns 
(German 2010: 98-101). Furthermore, in 2007 and early 2008 the Russian 
government became increasingly anxious about the prospect of Georgian NATO 
membership and US plans to deploy an anti-missile defence system in Eastern 
Europe, which Russian leaders considered as a threat to their country‘s strategic 
deterrent (cf. Mankoff 2012: 333-337). Russian concerns about these issues were 
expressed with utmost clarity in president Vladimir Putin‘s speech at the Munich 
security conference in February 2007.
159
 
In the months preceding the war, two international events greatly contributed to the 
escalation of tensions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In February 2008, Kosovo 
declared its independence from Serbia, Russia‘s main partner in the Balkans. 
Kosovo‘s declaration of independence and its recognition by most EU and NATO 
member states irritated Russian leaders, who argued that it would constitute a 
precedent for separatist entities in other regions of the world (cf. Averre 2009: 586; 
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 “Vladimir Putin's prepared remarks at 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy”, The 
Washngton Post, 12 February 2007, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html (accessed 7/7/2013).  
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Hamilton 2010: 207-208). Furthermore, in April 2008 the leaders of NATO countries 
met in Bucharest to discuss inter alia the granting of a membership action plan to 
Georgia and Ukraine, a prospect that was strongly opposed by Russia. Due to strong 
German and French opposition, Georgia and Ukraine were not offered a membership 
action plan. Georgia‘s unresolved conflicts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia were 
one of the main arguments used by the opponents of its NATO accession.
160
 
However, the prospect of Georgia‘s future NATO membership remained on the table 
and was strongly supported by both the United States and some East-Central 
European members of the alliance, including Poland (cf. Blank 2009: 116). 
Against this background, tensions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia escalated 
throughout the spring of 2008. Both Russia and Georgia increased their military 
presence near the conflict zone. In the second half of July 2008, the Russian and 
Georgian armies (the latter in conjunction with US troops) held military exercises in 
the South Caucasus (IIFFMCG 2009: vol. 2, 47-48).
161
  On the night of 7-8 August, 
following several days of skirmishes and fire exchanges along the Georgian-South 
Ossetian border, the Georgian army launched a full-scale attack on Tskhinvali, South 
Ossetia‘s capital. A few hours later, the Russian ground, air and naval forces became 
involved in the conflict, attacking Georgian targets in both South Ossetia and the rest 
of Georgia (IIFFMCG 2009: vol. 2, 209-210). This sequence of events was 
reconstructed by the EU fact-finding mission in the months following the conflict. 
However, the question of who started the war has remained heavily disputed, with 
both sides blaming each other. 
The intervention of Russian forces swiftly decided the outcome of the conflict. By 10 
August, most Georgian troops had been expelled from South Ossetia, while the 
Russian army extended the theatre of operations to Abkhazia. From 10 to 12 August, 
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 In particular, this argument was used by German federal chancellor Angela Merkel. On the other 
hand, French foreign minister Bernard Kouchner argued that NATO’s relations with Russia were 
already too strained due to the issue of Kosovo’s independence and the US plan to place a missile 
defense shield in Poland and the Czech Republic (IIFFMCG 2009: vol. 2, 45). 
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 Russia held the exercise “Caucasus 2008” in its North Caucasus republics of Chechnya, North 
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Approximately 600 Georgians and 1,000 US soldiers took part in the exercise “Immediate Response” 
at the Georgian base of Vaziani (IIFFMCG 2009: vol. 2, 47-48). 
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Russian forces advanced into Georgian territory and occupied several towns and 
military bases (IIFFMCG 2009: vol. 2, 211-214). An armistice was achieved on 12 
August, when French president Nicolas Sarkozy (in his capacity as President of the 
European Council) convinced the parties to sign a ceasefire agreement. The 
agreement provided inter alia for the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of 
troops to the positions occupied prior to the conflict (cf. Forsberg and Seppo 2011, 
IIFFMCG 2009: vol. 3, 587-592, Volkhonskiy 2009: 203-206). 
However, the ceasefire agreement did not end the political crisis. On 26 August 
2008, Russia recognised the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, a move 
that was harshly criticised by Georgia, the US and most European countries. NATO 
temporarily suspended talks with Russia in the NATO-Russia Council and the EU 
postponed negotiations on a strategic partnership agreement with Russia (cf. Blank 
2010: 189-191). Furthermore, some Russian troops delayed their withdrawal. In 
order to speed it up, an implementation agreement (complementing the ceasefire 
agreement) was signed in Moscow on 8 September 2008 (IIFFMCG 2009: vol. 3, 
593-594). The document provided for the withdrawal of Russian troops from 
undisputed Georgian territory within ten days after the deployment of a monitoring 
mission of the European Union (EUMM), which was established at the EU Council 
of foreign ministers on 15 September. The deployment of EUMM was completed by 
1 October and, on 9 October, the Russian foreign ministry announced the full 
withdrawal of all Russian forces from undisputed Georgian territory (IIFFMCG 
2009: vol. 2: 219).
162
 
In spite of international conflict resolution efforts, particularly through numerous 
rounds of talks involving both the authorities of Georgia and of the two separatist 
republics, the post-conflict status quo has crystallised.
 163
 In the months following the 
war, Russia increased its economic and military presence in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia (cf. Weitz 2009: 6-8). Following Russia‘s recognition of the two separatist 
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been the subject of different interpretations and remained contentious for many months after the 
conflict (IIFFMCG 2009: vol. 2: 219-223). 
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 The talks were held in Geneva and became known as “Geneva process”. 
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entities, Georgia severed diplomatic relations with Moscow.
164
 Furthermore, in 2009 
Russia vetoed the continuation of both the UN and the OSCE missions in Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia.
165
 As a result, after 2009 no international missions were present 
on the territory of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (IIFFMCG 2009: vol. 2: 441).
166
 
Russia‘s relations with the United States, NATO and the European Union were 
negatively affected in the months following the war (cf. Blank 2009). Within the 
European Union, however, different positions emerged throughout the crisis of 
August 2008 and in the ensuing months. While the fighting was still taking place, 
Polish president Lech Kaczynski participated in a public demonstration held in 
Tbilisi in support of Georgia, together with the presidents of Ukraine, Estonia and 
Lithuania and the prime minister of Latvia. Conversely, German and French leaders 
took a much more cautious stance, which also allowed French president Sarkozy to 
mediate between the warring parties (cf. Sakwa 2012: 601). The Finnish government 




In the three countries under analysis, the August 2008 war between Russia and 
Georgia was a central topic in foreign policy makers‘ speeches during the military 
escalation and in the following two months, until Russian troops completed their 
withdrawal from undisputed Georgian territory. The discourse analysis in the 
following subchapters focuses primarily on this period (August-October 2008). 
However, speeches concerning security relations with Russia in the months 
preceding the crisis are also analysed in order to assess the nature of discourses in the 
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run up to the war. Furthermore, the analysis includes a few speeches held after 
October 2008 in which the Russian-Georgian war is addressed. This allows an 
investigation of any lasting impact which the conflict may have had on discourses 
regarding relations with Russia. 
 
Partners in difficult times: German leaders’ discourses 
During the August 2008 crisis, chancellor Angela Merkel and foreign minister 
Frank-Walter Steinmeier were the most prominent German politicians who made 
public statements concerning the Russian-Georgian conflict and represented 
Germany‘s official stance. Hence, the analysis will focus primarily on their 
statements. Both Merkel and Steinmeier were very active throughout the crisis. 
Merkel travelled to Russia and Georgia and attended the extraordinary European 
Council held in Brussels on 1 September 2008 to discuss the EU‘s position on the 
conflict. Steinmeier discussed his views on the war and Russia in interviews with 
mainstream German newspapers and held speeches on the same topic in official 
contexts, including the UN General Assembly and diplomatic conferences at the 
German ministry of foreign affairs. Furthermore, Steinmeier travelled to Abkhazia 
and Georgia in late July 2008 and was the last high-ranking Western politician who 
attempted to mediate between the parties before the outbreak of war (IIFFMCG 
2009: vol. 2, 59). 
In addition to Merkel‘s and Steinmeier‘s statements, two speeches by secretary of 
state Gernot Erler and one by state minister for Europe Günter Gloser were also 
examined. Like Steinmeier‘s statements, Erler‘s and Gloser‘s speeches were 
retrieved in the electronic archive of the German foreign ministry. They are of 
particular relevance because they delve further into some of the issues addressed in 
the foreign minister‘s speeches. Since Erler and Gloser were prominent officials in 
the German foreign office, their views can be considered as part of German foreign 
policy making elite‘s public discourse, which is the subject of this analysis. 
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The investigation of German foreign policy makers‘ statements revealed three 
dominant discourses concerning the August 2008 war and contemporary security 
relations with Russia. The first discourse stressed Russia‘s importance as an 
international actor and as an essential partner for the EU on all key issues pertaining 
to European security. This discourse emerged in speeches held before, during and 
after the August 2008 war; it therefore reflected a broad, consolidated line of thought 
on security relations with Russia in German foreign policy making circles. On the 
other hand, the second discourse appeared mostly in speeches held during or 
immediately after the August 2008 war. It criticised some of Russia‘s political and 
military decisions during the crisis, such as the large-scale use of force and the 
recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However, this criticism was not 
particularly strong and was often accompanied by requests for further political 
consultations with Russia. The third discourse focused on Germany‘s and the EU‘s 
role in the August 2008 crisis and their subsequent stance towards Russia. It praised 
the EU‘s mediation during the crisis and emphasised the need for a coherent and 
active EU foreign policy towards the conflict region and Russia. 
 
No return to the Cold War: Russia as a strategic security partner 
From early 2007 until the final months of 2008, German foreign policy makers‘ 
speeches on Russia were held against a background of deteriorating NATO- and EU-
Russia relations, which was exacerbated even further by the August 2008 war. 
Within this context, German leaders attempted to counter the negative trends in 
relations with Russia and sought dialogue with Moscow. The dominant German 
security discourse in this period stressed that Russia was a key player in the 
international arena and hence an indispensable partner for the strengthening of 
European security. German policy makers rejected the contemporary media 
discourse foreshadowing a new Cold War with Russia and attempted to expose 
comparisons between the Soviet Union and Russia as historical anachronisms. 
Political pragmatism and history are the topoi linking the argument (Russia is a key 
partner for European security and no longer a Cold War rival) to its logical 
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conclusion that Germany, NATO and the EU should seek cooperation with Russia. 
This discourse reflects long-standing German perceptions of Russia as an essential 
factor in European security. Negative memories of the Cold War, when Germany 
was politically divided and stood on the frontline of superpower confrontation, 
played an important role in the rejection of the Cold War discourse.  
German leaders‘ preoccupation to halt the deterioration of relations with Russia 
emerged already in March 2007, in a speech held by foreign minister Steinmeier only 
a few weeks after Putin‘s critical remarks about NATO enlargement and defence 
policies at the Munich security conference.
168
 Addressing the German parliament on 
the issue of the US anti-missile shield in Eastern Europe and Russia‘s opposition to 
it, Steinmeier argued:  
 
In my opinion, the danger of a division of Europe and NATO, as well as 
Russia‘s lapse into old habits, would be a very high price to pay [for the 
deployment of the anti-missile shield]. German foreign policy aims to 
unite Europe, maintain the transatlantic partnership and the strategic 
partnership with Russia. A new Cold War between the USA and Russia, 





Steinmeier defined the partnership with Russia as ―strategic‖ and juxtaposed it to the 
partnership with the US, thereby implying that, for Germany, it was of no less 
importance. Through perspectivation (signalled by the phrase ―in my opinion‖), he 
emphasised his opposition to confrontation with Russia on the issue of missile 
defence and argued that it would undermine German interests. In the attempt to 
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 Vladimir Putin's prepared remarks at 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy, The Washngton 
Post, 12 February 2007. 
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 Frank-Walter Steinmeier’s speech at the lower house of the German parliament (Bundestag), 21 
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reconcile Germany‘s alliance with the US and its partnership with Russia, Steinmeier 
proposed a ―shared system, or at least joint efforts in the field of missile defence‖.
170
 
Steinmeier‘s desire to find an agreement with Russia on controversial issues of 
European security surfaced also on a few other important occasions, such as his 
speech at the German parliament on the recognition of Kosovo‘s independence in 
February 2008 (―We all would have wanted a solution […] that took more into 
account Russia‘s position‖).
171
 Furthermore, from mid-May 2008 until the outbreak 
of war in the South Caucasus, Steinmeier‘s speeches on Russia were dominated by 
the launch of the German-Russian modernisation partnership, a policy initiative 
aimed at cooperation and promoting internal reforms in Russia (Spanger 2011: 655). 
After the election of apparently reform-oriented Dmitri Medvedev to the Russian 
presidency in March 2008, Steinmeier became the main advocate of the 
modernisation partnership. In a relevant speech held at the University of 
Yekaterinburg in May 2008, the German foreign minister argued: 
 
Russia is and remains an indispensable partner for Germany and the EU, 
also for the shaping of tomorrow‘s world. We need your country [Russia] 
as partner for security and stability in Europe and beyond. We need each 





Through the discursive strategy of predication, Russia was qualified as ―an 
indispensable partner‖ on a vast range of key European and global security issues. As 
this extract shows, Steinmeier used the modernisation partnership also to promote 
cooperation in security policy and reiterate Germany‘s consideration of Russia as an 
essential international partner. His views were echoed by chancellor Angela Merkel, 




 Frank-Walter Steinmeier’s speech at the lower house of the German parliament (Bundestag), 20 
February 2008, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2008/080220-
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172
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who stressed that Russia was a partner on several occasions. Most significantly, she 
did so at the Bucharest NATO summit of April 2008, where relations with Moscow 
on the question of NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine were a highly 
divisive issue among member states.
173
  
As transpires from a speech held by state secretary Gernot Erler two months later at a 
conference in Berlin, Germany‘s opposition to granting Georgia a NATO 
membership action plan was motivated primarily by Georgia‘s unresolved conflicts 
with Abkhazia and South Ossetia and ―the particular consequences for European 
stability and security‖ which granting the action plan would have entailed.
174
 The 
latter point was an implicit reference to the negative impact that accepting Georgia as 
a NATO member would have had on relations with Russia. Furthermore, on the eve 
of the Bucharest summit, state secretary for Europe Günter Gloser had anticipated 
that discussions on NATO enlargement would be difficult due to potential 
disagreements with Russia. Gloser‘s remarks emphasised that the EU had no 
alternative to the partnership with Russia, particularly in the energy sector, thereby 




During the August 2008 war and the ensuing crisis, the discourse on Russia as a key 
security partner was toned down but continued to be present in German leaders‘ 
speeches and policy decisions. On 15 August, while Russian troops were still 
operating on undisputed Georgian territory, Merkel and Medvedev concurred that 
dialogue with the US on the anti-missile shield should continue, despite the 
simultaneous US-Polish agreement to deploy the system without consulting 
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Russia.
176
 In late August, in spite of tensions with Russia due to Moscow‘s unilateral 
recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Steinmeier returned to the issue of the 
anti-missile shield and criticised the US-Polish agreement on the grounds that it was 
ill-timed and could be misunderstood by Russia. Moreover, Steinmeier expressed his 
hope that ―the debate [on the anti-missile shield] would not be disrupted by the 
conflict in Georgia‖.
177
 In an interview with a mainstream German newspaper, Welt 
am Sonntag, the German foreign minister also spoke against suspending cooperation 
with Russia at the EU level and in the NATO-Russia Council.
178
 As early as 
September 2008, Steinmeier returned fully to his pre-war discourse stressing the 
need of a partnership with Russia on security issues. At the opening of a conference 
of German and EU diplomats and parliamentarians at the German ministry of foreign 
affairs, he emphasised the need for ―Russia‘s constructive contribution in the region 
[the South Caucasus], as a partner in shaping the European security and peace order 
and in tackling global challenges‖.
179
 
Steinmeier‘s statements in favour of cooperation with Russia were often 
accompanied by a resolute rejection of the contemporary media discourse on a new 
Cold War. In an interview with the Süddeutsche Zeitung on 27 August 2008, the day 
after Russia‘s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Steinmeier stated: 
 
I am appalled by those who, in the West and Russia, seem to wish a 
return to the cynical realities of the Cold War. I am disconcerted by the 
loss of historical memory about years that I remember very well and that 
saw the death of many. And I don‘t understand what leads some to make 
                                                          
176
 “Merkel redet Medwedew ins Gewissen”, Spiegel Online, 15 August 2008, 
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/georgien-krise-merkel-redet-medwedew-ins-gewissen-a-
572360.html (accessed 30/5/2014). 
177
 Frank-Walter Steinmeier’s interview with Süddeutsche Zeitung, 27 August 2008, 
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Infoservice/Presse/Interviews/2008/080827-BM-
Sueddeutsche.html (accessed 7/7/2013).  
178
 Frank-Walter Steinmeier’s interview with Welt am Sonntag, 17 August 2008, 
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Infoservice/Presse/Interviews/2008/080817-BM-WamS.html 
(accessed 7/7/2013).  
179
 Frank-Walter Steinmeier’s speech at the opening of the ambassadors’ conference at the German 
foreign ministry, 8 September 2008, http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/DE/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2008/080908-Rede-BM-Boko-Eroeffnung.html (accessed 
7/7/2013).  
Divisive identity, divided foreign policy? 
 
168 
The August 2008 Russian-Georgian war 
frivolous comparisons with historical situations such as Munich 1938 
[the symbol of Western appeasement of Nazi Germany] or Sarajevo 1914 
[the outbreak of the First World War]. It is clear that our conflicts are no 




Steinmeier used the discursive strategy of perspectivation to convey his harsh 
personal criticism of a memory politics discourse that constructed similarities 
between the August 2008 crisis and some of the most tragic events of twentieth 
century European history. During the above-mentioned conference at the German 
foreign ministry in September 2008, Steinmeier argued (with the same emotionally-
charged rhetoric) that Cold War times were ―over once and for all. And therefore all 
the talk about the Cold War is just a rhetorical relict of past times‖.
181
 To make his 
argument more compelling with the German public opinion, in a speech held in 
December 2008 Steimeier emphasised the differences between German and 
European security in 2008 and during the Cold War: 
  
There are no longer soldiers patrolling borders in Central Europe, no 
simulation games involving the use of tactical nuclear weapons in the 
Fulda gap [in Central Germany] […] All those who inconsiderately talk 
of a new Cold War today seem to forget what the [Berlin] Wall and 





The speech was held at an independent German foundation focusing on European 
politics, on the occasion of the thirty-seventh anniversary of Willy Brandt‘s Nobel 
Peace Prize speech.
183
 The commemoration provided Steinmeier with the 
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opportunity to praise Brandt‘s Ostpolitik and portray its approach to the Soviet Union 
as a model for cooperation with Russia. According to him, only this cooperative 
approach could lead to arms control and to the settlement of the frozen conflicts, 
which ―cannot be resolved without Russia‘s constructive contribution‖.
184
 By the 
time Steinmeier made these remarks, Barack Obama had been elected president of 
the United States (in November 2008) and had announced a reformulation of US 
relations with Russia, based on a cooperative approach. Hence, Steinmeier‘s 
discourse on treating Russia as a partner was also in tune with the new policy line of 
the White House. This further encouraged him to advocate the resumption of 
dialogue with Russia in forums that had been suspended after the August 2008 war, 




The military escalation of August 2008: mild criticism, no rash judgements 
Although German leaders tended to see Russia predominantly as a security partner, a 
more critical discourse emerged during the August 2008 war. This discourse mildly 
criticised Russia‘s disproportionate use of force, the delay in the withdrawal of 
Russian troops after the ceasefire agreement and Moscow‘s unilateral recognition of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However, Merkel‘s and Steinmeier‘s criticism focused 
mostly on a few technical and legal issues and was not radical. In fact, they both 
advocated further talks with Russia to solve the crisis and were opposed to retaliatory 
measures that might lead to harsher confrontation. Furthermore, German leaders 
refused to put all the blame for the outbreak of war on Russia, which strikingly 
contrasted with the behaviour of their Polish and American counterparts and with the 
dominant Western media discourse (cf. Heinrich and Tanaev 2009).
186
 In particular, 
Steinmeier‘s statements suggested that Georgians and South Ossetians shared 
responsibility for the crisis. 
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German leaders‘ stance towards Russia during August 2008 can be interpreted as a 
reflection of two essential constitutive elements of German national identity: the 
rejection of war as means to solve disputes and the support of multilateralism and 
international law (cf. Berger 1996, Bjola and Kornprobst 2007).
187
 Preference for 
multilateralism and long-standing German perceptions of Russia as a key partner in 
European security also help understand Merkel‘s and Steinmeier‘s insistence on 
engaging Russia to achieve a negotiated solution of the crisis. Legality and political 
pragmatism are the topoi that link the key argument in this discourse (Russia‘s 
reaction to the crisis was disproportionate, but a solution can be found only through 
dialogue with Moscow) and its logical conclusion (talks with Russia have to 
continue). 
The critical discourse on Russia was prominent in particular in the first public 
statements issued after the outbreak of war. On 15 August 2008, during a meeting 
with Russian president Dmitri Medvedev, Merkel defined Russia‘s military 
intervention as ―partly disproportional‖ and claimed that Georgia‘s territorial 
integrity was a precondition for conflict resolution.
188
 During her visit to Tbilisi two 
days later, the chancellor forcefully demanded the withdrawal of Russian troops from 
Georgian territory.
189
 Merkel‘s arguments were echoed in a harsher tone in 
Steinmeier‘s interview with Welt am Sonntag on 17 August. 
 
Georgia‘s territorial integrity remains the foundation of our [the EU‘s] 
policy […] In our talks with the Russian side we have made very clear 
that, by bombing and sending troops to the core of Georgian territory, 
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 Frank-Walter Steinmeier’s interview with Welt am Sonntag, 17 August 2008. 
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In the interview, Steinmeier argued that Germany‘s position was based on 
international law. He also referred to international norms in order to justify his call 
for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgian territory. Russia‘s recognition of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia on 26 August was perceived as another violation of 
international law, which led to a new exacerbation in German discourses. Shortly 
after Russia announced its recognition of the two separatist entities, Merkel defined 
the decision as ―completely unacceptable and contrary to international law‖.
191
 The 
day after, in an interview with Süddeutsche Zeitung, Steinmeier called the Russian 
decision ―wrong‖, ―dangerous‖, ―very regrettable‖ and ―in no way acceptable‖.
192
  
Despite these occasional peaks of tensions, German discourses during the conflict 
were mostly balanced and never took an anti-Russian tone. Contrary to the dominant 
trend in Western media, German leaders did not accuse Russia of starting the 
conflict. In the above-mentioned interview with Welt am Sonntag, Steinmeier stated 
that the conflict had roots that reached far back into the past and that ―making a 
chronology of the escalation and blaming either side‖ was not his task.
193
 Moreover, 
he suggested that, by July 2008 (when he went on a trip to Abkhazia to mediate 
between the parties), conflict appeared inevitable. 
 
In Abkhazia I had to witness how uncompromising and irreconcilable the 
parties to the conflict were. For this reason, I did not delude myself about 
the explosiveness of the situation, even if it was not possible to predict 




Steinmeier attempted to make his claim about the likelihood of a military escalation 
more compelling through perspectivation, which is highlighted by the first-person 
narrative and the ensuing subjective description of the situation on the ground. By 
                                                          
191




 Frank-Walter Steinmeier’s interview with Süddeutsche Zeitung, 27 August 2008. 
193
 Frank-Walter Steinmeier’s interview with Welt am Sonntag, 17 August 2008. 
194
 Ibid. 
Divisive identity, divided foreign policy? 
 
172 
The August 2008 Russian-Georgian war 
emphasising that the parties were ―uncompromising‖ and ―irreconcilable‖, 
Steinmeier also conveyed the idea that responsibility for the crisis was shared. This 
view was reiterated more clearly in his interview with Süddeutsche Zeitung on 27 
August 2008. 
 
Attributions of responsibility are certainly not a key issue now, but we 
should base our assessments on the fact that the Georgian attack of 
Tskhinvali was preceded by days of mutual provocations between 




In this passage, Steinmeier suggested that responsibility for the outbreak of war is 
shared by Georgians and South Ossetians, but he also implied that the Georgian 
attack on Tskhinvali was to blame for the start of full-scale military operations. 
Russians were neither accused of having started the war, nor of having played a role 
in the ―mutual provocations‖. This interpretation of events was functional to 
alleviating tensions with Russia and returning to the negotiating table, which 
appeared as the main objective of German diplomacy during the August 2008 crisis. 
Even in the tensest phase of the crisis, Steinmeier argued that ―a solution of the 
conflict is hardly possible without Russia. We must therefore keep all 
communication channels open […]‖.
196
 In the statements made immediately after 
Russia‘s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Merkel continued to advocate 
―direct talks‖ with Medvedev, while Steinmeier hoped for ―joint efforts [together 





                                                          
195
 Frank-Walter Steinmeier’s interview with Süddeutsche Zeitung, 27 August 2008. 
196
 Frank-Walter Steinmeier’s interview with Rheinische Post, 23 August 2008, 
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Infoservice/Presse/Interviews/2008/080823-BM-
RheinPost.html (accessed 7/7/2013).  
197
 Press release of the office of the Federal Chancellor, 26 August 2008; Frank-Walter Steinmeier’s 
interview with Süddeutsche Zeitung, 27 August 2008. 
Divisive identity, divided foreign policy? 
 
173 
The August 2008 Russian-Georgian war 
Negotiating with Russia: the EU as a successful mediator 
Following the August 2008 crisis, German leaders argued that the EU had proved 
successful in crisis management and that, based on this positive experience, it should 
play a key role in enhancing relations with Russia and the Eastern neighbourhood. 
This discourse reflected German leaders‘ tendency to support EU policies and 
multilateralism, which is a well-established trait of Germany‘s foreign policy 
identity. Europeanism, meant as the commitment to EU values and policies, is the 
topos linking the key argument (the EU proved successful in negotiations with 
Russia and in crisis management in Georgia) with its logical conclusion (EU policies 
towards Russia and the Eastern neighbourhood should be enhanced). 
In German leaders‘ speeches, the claim that the EU had been successful at mediating 
in the Russian-Georgian crisis appeared as early as mid-August 2008. In his 
interview with Welt am Sonntag on 17 August 2008, Steinmeier argued: 
 
Europe can achieve something. The mediation of [French and European 
Council] president Sarkozy and of his foreign minister Kouchner, 
supported by other EU states including Germany, has contributed to the 
cessation of hostilities […] From the phone calls that I made after the 
outbreak of war, I know how difficult it was to stop the fighting. 
Therefore we should not underestimate the successful mediation of the 




Through perspectivation (―From the phone calls that I made […] I know how 
difficult it was‖), Steinmeier emphasised the significance of Sarkozy‘s mediation, 
which he framed as a joint EU effort, rather than as a success of the French 
president.
199
 Further on in the interview, he underplayed internal divisions in the EU 
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during the crisis and stressed the ―common positions‖ on which all member states 
converged, namely the support of Georgia‘s territorial integrity and the decision to 
contribute to stabilisation and humanitarian relief efforts. In his interview with 
Süddeutsche Zeitung on 27 August, Steinmeier bluntly rejected the assertion that the 
EU was helpless and deeply divided over the crisis, calling such claims ―superficial‖ 
and ―unjustified‖.
200
 His views on this issue were shared by Angela Merkel. 
Following the extraordinary European Council on 1 September 2008, Merkel 
claimed that the EU had sent out ―a signal of unity and resoluteness‖ regarding the 
Caucasus crisis and defined the EU-brokered six-point plan ―an important document‖ 
on which to build future endeavours.
201
 
Based on these positive assessments of the EU‘s role in the crisis, both Merkel and 
Steinmeier advocated the enhancement of EU policies towards the conflict zone and 
Russia. In August 2008, shortly after the ceasefire agreement, Merkel argued that 
there were ―good reasons to step up the EU‘s neighbourhood policy with 
Georgia‖.
202
 A few days later, she claimed that the EU should do all it could to 
support Georgia through its ―policy of neighbourliness‖.
203
 On 8 September 2008, at 
a conference of German and EU diplomats and parliamentarians at the German 
ministry of foreign affairs, Steinmeier argued that the EU was ready to take part in 
conflict management and monitoring operations. He also advocated the 
intensification of EU policies in the Eastern neighbourhood in order to create ―a 
European space of security, stability and prosperity‖.
204
 In his speeches of late 2008, 
Steinmeier encouraged the formulation of the EU‘s Eastern Partnership, a policy 
framework that aimed to intensify relations with neighbouring European post-Soviet 
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countries.
205
 Furthermore, he argued that the EU should continue to engage Russia in 
order to negotiate a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (the previous 




The long shadow of history challenging pragmatism: Polish 
discourses 
Polish foreign policy leaders engaged differently in the debate concerning the 
Russian-Georgian war. President Lech Kaczynski was undoubtedly the most vocal in 
condemning Russia‘s policies and expressing solidarity with the Georgian 
government. Prior to the August 2008 escalation, Kaczynski established a very close 
relationship with the Georgian leadership and became one of the staunchest 
supporters of Georgia‘s integration in NATO and EU structures. During the August 
2008 war, while military operations were still taking place, Kaczynski travelled to 
Tbilisi and gave a deeply emotional speech attacking Russia during a rally in support 
of Saakashvili. He maintained the same stance after the crisis was over, travelling to 




Although their involvement in public debates was less emotional and militant than 
Lech Kaczynski‘s, prime minister Donald Tusk and foreign minister Radoslaw 
Sikorski also issued statements on the Russian-Georgian war, both during and after 
the August 2008 crisis. Furthermore, on 20 August 2008 Sikorski signed an 
agreement with US secretary of state Condoleeza Rice concerning the deployment of 
elements of the US anti-missile shield on Polish territory. As the document was 
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signed during the Russian-Georgian crisis and contributed to rising tensions with 
Russia, the debates on the anti-missile shield and the war in the Caucasus became 
intertwined. Sikorski had to engage with press speculations according to which the 




The analysis of Polish leaders‘ statements highlights two dominant discourses 
concerning Russia with regard to the August 2008 war. The first discourse appeared 
in Lech Kaczynski‘s speeches and emphasised Russia‘s alleged role as aggressor. 
Memory politics is central to this discourse, as Kaczynski described Russia‘s policies 
during the August 2008 crisis as a continuation of Tsarist and Soviet imperialism. In 
addition, he advocated greater NATO and EU involvement in the crisis and the 
adoption of a tougher stance against Russia. The second discourse was found in 
Tusk‘s and Sikorski‘s speeches and can be understood better within the context of 
the Polish government‘s attempts to improve relations with Russia after the fall of 
2007. Also this discourse was critical of Russia, but it made a more moderate use of 
memory politics (mostly limited to a few statements by Sikorski in August 2008) and 
was framed in a less emotional rhetoric. It advocated a pragmatic approach to Russia 
and, particularly when the August 2008 crisis subsided, it highlighted improvements 
in Polish-Russian relations after the election of Tusk‘s government. 
 
Lech Kaczynski: confronting the imperialist aggressor 
As argued, Kaczynski‘s speeches during and after the August 2008 war were 
virulently anti-Russian. Kaczynski claimed that Russian political elites and foreign 
policy were inherently imperialist and aggressive as a result of the country‘s long 
imperial history. Hence, he put all the blame for the outbreak of war on Russia and 
sided unequivocally with Saakashvili‘s government. In most of Kaczynski‘s 
speeches, the argument for Russia‘s culpability in the August 2008 crisis was based 
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entirely on memory politics, notably the construction of parallels with Russia‘s 
imperial history. Occasionally, violations of international law were also cited in order 
to support the argument. History and legality are the topoi connecting Kaczynski‘s 
main argument (Russia‘s imperialism and aggressiveness are to blame for the 
outbreak of the August 2008 war) with its logical conclusion that the European 
Union and the United States should take a tougher stance against Russia. 
The discourse propagated by Kaczynski reflected traditional Polish perceptions of 
Russia as an imperialist country, which became deeply engrained in Polish national 
identity as a result of the Tsarist occupation, the wars with the Soviet Union and 
Poland‘s inclusion in the Soviet sphere of influence during the Cold War. 
Kaczynski‘s occasional references to differences in values between Russia and the 
rest of Europe resonated with long-standing Polish discourses that describe Russia as 
oriental, less civilised and hence morally incompatible with European civilisation. 
Furthermore, his calls for EU and particularly NATO actions to confront Russia 
reflected the strong Euro-Atlantic dimension of post-communist Poland‘s foreign 
policy identity. On the other hand, Kaczynski‘s disappointment at the alleged failure 
of some EU member states to support Georgia can be understood within the context 




The shared experience of conflict with Russia and a strong support for Georgia‘s 
NATO and EU integration were the foundations on which Kaczynski‘s partnership 
with Saakashvili was built before the August 2008 crisis. This emerged particularly 
in a speech Kaczynski held in early March 2008, during Saakashvili‘s official visit to 
Warsaw. 
 
The Polish and the Georgian nations have a diverse history in the sense 
that the Georgian nation was in existence for a longer time. In a sense, 
our histories are similar, though, for both nations had to fight a tough 
fight for their independence. Both at one time fell victim to Russian 
imperialism. This happened more or less at the same time. Both rebelled. 
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[…] And then, the time has come when independence could be once 
more regained, after years of struggle and vicissitudes, when in both 
countries the striving for freedom finally prevailed. And this has become 




Russia was portrayed in unambiguously negative terms: imperialist, oppressive, 
opposing the ―striving for freedom‖ in Poland and Georgia. The construction of a 
common experience of ―falling victim to Russian imperialism‖, rebelling against it 
and finally regaining independence was considered so significant as to constitute ―a 
platform for very close cooperation‖ in the present. In the following sentences, 
Kaczynski explained the concrete focus of this cooperation. 
 
I am confident that Georgia has entered the finishing straight as far as 
NATO membership is concerned. I also think that the EU perspective 
will open up soon. Be assured that in four weeks‘ time in Bucharest […] 
you will be able to take advantage of our support. We are doing this in 
the name of the old maxim which was coined in the nineteenth century: 
―For your freedom and for ours!‖ 
 
Kaczynski clarified the rationale of his promise to support Georgia‘s NATO and EU 
integration with a nineteenth century motto that Polish romantic nationalists used in 
their fight against the occupying Tsarist army.
211
 The historical parallel suggests that 
Kaczynski supported Saakashvili‘s bid for NATO and EU membership in order to 
protect both Poland‘s and Georgia‘s freedom from Russian imperialism. This logic 
was therefore based on the assumption that Russia still threatened Polish and 
Georgian independence.  
At the NATO summit in Bucharest (2-4 April 2008), Kaczynski upheld his pledge to 
support Georgia‘s application for NATO membership, in spite of strong German, 
                                                          
210
 Lech Kaczynski’s press conference on 3 March 2008, http://www.president.pl/en/archive/news-
archive/news-2008/art,18,poland-supports-georgias-membership-of-nato.html (accessed 7/7/2013). 
Minor grammar mistakes in the original English translation were corrected, without altering 
significantly either the style or the content of Kaczynski’s statement. 
211
 See chapter 4. 
Divisive identity, divided foreign policy? 
 
179 
The August 2008 Russian-Georgian war 
French and Russian opposition. In an open letter published on the Financial Times a 
few days before the start of the summit, Kaczynski went as far as claiming that 
leaving Georgia and Ukraine out of NATO ―might put at risk the construction of a 
stable European security system‖.
212
 Furthermore, in a press conference held during 
the summit, Kaczynski argued that ―for Poland the central issue is that of [the NATO 
membership of] Ukraine and Georgia‖.
213
 
As tensions in Georgia‘s separatist republics increased in the spring and early 
summer of 2008, Kaczynski continued to give unrelenting support to Saakashvili and 
held Russia uniquely responsible for the deterioration of the situation on the ground. 
In mid-July, he publicly appealed to Russia ―to refrain from measures which could 
exacerbate the tension and might imperil the achievement of an agreement‖.
214
 It is 
therefore no surprise that, when full-scale war started on 8 August, Kaczynski 
blamed Russia alone and openly sided with Saakashvili. In his speech at the political 
rally in Tbilisi, on 12 August 2008, Kaczynski argued that the war in Georgia 
exposed Russia‘s desire to reconstruct the Soviet empire. 
 
It is the first instance in a long time that our neighbours from the North 
[…] have shown the face that we used to know all too well for centuries. 
Those neighbours believe that the nations surrounding them should be 
subordinated to them […] The country I have in mind is Russia. That 
country believes that the old days of an empire that collapsed some 
twenty years ago are now about to return, that domination will be again 
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Through perspectivation and the use of memory politics, Russia was portrayed as 
imperialist and aggressive. Kaczynski‘s condemnation of Russia was not limited to 
the decisions of its political elites, but concerned the country as a whole. Russia was 
personified (it had a ―face‖, it ―believes‖) and treated as a malevolent entity poised to 
subjugate neighbouring nations, just like the Soviet Union did until the end of the 
Cold War. 
Kaczynski used memory politics and references to Russia‘s imperial past in 
numerous other speeches concerning the August 2008 crisis. On 24 September 2008, 
in his address at the conference of the Foreign Policy Association (a US-based, non-
profit organisation focusing on foreign policy issues), Kaczynski argued that 
Russia‘s desire to reconstruct its empire had never subsided. 
 
This imperial tendency started to revive slowly and in various forms […] 
The fundamental reason, I believe, is something that is ingrained in the 
tradition of a given nation and state, in the tradition of relations between 
the rulers and the people; this is a question of paramount importance in 
Russia […] My point is that the revival of the imperial tendency was a 




According to Kaczynski, Russia and its elites were inherently imperialist as a result 
of the country‘s history. Imperialism was ―ingrained‖ in Russian tradition, hence ―the 
revival of the imperial tendency‖ (of which Russia‘s war in Georgia is ―the best 
example‖
217
) was ―a natural phenomenon‖. He also emphasised the alleged 
peculiarity of Russian imperialism, which according to him was the result of 
―national customs often very different from our European customs‖.
218
 Through this 
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categorisation of Russia as non-European and opposed to the West, Kaczynski went 
as far as to frame the Russian-Georgian war in terms of a clash of civilisations. 
 
[…] I can say that, in Georgia, Russia showed the face it wanted to show. 
It was not a coincidence. ‗We are powerful, and you are helpless‘. Who 




Accordingly, Kaczynski believed that the Russo-Georgian war was only the first 
episode of a larger geopolitical clash between Russian imperialism and the West. 
 
What is the meaning of that [the violation of Georgia‘s territorial 
integrity] in geopolitical terms? Namely, for Europe, as well as for the 
United States, it is not Georgian territory - for Georgia merely serves as a 
pathway – but today definitely Azerbaijan, and tomorrow Kazakhstan 




For Kaczynski, taking a tougher stance and confronting Russia was the only way for 
the EU and NATO to stop this expected succession of crises. This emerged in his 
speech at the rally in Tbilisi on 12 August 2008, where he claimed that the purpose 
of his perilous trip to war-ridden Georgia was ―to make the world react even stronger 
[against Russian actions], the European Union and NATO in particular‖.
221
 
Furthermore, in his address at the Foreign Policy Association conference, Kaczynski 
argued that after the Russian-Georgian war ―NATO should return to defence 
objectives‖, namely focus on the military defence of its member states from foreign 
aggressors. In this context, he welcomed the signature of the agreement on the anti-
missile shield between Poland and the United States as ―a major victory‖ of his 
foreign policy line. He also stated that, most likely, Georgia would not have been 






 Lech Kaczynski’s speech in Tbilisi, 12 August 2008. 
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attacked by Russia if it had been granted a NATO membership action plan at the 
Bucharest summit in April 2008.
222
 
Within this discourse advocating a tougher stance towards Russia, Kaczynski often 
criticised EU and NATO countries that supported a more cooperative approach. In 
his remarks at the Foreign Policy Association, he lamented that some European states 
―display an attitude vis-à-vis the existing threats that I would describe as extremely 
moderate; outright extremely soft‖.
223
 In the speech held in Tbilisi in August 2008, 
Kaczynski‘s criticism of these states echoed the Polish identity discourse on Poland‘s 
unreciprocated commitment to Western values. 
 
If the values that are to be the foundation of Europe are to have any 
practical significance at all, we can defy [we have to defy Russia]. If 
those values are to matter at all, we must be here; the whole of Europe 
must be present here. Among us, there are four NATO members […] 
There is Mr President Sarkozy, who at present presides over the 




Besides Poland, the four NATO members which Kaczynski referred to included 
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, three former Soviet republics where past conflicts 
with Russia have influenced profoundly the construction of national memory and 
identity (cf. Grigas 2013).  
While parallels with Russia‘s imperial past and aggressive foreign policy provided 
the main rationale of Kaczynski‘s discourse, his criticism of Russian actions during 
the August 2008 crisis was occasionally substantiated also with references to 
international law. In his statement condemning Russia‘s recognition of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia, for instance, he argued that the ―unprecedented aggression by the 
Russian Federation against the independent Georgian state‖ was ―entirely 
incompatible with international law‖ and hence ―cannot fail to elicit a resolute 
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response from the states of the free world‖.
225
 Similarly, in his speech before the 
General Assembly of the United Nations in September 2008, Kaczynski condemned 
the Russian intervention in Georgia on the grounds that ―fundamental principles of 




However, memory politics played a role also in these speeches, even if in a more 
subtle way. For instance, phrases such as ―the states of the free world‖ were 
borrowed from Western Cold War rhetoric and implied that Russia belonged to the 
‗unfree‘, ‗undemocratic world‘, just like the Soviet Union during the Cold War (cf. 
Neumann 1998:103). By the same token, in the aforementioned speech at the UN 
General Assembly Kaczynski argued that Russia‘s violation of another country‘s 
territorial integrity was unacceptable because this was ―the principle against which 
the United Nations was established 63 years ago as a consequence of World War II‖. 
Following his reasoning, Russia‘s intervention in Georgia was reminiscent of the 
power politics that characterised Europe until the Second World War and posed ―a 





Sikorski and Tusk: a rocky path to pragmatism in relations with Russia 
The reactions of the Polish prime minister and the foreign minister to developments 
in Georgia in August 2008 differed significantly from Kaczynski‘s, in both tone and 
content. Although both Tusk and Sikorski were critical of Russia‘s actions, they 
developed a discourse that did not preclude cooperation with Moscow. This 
discourse can be understood within the context of Tusk‘s attempt to improve 
Poland‘s relations with Russia after his election in the fall of 2007. It emphasised 
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that, thanks to the pragmatic approach of his government, relations between Poland 
and Russia improved in the months before the start of the Russian-Georgian war, 
particularly in the commercial field. Assessments of the war‘s origins were more 
balanced and the continuation of a pragmatic engagement with Russia was 
advocated. Occasionally, this discourse coexisted with the use of memory politics 
and harsh criticism of Russia‘s foreign policy, notably in Sikorski‘s speeches. 
However, the core of the discourse stressed that, due to Russia‘s economic and 
political importance, Poland should continue its attempts to improve relations, also 
while maintaining a critical attitude towards some of Russia‘s foreign policy 
decisions. Political pragmatism and economic convenience are the topoi linking the 
main argument (in spite of the war in Georgia, Russia is an important actor for 
Poland and relations with it can improve) to its logical conclusion (Poland should 
continue to engage Russia while maintaining a critical stance towards its foreign 
policy).  
Within this discourse, the focus on engaging Russia reflected the government‘s 
efforts to forge a new foreign policy identity where traditional Polish perceptions of 
Russia and Germany as Poland‘s historical enemies were downplayed. On the other 
hand, the positive potential of engagement and cooperation was emphasised. Sikorski 
occasionally made use of memory politics that reflected deep-seated Polish fears of 
Russia. However, criticism of Russian policies was based mostly on substantive 
arguments (violation of territorial integrity, disproportionate use of force), rather than 
on the construction of historical parallels.  
Tusk‘s reluctance to use historical arguments in his speeches concerning relations 
with Russia emerged already during his first official visit to Moscow. The visit took 
place in February 2008, only three months after his appointment as prime minister, 
and was a clear attempt to restart dialogue with the Kremlin after the period of frosty 
relations under the government of Jaroslaw Kaczynski. In an interview with the 
Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta held shortly after a meeting with the Russian 
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leadership, Tusk argued that he preferred not to focus on the history of Polish-
Russian relations but rather to ―overcome its consequences‖.
228
 In addition, he stated: 
 
It‘s important to solve the difficult issues of our [Poland‘s and Russia‘s] 
neighbourhood in the spirit of truth, but without excessive and 
exaggerated emotions from both sides. History must not be used in the 
political struggle, as it causes more problems mainly. 
 
Accordingly, Tusk‘s replies in the interview focused exclusively on current issues, 
which were analysed in pragmatic terms and with a clear intention of minimising 
contentious issues. Disputes over the price of Russian gas were described as the 
logical result of different market interests (hence Tusk claimed that ―No drama 
should be made out of it!‖), while on the issue of the anti-missile shield Tusk stated 
that Poland was ―not interested in anything that could be meant to be anti-Russian‖. 
Furthermore, he stressed the improvement of relations with Russia during his first 
months in office, focusing particularly on substantive issues such as the resolution of 
trade disputes. 
Tusk‘s discourse was echoed in Sikorski‘s statements in the spring of 2008. In an 
interview with the BBC television programme Hardtalk, Sikorski claimed that 
Polish-Russian relations had improved during his time in office. He explained that 
Poland was ―dealing with Russia pragmatically, because it‘s an important country 
and a major trade partner, we [Poland] have 17 billions of trade with Russia‖. Like 
Tusk, Sikorski emphasised that relations with Russia should be guided by 
pragmatism, rather than by historical controversies: ―We [Poland and Russia] are 
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The outbreak of the August 2008 war constituted a major challenge for Tusk‘s and 
Sikorski‘s discourse advocating a pragmatic relationship with Russia. The Russian 
military intervention in Georgia reawakened deep-seated fears of Russia among the 
Polish public opinion and caused a change of attitudes regarding security relations 
with Russia.
230
 In particular, the fear of future Russian military operations against 
Poland increased, together with the support for the deployment of the anti-missile 
shield and US troops on Polish territory, which had previously encountered much 
opposition due to the risk of undermining relations with Russia. Confronted with this 
change of attitudes, Sikorski attempted to hold to the discourse emphasising 
pragmatism, but occasionally slipped into arguments that show the enduring 
relevance of memory politics and wariness of Russia in his foreign policy thinking. 
In an interview with the British newspaper Telegraph on 20 August 2008, Sikorski 
gave a much more balanced assessment of the war‘s origins then Kaczynski, 
claiming that ―Georgia allowed itself to be provoked‖ and that the ―Russian 
response‖ (implying that Russia did not start the escalation) had been 
―disproportionate‖.
231
 He also stated that the Polish decision to announce the 
agreement on the deployment of the anti-missile shield during the Georgian crisis 
―had nothing to do with [developments in] Georgia‖ and was not targeted against 
Russia. However, in the same interview Sikorski argued that Russian military 
operations in Georgia were ―reminiscent of things we hoped belonged to the past‖. 
He also used memory politics, particularly references to the Nazi-Soviet invasion of 
Poland in 1939, to justify his demands for additional US military presence and 
weapons on Polish territory. 
A similar combination of pragmatism and occasional slips into memory politics can 
be detected in other speeches given by Sikorski in the months after the August 2008 
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war. In November 2008, during his address at the Atlantic Council (a US-based think 
tank focusing on transatlantic issues) he argued: 
 
Poland had difficult, sometimes very painful relations with Russia in the 
past, but we don‘t want confrontation with our neighbours. The 
government of Donald Tusk has restarted pragmatic dialogue with 
Russian authorities […]. I have already visited Moscow twice. Warsaw is 
the first NATO capital visited by the Russian foreign minister after the 
war in Georgia. We had good, frank discussions […] In fact, Poland is 
the last country on earth that wants a return of the age of East-West 





In these remarks, Sikorski reiterated unequivocally the pragmatic foreign policy 
approach to Russia that Poland had developed before the August 2008 war. Russia 
was associated with a positive semantic field (―neighbours‖, ―partner‖) and portrayed 
as a country with which it was possible to have ―good, frank discussions‖. Sikorski 
emphasised his commitment to improving relations with Russia through 
perspectivation, which highlighted both his personal involvement in the diplomatic 
efforts (―I have already visited Moscow twice‖) and his desire to build a partnership 
with Moscow (―we don‘t want confrontation‖, ―we would like to see Russia as a 
partner‖). This approach is all the more remarkable if compared with Kaczynski‘s 
contemporary speeches, which advocated confrontation with Moscow by stirring 
traditional Polish fears of Russia. However, Sikorski made occasional use of memory 
politics also in his talk at the Atlantic Council, particularly when he compared 
Russia‘s justification for its intervention in Georgia with the rationale the Soviet 
Union had provided for its invasion of Poland in 1939. Furthermore, in the same 
speech he accused Russia of attempting to undermine European security and argued 
that NATO should improve its defence capabilities as a result of ―Russian tanks 
rolling into Georgia‖. 
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Tusk also disapproved of Russia‘s actions in Georgia, but his criticism concerned 
exclusively substantive, contemporary policy issues. For instance, in his interview 
with the German daily Neue Osnabrücker Zeitung in early September 2008, Tusk 
focused primarily on questions concerning the EU‘s role in the August 2008 crisis 
and the presence of Russian troops in Georgia.
233
 No significant use of memory 
politics was made. Russia was criticised mostly on technical grounds concerning the 
withdrawal of its army from the conflict area. As the crisis subsided, Tusk reframed 
his criticism within a narrative arguing that relations with Russia might improve 
through a pragmatic approach, but only after a long and uneasy process. This 
narrative emerged clearly in an interview with the Financial Times in December 
2008. 
 
We showed a lot of good will and Russia also appeared interested in 
improving ties with Poland […] My meetings with Putin and Medvedev 
showed a good direction. However, the crisis in the Caucasus definitely 




In spite of these expected difficulties, Tusk claimed that he saw Russia as ―a 
potentially positive partner for Poland and the EU‖ and defended his pragmatic 
approach to relations with Moscow, arguing that it corresponded to the expectations 
of Poland‘s EU partners. 
 
I get the impression from European capitals that there is a clear 
expectation that Poland play the role of a leader in the positive change of 
European-Russian relations, and that is the policy we are trying to follow. 
We don‘t have any particular illusions about Russia and I think we see 
her rationally. I am one of the politicians who does not have an anti-
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Russian obsession. In Brussels and in many European capitals, this 




Hence, Tusk suggested that his reformulation of Poland‘s policy towards Russia had 
allowed the country to be considered as a leader in steering the Union‘s relations 
with Moscow. Remarkably, as is implied by his reasoning, this could only be 
achieved by developing a new foreign policy approach that downplayed long-
standing Polish fears of Russia, which Tusk critically labelled as ―anti-Russian 
obsession‖. 
 
Finnish discourses: Russia’s comeback, challenge or a new 
partnership?  
The August 2008 crisis took place during Finland‘s chairmanship of the Organisation 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). As the OSCE is the main pan-
European security organisation of which both Russia and Georgia are members, 
Finnish foreign minister and OSCE chairman Alexander Stubb felt the urge to take 
the initiative and seek a mediated solution to the crisis.
236
 He travelled to both 
Georgia and Russia and held negotiations with the leaders of both countries. Among 
Finland‘s top foreign policy makers, he was the most active contributor to the debate 
on the August 2008 crisis. His predecessor Ilkka Kanerva (in office until April 2008), 
prime minister Matti Vanhanen and president Tarja Halonen also participated in the 
public debate, but featured less prominently than Stubb in the media.  
Two main discourses emerged from the analysis of Finnish foreign policy makers‘ 
statements on the Russian-Georgian war and contemporary security relations with 
Russia. The first discourse emphasised Russia‘s return to the role of key actor in 




 As he wrote in an article published on his personal website in October 2008, “Finland happens to 
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European security. Russia‘s foreign policy was generally described as assertive and 
at times even militaristic, hence posing a challenge for Finland. Accordingly, the 
discourse stressed the necessity to engage Russia in order to defuse tensions. This 
narrative emerged also in texts preceding the outbreak of the Russian-Georgian war, 
but it became more prominent during the August 2008 crisis.  
The second discourse highlighted Russia‘s role as a partner for Finland and the EU. 
Before the outbreak of war, the second discourse coexisted with the first. It lost 
momentum during the August 2008 crisis but became dominant again in the final 
months of 2008, when top Finnish foreign policy makers responded positively to 
highly controversial Russian requests to reform the European security system.
237
 In 
both discourses, neither Russia nor Georgia were explicitly blamed for the outbreak 
of the August 2008 war. Finnish leaders‘ speeches focused on supporting diplomatic 
efforts with both belligerents and on the need to alleviate the humanitarian crisis, 
without delving into the contentious debate concerning responsibilities for the 
conflict. 
 
Russia’s assertiveness and military comeback: engagement as the only option for 
Finland 
As argued, the first of the two discourses introduced above emphasised Russia‘s 
military revival under Putin and the assertiveness of its foreign policy. Confronted 
with this scenario, Finnish foreign policy leaders claimed that there was no 
alternative to engagement and cooperation with Russia. Foreign ministers Ilkka 
Kanerva and Alexander Stubb were the main proponents of this discourse, which was 
dominant from the early months of 2008 until the end of August 2008. Danger, 
notably the perception of a potential threat emanating from Russia, and political 
pragmatism are the topoi linking the main argument (Russia‘s foreign policy is 
assertive and constitutes a challenge for Finland) to its conclusion (Finland should 
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engage Russia). This discourse can be interpreted and understood through the prism 
of Finnish national identity, where Russia has been constructed both as the source of 
Finland‘s main ―security deficit‖ and as an unavoidable actor in the security field. 
The narrative highlighting the assertiveness of Russia‘s foreign policy was already 
present in speeches held in the months preceding the outbreak of the Russian-
Georgian war. In February 2008, in his remarks at the Woodrow Wilson 
International Center (a prominent think tank based in Washington), Kanerva argued: 
 
Today, Russia is much more active in foreign policy and seeks to 
position itself as a superpower – not only regionally but more globally, 
too. Moscow is pursuing its interests with determination and Russia‘s 




The statement that Russia‘s military posture had become more active also in 
Finland‘s neighbourhood reflected a perception of danger for Finnish security, to 
which Kanerva responded by advocating cooperation with Russia. 
 
Even if it is difficult at times, I do not see any other possibility than 
trying to engage Russia in dialogue and cooperation […] Russia‘s 
contribution is needed in combating terrorism and arms proliferation, in 
many regional conflicts as well as in fighting climate change. 
 
Through the use of perspectivation (―I do not see any other possibility‖), Kanerva 
presented cooperation with Russia as the only possible policy option for Finland. 
Significantly, he referred to the resolution of regional conflicts as one of the key 
areas in which Russia‘s contribution was needed. As emerges from a statement 
issued two days after his speech in Washington, Kanerva considered the frozen 
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conflicts in Georgia a priority for Finland‘s OSCE Chairmanship.
239
 As concrete 
evidence for this, he also paid a diplomatic visit to the area in late February 2008.
240
 
Hence, Finnish foreign policy towards the Abkhaz and South Ossetian conflicts 
appeared well-delineated already before the escalation leading to war in August 
2008; mediation and cooperation with Russia were its key tenets. 
This policy line remained substantially unchanged after Kanerva was replaced by 
Stubb as Finland‘s foreign minister. During the August 2008 crisis, Stubb sought a 
solution to the crisis through dialogue with Russia. He took a more critical attitude 
towards Russia only at the peak of the crisis, when Moscow delayed the withdrawal 
of its troops from the conflict zone and recognised South Ossetia‘s and Abkhazia‘s 
independence. On 25 August 2008, on the occasion of an address to top Finnish 
diplomats, Stubb argued:  
 
Victorious war strengthened Russia‘s position as superpower. 
Nationalistic and protectionist superpower thinking has characterised its 
external relations even before this. But its superiority is not based on size 
and energy solely anymore. Today, Russia has both the will and capacity 
to deploy its armed forces as a foreign policy instrument. Another 
significant change is the doctrine of protection of expatriate Russians, 
developed to justify the conduct of aggressive policy. It is impossible to 





The semantic field associated with Russia (nationalistic, protectionist, superiority in 
size and energy, willing and capable to deploy its armed forces as a foreign policy 
                                                          
239
 Ilkka Kanerva’s statement at the United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe, 13 February 2008, 
http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=115012&contentlan=2&culture=en-US 
(accessed 7/7/2013).  
240
 Press release of the Finnish foreign ministry, 21 February 2008, 
http://formin.finland.fi/public/Print.aspx?contentid=115444&nodeid=17395&culture=en-
US&contentlan=2 (accessed 7/7/2013).  
241
 Alexander Stubb’s speech at the annual meeting of the heads of Finnish diplomatic missions 
abroad, 25 August 2008, 
http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=135322&contentlan=2&culture=en-US 
(accessed 7/7/2013).  
Divisive identity, divided foreign policy? 
 
193 
The August 2008 Russian-Georgian war 
instrument, aggressive) constructed the image of a menacing country that based its 
foreign policy conduct on Realpolitik. Stubb‘s claim that Finland should take into 
account the aggressive shift in Russia‘s foreign policy resonated with the Finnish 
historical narrative portraying Russia as Finland‘s main ―security deficit‖.  
The tensest moment in Finnish-Russian relations during the Georgian crisis was 
reached on 26 August, when Stubb issued a statement condemning Russia‘s 
recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and arguing that ―the international 
community cannot accept unilaterally established buffer zones‖.
242
 Thereafter, 
tensions subsided and Stubb returned to a more cooperative rhetoric. In fact, even at 
the height of the crisis the Finnish foreign minister did not abandon the discourse 
stressing the need of cooperation with Russia. In the address to Finnish diplomats 
quoted above, Stubb also argued that Russia did not pose a military threat to Finland. 
This statement appears in contradiction with his remarks concerning Russia‘s 
aggressive foreign policy, but it can be understood as a reflection of the belief, 
deeply rooted in post-1945 Finnish foreign policy identity, that Finland had no 
alternative to engaging Russia.
243
 Hence, Stubb avoided a discourse that might lead 
to confrontation between Finland and Russia and sought to multilaterlise the debate, 
most notably by arguing that Finland could ―restrain the nationalist and nation-state 
oriented trend only by being active in the EU‖.
244
 This approach was also compatible 
with the traditional Finnish preference for multilateralism in addressing international 
crises and the pro-European orientation of Finnish foreign policy.
245
 
The press release issued by the Finnish government‘s Communications Unit on 29 
August, on the verge of the extraordinary European Council on the crisis in Georgia, 
clearly shows in what direction Finland intended to steer EU policy towards Russia. 
After restating Finnish support for Georgia‘s territorial integrity, the communiqué 
declared that Finland did not support any sanctions against Russia and that sanctions 
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―would trigger a vicious circle of counter-measures that would be hard to break‖.
246
 
Therefore, also at EU level Finland rejected hostile confrontation with Russia and 
advocated dialogue as the best policy to solve the crisis. 
  
Leaving the war behind: good neighbourly relations and strategic partnership 
Following the government‘s communiqué on 29 August, the Finnish stance towards 
Russia in the context of the South Caucasus war was softened and a discourse 
stressing good neighbourly relations and strategic partnership with Russia became 
dominant. This discourse existed already before the crisis and can be detected 
especially in prime minister Matti Vanhanen‘s and president Tarja Halonen‘s 
speeches. It lost prominence temporarily during the August 2008 war, but it did not 
disappear. Arguably, its enduring influence may have been one of the reasons why 
Finnish foreign policy makers focused on alleviating the humanitarian crisis and 
defusing tensions throughout the month, thereby paving the way for the resumption 
of friendly relations with Russia. Strategic advantage, meant as the benefits from 
cooperating with a key security actor, is the topos linking the main argument (Russia 
is a neighbour and a strategic partner) to its conclusion (Finland should pursue a co-
operative relationship and be open to Russia‘s policy initiatives). This discourse 
reflected the post-1945 conceptualisation of Russia as a key partner in Finnish 
foreign policy identity. 
 Before the outbreak of the August 2008 war, the narrative describing Russia as a 
peaceful neighbour emerged, for instance, in Vanhanen‘s remarks at a seminar 
organised by the Finnish Centre Party on the topic of foreign and security policy. 
 
Above all, Russia signifies for us a neighbour, a neighbour, and a 
neighbour. Russia has changed fundamentally in terms of its societal 
systems since the Cold War era. Finland has a great interest in Russia 
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remaining stable and co-operative […] From Finland‘s perspective, 





Vanhanen‘s description suggested that Russia was radically different from the Soviet 
Union and no longer posed an ideological and military challenge to Finland. 
Consequently, it was simply a ―neighbour‖, with no threatening intentions, and 
Finland had ―a great interest‖ in cooperating to ensure that it remained so. Within 
this context, the triple emphasis on the word ―neighbour‖ takes a positive 
connotation and conveys the idea that post-Soviet Russia deserved special attention 
in Finnish foreign policy due to its extensive border with Finland. 
The behaviour of Finnish foreign policy makers during the August 2008 crisis can be 
interpreted as a reflection of both this narrative and of the discourse arguing for 
cooperation with Russia as the only option for Finland. Foreign minister Stubb 
fostered diplomatic channels with Moscow, focused on negotiations and on 
deescalating the crisis, an approach that is reminiscent of Finland‘s Cold War role as 
mediator between Russia and the West.
248
 Accordingly, Stubb claimed to be ―in 
constant contact with [his] colleagues in the European Union and the United States‖, 
while at the same time he held talks with Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov.
249
 
On 12 August, as soon as the Russian army decided to halt operations in Georgia, 
Stubb issued a statement to ―welcome president Medvedev‘s decision‖, which 
implied that he was still treating Russia as a partner, in spite of tensions due to its 
disproportionate use of force.
250
 
In the first month after the cited communiqué of 29 August, Finnish leaders‘ 
statements on the Russian-Georgian war emphasised primarily Finland‘s role in 
mediating and providing humanitarian relief. In Halonen‘s words, ―Finland focused 
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on achieving a ceasefire, ensuring the delivery of humanitarian aid and promoting 
respect for international law‖.
251
 Similarly, in his speech at the United Nations‘ 
Security Council in late September, Stubb stressed his efforts ―to promote the 
implementation of a ceasefire agreement and the humanitarian efforts in the 
region‖
252
. The question of responsibility for the outbreak of war, which as seen 
played a prominent role in the speeches of German and Polish leaders, was never 
addressed. This omission served the purpose of avoiding further tensions and 
focusing on post-conflict developments. 
In the following months, Finnish leaders responded in a remarkably positive way to 
Medvedev‘s controversial proposals to reform the European security architecture and 
described Russia as a strategic partner. In a speech at the London School of 
Economics in November 2008, Stubb argued that, ―against the backdrop of the war 
in Georgia, the financial crisis and the election of Barack Obama‖, the world was 
―witnessing the embryo a post-American, multipolar world‖, thereby drawing 
conclusions that resonated with Russian leaders‘ contemporary analyses.
253
 While 
most European and North American leaders reacted sceptically to Russia‘s calls for a 
debate on a new European security structure, Stubb welcomed them, with the proviso 
that existing institutions remained in place (cf. Lo 2009). In her address to the OSCE 
ministerial council on 4 December 2008, Halonen went even further in meeting 
Russia‘s plea. 
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The participants of this OSCE ministerial council should use the 
opportunity to […] share views on the future of security in Europe. The 
Presidents of the Russian Federation and France have already contributed 
to this debate. I hope that it will be continued in an open and constructive 
atmosphere. We should not assume that current practices of co-operation 




The last sentence of this passage suggested openness to Russia‘s proposals to reform 
the existing European security system and sounded as an invitation to the other 
OSCE member states to take a flexible stance on the issue. Halonen‘s approach to the 
topic reflected the tendency in post-1945 Finnish foreign policy to respond positively 
to Russia‘s foreign policy initiatives and act as mediator with NATO countries. 
By December 2008, the Russian-Georgian war no longer appeared as a source of 
tension in Finnish discourses about Russia. In an interview with the Finnish Journal 
of Foreign Affairs Ulkopolitiikka, Stubb argued that the war had ―strengthened the 
unity of Europe‖, while Russia was defined as ―a strategic partner for the EU‖.
255
 
According to the Finnish foreign minister, the ―big challenge‖ was ―to transform the 
partnership into a functional relationship‖. Hence, once the August 2008 crisis had 
subsided, Stubb returned to the deep-rooted Finnish identity narrative portraying 
Russia as both a partner and a challenge that could be turned into an opportunity if 
Finland engaged it with adequate policies. 
 
Conclusion 
This case study highlighted the relevance of historically constructed images of 
Russia as a security threat in national foreign policy discourses during the August 
2008 crisis. In particular, it explored the extent to which Russia‘s Tsarist and Soviet 
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imperial past provided the key for national leaders‘ interpretations of current events. 
References to Tsarist and Soviet imperialism were most prominent in Polish 
discourses, notably in those of president Lech Kaczynski. Kaczynski‘s statements 
were deeply fraught with memory politics and portrayed Russia‘s foreign policy in 
2008 as a continuation of Soviet foreign policy. Conversely, German foreign minister 
Frank-Walter Steinmeier rejected the use of memory politics to blame Russia for the 
crisis in Georgia. Steinmeier made historical references only in order to emphasise 
the differences between East-West relations during the Cold War and tensions with 
Russia in August 2008. On the other hand, Finnish foreign policy makers never 
openly referred to Russia‘s past to interpret the war in Georgia. Nonetheless, their 
behaviour during the crisis was also influenced by deep-rooted national perceptions 
of Russia and of Finland‘s role as bridge builder in relations between Moscow and 
the West. 
German discourses emphasised Russia‘s central role in European security and the 
consequent need of treating Russia as an indispensable partner. Negative memories 
of the Cold War, when Germany was divided and stood on the frontline of 
superpower rivalry, informed German leaders‘ rejection of confrontation with 
Russia. A German narrative criticising Russia‘s actions during the August 2008 crisis 
did emerge, but it focused mostly on technical and legal issues (the withdrawal of 
Russian troops after the ceasefire and the disproportionality of Russia‘s military 
intervention). Rather than a deep-rooted anti-Russian attitude, this discourse reflected 
elements of post-1945 German national identity such as the rejection of war as means 
to solve disputes and the support of multilateralism and international law. These 
aspects of German identity also contribute to understanding Merkel‘s and 
Steinmeier‘s discourse praising EU mediation during the crisis and advocating 
further EU engagement in relations with Russia. 
Polish discourses revealed a marked dichotomy between top government officials 
and the presidency. The discourse advanced by prime minister Tusk and foreign 
minister Sikorski was critical of Russia‘s actions in Georgia but also emphasised the 
necessity of continuing to engage the Kremlin, reflecting the government‘s attempt 
to construct a new foreign policy approach towards Russia after 2007. Occasionally, 
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Sikorski‘s speeches slipped into memory politics and comparisons with Russia‘s 
Soviet past. However, for the most part this discourse was pragmatic and not 
fundamentally irreconcilable with dominant German discourses. Conversely, Lech 
Kaczynski‘s discourse was profoundly hostile towards Russia, which was portrayed 
as aggressive and intolerant of European values. This narrative reflected long-
standing Polish perceptions of Russia as an imperialist country, morally incompatible 
with European civilisation. Kaczynski also accused other EU countries of being too 
compromising with Russia and of leaving him alone with a few other East-Central 
European countries to defend European values. This discourse resonated with the 
Polish identity narrative on Poland‘s unreciprocated commitment to the Western 
cause. 
Competing discourses on Russia existed also in Finland throughout the Georgian 
crisis. Here, however, different narratives reflected traditionally ambivalent Finnish 
perceptions of Russia. At the peak of the crisis, in August 2008, the dominant 
discourse stressed the growing assertiveness and militarism of Russia‘s foreign 
policy and argued for the necessity to engage Russia in order to defuse tensions. This 
narrative can be understood through the prism of Finnish national identity, where 
Russia was simultaneously constructed as a security challenge and as an 
indispensable partner for Finland‘s security. While this discourse appears wary of 
Russia‘s foreign policy posture, the narrative that became dominant in the weeks 
following the August 2008 military escalation was very supportive of cooperation 
with Moscow. Most strikingly, it argued for openness in the Western response to 
Russia‘s controversial requests of reforming the European security system after the 
August 2008 war. Similarly to German discourses, it portrayed Russia as a strategic 
partner. 
Ultimately, the empirical analysis in this chapter reiterated the relevance of national 
identity and historically constructed images of Russia to foreign policy makers‘ 
discourses. Divergences in the conceptualisation of Russia in German, Polish and 
Finnish identity were reflected in the different stance that each country took during 
the August 2008 crisis. Kaczynski‘s discourse stood out from all the others because it 
relied on profoundly anti-Russian perceptions and memory politics that are peculiar 
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to Polish identity. However, pragmatism and the support for a multilateral solution of 
the conflict were common traits across other national narratives. Therefore, 
compared with discourses on Nord Stream in 2005-2007 (prior to the events 
discussed in this chapter), national narratives on Russia during the 2008 Russian-
Georgian war were less discordant. As the next chapters show, in the following four 
years national discourses on Russia continued to converge towards a pragmatic 
stance across different policy fields. 
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This chapter focuses on German, Polish and Finnish foreign policy makers‘ 
discourses on the street protests that took place in Russia from December 2011 until 
the end of 2012. As opposed to the previous two chapters, which analysed discourses 
on Russia as an international actor, this case study investigates narratives about 
domestic developments in Russia. This focus allows an evaluation of the role played 
by historical perceptions of Russia‘s internal system of government in current 
discourses. Moreover, it enables an assessment of the relevance of value-based 
constituents of German, Polish and Finnish identity, such as the support for 
democracy and human rights, in policy makers‘ discourses on Russia  
The main research questions addressed in the chapter are: how are the Russian state 
and street demonstrators portrayed in German, Polish and Finnish policy makers‘ 
discourses? Which discursive strategies are used and which semantic fields are 
associated with the Russian authorities and demonstrators? How do discourses relate 
to national identity and to historical perceptions of Russia? How do discourses relate 
to each other within each national discursive arena and across the three countries 
under investigation? As for the previous two case studies, the main components of 
national identity and the dominant historical narratives on Russia identified in 
chapter 4 provide the interpretive framework. 
The analysis starts with a brief survey of the street protests in Russia in 2011 and 
2012, including their main causes, key features and developments. This section is 
based on some of the most recent literature published on the topic and fulfils the 
purpose of contextualising the ensuing discourse analysis. The following three 
subchapters analyse the discourses of German, Polish and Finnish foreign policy 
leaders in accordance to the theory and methodology presented in chapters 2 and 3. 
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For each national discursive arena, the most prominent issues in contemporary 
bilateral relations with Russia are outlined briefly in order to identify the wider 
background of the debate on street protests. The concluding section reviews the 
chapter‘s main findings and compares national discourses. 
Most notably, this case study allows an investigation of the dichotomy between long-
standing constructions of Russia as an important partner and as an authoritarian 
country that violates democratic principles and human rights. It attempts to establish 
which characterisation of Russia was predominant in 2011 and 2012, namely at a 
time when Russia was becoming both more authoritarian and increasingly important 
in economic and commercial terms. The chapter argues that the two historical 
narratives competed for dominance, but the one portraying Russia as a partner 
eventually prevailed in official discourses in all countries under analysis. 
 
Street protests in Russian cities, December 2011 - May 2012 
The mass protests that took place in Russian cities between December 2011 and May 
2012 were among the largest the country had experienced since the disintegration of 
the Soviet Union. As Russia was recovering from the 2008 economic crisis at a 
relatively swift pace, the demonstrations were largely unexpected. They started 
immediately after the national parliamentary elections of 4 December 2011, drawing 
much attention from international media and analysts. The elections were won by 
Vladimir Putin‘s and Dmitri Medvedev‘s United Russia party amidst accusations of 
electoral fraud. United Russia received over 49 per cent of the votes, a drop of 
approximately 15 per cent compared with the party‘s 2007 election result, but still 
sufficient to ensure a majority of seats in parliament (Gill 2012: 449).  
As Graeme Robertson (2013) and Lilia Shevtsova (2012a) have argued, the protests 
may have been sparked by electoral fraud, but had much deeper causes and were a 
continuation of longer-term trends.
256
 Frustration with the corruption of state 
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officials, lack of opportunities for social mobility for younger Russians and 
disillusionment with politics accumulated over the previous years. As Gordon Hahn 
(2012) and Vladimir Gel'man (2013) noted, president Dmitri Medvedev's discourse 
on modernisation nurtured expectations of liberal reforms among the urban middle 
class, which were disappointed when his mandate drew to an end without any 
significant change. 
Although the Russian economy had largely recovered by 2011, the 2008 crisis may 
have contributed to the discontent of the middle class by bequeathing to it a growing 
sense of  political impotence and uncertainty about the future (Chaisty and 
Whitefield 2012: 202-204, Volkov 2012: 55). This discontent could not be 
channelled through established opposition parties, which were perceived as part of 
the Kremlin's corrupt system of power (cf. March 2012). Furthermore, Medvedev's 
continuous stress on the need to modernise the economy may have involuntarily 
conveyed the idea that the country was failing to recover from the 2008 financial 
crisis (Robinson 2013). 
Other shorter-term factors also played a role. After 2010, the new mayor of Moscow, 
Sergei Sobyanin, proved more liberal than his predecessor on the issue of approving 
opposition protests, which allowed an increasing concentration of demonstrations in 
the Russian capital (Hahn 2012: 488, Robertson 2013: 18). Furthermore, in 
September 2011 Russian president Medvedev announced that he had already agreed 
long time before with then prime minister Vladimir Putin that the latter should return 
to the presidency in 2012 (Putin had already served two terms as president between 
2000 and 2008). In return, Putin promised to support Medvedev‘s bid for the position 
of prime minister in case their party, United Russia, won the December 2011 
parliamentary elections. Together with the accusations of electoral fraud in 
December, the announcement of this pre-arranged swap of posts and the prospect of 
Putin‘s return to the presidency until 2018 or even 2024 acted as the main catalysts 
                                                                                                                                                                    
forest, the dismissal of a regional official, a local construction project), rather than on the Russian 
political system as a whole (Evans 2012). 
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for the post-election mass protests in Moscow and other Russian cities (Shevtsova 
2012a: 212, Volkov 2012: 55-57).
257
 
The protesters were mostly well-educated, young or middle-aged and belonged to the 
middle class. They obtained information on political events primarily from the 
internet, a fact that differentiated them from the majority of Russians, who relied 
mostly on televised news (Volkov 2012: 57-60). They also used social media to 
organise and coordinate protest marches and rallies (cf. Bode and Makarychev 2013). 
Their ideological background was very diverse, ranging from liberalism to 
communism and nationalism (Koesel and Bunce 2012: 411-412). The 
demonstrations that they organised after the 2011 parliamentary elections were 
different from previous ones in post-Soviet Russia in several respects. Contrary to 
previous, local protests, demonstrators were able to forge new ties among existing 
extra-parliamentary opposition groups (Greene 2013: 41). As a result, 
demonstrations became larger and focused on broader issues of national politics, 
with the declared aim of influencing them (Robertson 2013: 18). Protesters 
demanded inter alia new parliamentary elections, easier rules for the registration of 
opposition parties and the dismissal of Central Election Commission head Vladimir 
Churov (Shevtsova 2012: 21). 
The first demonstration took place in Moscow on 5 December 2011, the day after the 
parliamentary elections. The protest was unsanctioned and involved approximately 
8,000 people, mostly activists from civil society organisations and extra-
parliamentary political parties, including street opposition leaders Boris Nemtsov and 
Alexei Navalny (Greene 2013: 42, Robertson 2013: 19). Subsequent protests were 
much larger. On 10 December a demonstration held in Moscow‘s Bolotnaya Square 
drew around 50-60,000 people. Two weeks later, on 24 December, over 100,000 
protesters gathered on Sakharov Avenue. Smaller demonstrations were held in early 
2012, throughout the campaign for the presidential elections in March. Prominent 
non-governmental organisations such as Golos and Memorial and the banned 
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People‘s Freedom Party took part, together with other smaller civil society 
movements. They demanded free and fair presidential elections and harshly criticised 
United Russia‘s candidate Vladimir Putin (Greene 2013: 42, Hahn 2012: 495-496). 
Between December and March, Russian authorities responded to protests with a 
―mixture of repression plus half-hearted measures to redress grievances‖ (Volkov 
2012: 56). Some reforms were announced, including easier rules for the electoral 
registration of political parties and the reinstatement of popular elections for regional 
governors (Gel‘man 2013: 7). Putin stated that the demonstrations were orchestrated 
from abroad, portrayed the street opposition as ―unpatriotic‖ and ―anti-Russian‖ and 
argued that protests would hinder Russia‘s economic recovery. However, as 
demonstrations continued, he reframed his rhetoric and claimed that he was pleased 
with the protests because they highlighted the strength of Russian democracy and 
civil society (Koesel and Bunce 2012: 415-416). 
Until March 2012, Putin and his supporters focused primarily on achieving an 
absolute majority and winning the presidential elections in the first round. As the 
street opposition did not field a candidate, its actions appeared unlikely to have any 
concrete impact on the campaign.
258
 Despite the lack of real challengers, United 
Russia launched a more aggressive media campaign than the one for the previous 
parliamentary elections, attacking opposition leaders and emphasising the negative 
consequences of social unrest on the country‘s economy (Gel‘man 2013: 8). 
Moreover, it organised large pro-Putin rallies to show that he enjoyed overwhelming 
support among Russians (Smyth et al. 2013). Together with new instances of 
electoral fraud and the lack of any strong alternative candidate, these measures 
ensured Putin‘s re-election in the first round, with over 63 per cent of the votes 
(Gel‘man 2013: 3). 
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Following the presidential election, the authorities‘ strategy to deal with street 
protests became more repressive. Furthermore, demonstrations drew smaller crowds, 
showing that social media provided an insufficient base for permanent political 
mobilisation (Gel‘man 2013: 8-9). As Gordon Hahn (2012: 497-503) noted, scarcer 
participation may have also been due to the growing belief that, with adequate 
organisation, the street opposition could acquire political power through the regular 
electoral process. In March 2012, opposition candidates won mayoral elections in 
several large provincial capitals, including Tolyatti, Yaroslavl and Oryol. 
Furthermore, on 2 May 2012 a law relaxing requirements for the electoral 
registration of political parties entered into force, making it easier for the extra-
parliamentary opposition to be able to run in future elections. 
The authorities combined this concession with harsher measures against new 
demonstrations.  On 6 May 2012, on the eve of Putin‘s inauguration to the 
presidency, the police crushed unsanctioned protests with an overwhelming use of 
force and the arrest of over 250 people.
259
 After Putin‘s return to power, the extra-
parliamentary opposition underwent a process of internal reorganisation to create a 
more solid and coherent political base, which culminated in the election of a 
coordinating council in October 2012. Demonstrations continued during the summer 
and fall of 2012, but on a smaller scale and in a context of increasing repression 
(Robertson 2013: 21-22). 
 
Democracy or partnership? German leaders’ conflicting 
discourses 
Mass protests in Russia were a prominent topic in the German political debate 
throughout 2012. From mid-2008, German-Russian bilateral relations focused on the 
development of a modernisation partnership, including economic, technological and 
legal cooperation. From the German perspective, the partnership was to serve 
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Germany‘s economic interests, contribute to the modernisation of the Russian 
economy and strengthen the rule of law in Russia. By the fall of 2011, however, the 
partnership had seemingly failed to produce tangible results in terms of Russia‘s 
modernisation. Within this context, German policy makers considered the December 
2011 and March 2012 elections as important factors to assess the strength of the rule 
of law in Russia and the Russian political leadership‘s willingness to modernise the 
country (cf. Gotkowska 2010, Meister 2012).
260
 
As the elections and the ensuing demonstrations took place in Russia, two dominant 
and conflicting discourses developed among German foreign policy makers. One was 
very critical of Russia‘s political system, of the authorities‘ handling of post-electoral 
demonstrations and of the overall running of the country‘s economy and society. 
From the fall of 2011, this discourse featured prominently in the speeches of some 
officials at the German foreign ministry, most particularly in those of Andreas 
Schockenhoff and Markus Löning. At the federal foreign office, Schockenhoff was 
responsible for German-Russian civil society cooperation, while Löning was 
commissioner for human rights policy and humanitarian aid. Both played a key role 
in German official discourses on events in Russia in 2011 and 2012 through 
interviews with mainstream media, press releases and public appeals to the Russian 
leadership. Hence, their speeches are also investigated. 
The other discourse appeared in particular in chancellor Angela Merkel‘s and foreign 
minister Guido Westerwelle‘s speeches and was considerably less critical towards 
Russia.  Merkel and Westerwelle described the protests in Russian cities as a positive 
development and expressed disapproval of some of the Kremlin‘s measures to curb 
demonstrations and restrict civil freedoms. However, they consistently reiterated 
their commitment to building a strategic partnership with Russia regardless of the 
outcome of its parliamentary and presidential elections. They also argued that their 
occasional criticism of Russia‘s internal affairs was no obstacle for bilateral dialogue 
and economic cooperation.  
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Democracy, human rights and Russia’s failed modernisation 
Russia‘s failure to modernise and the repressive policies implemented by the Russian 
ruling elite during the 2011 and 2012 elections were the dominant themes of 
Schockenhoff‘s and Löning‘s speeches. According to them, Russia had consistently 
violated democratic principles and human rights, namely core German and European 
values. Hence, they argued that Germany should take a more critical stance towards 
Russia (including the application of sanctions) and support the cause of Russian 
street demonstrators. Humanitarianism is the topos linking the key argument (Russia 
violated democratic principles and human rights) to its conclusion (Germany should 
take policy countermeasures and support the Russian opposition). 
Schockenhoff‘s and Löning‘s emphasis on human rights and democracy can be 
understood through the prominent role which these principles have played in identity 
construction and foreign policy discourses in post-1945 Federal Germany. In German 
foreign policy discourses, individual freedoms and democracy have long been 
described as core elements of the German state and as major constituents of its 
foreign policy.
261
 Furthermore, Schockenhoff‘s and Löning‘s arguments resonate 
with German historical discourses describing Russia as a backward and corrupt 
country. As argued in chapter 4, these narratives also influenced German perceptions 
of post-Soviet Russia. 
Schockenhoff expressed his concerns about political developments in Russia shortly 
after Medvedev and Putin announced their intention to swap their posts. In October 
2011, while speaking at a conference on Russia at the Heinrich Böll Foundation in 
Berlin, Schockenhoff questioned whether the country‘s modernisation would be 
possible after Putin‘s return to the presidency. 
 
                                                          
261
 See chapter 4. In the speeches under analysis, this concept was best summarised by German state 
secretary Cornelia Pieper in her statements at the opening of an exhibition on German and Russian 
history in Moscow in June 2012: “The free and democratic constitutional order is the core element of 
our state and guarantees individual freedoms and rights. These shape our actions and thinking and 
are the precept for Germany’s value oriented domestic and foreign policy”; 
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2012/120620-
StM_P_Ausstellung_St_H_M.html (accessed 25/10/2013).  
Divisive identity, divided foreign policy? 
 
209 
Post-electoral democratic protests in Russia 
I am worried about internal developments in the country [Russia] […] 
Above all, I am worried because the Russian middle class does not see its 
interests represented in the political system […] It seems to me that the 
basic problem in Russia is that also today there is no consensus on the 
need to modernise the country. On the contrary, among the elites and in 





Through perspectivation (signalled by the phrases ―I am worried‖, ―it seems to me‖ 
and by the use of exclamation marks), Schockenhoff clearly positioned himself 
against the Russian elites‘ political line. He also claimed that his only hopes for 
Russia‘s modernisation were based on the ―revitalisation […] of particular parts of 
the Russian civil society‖, namely those that were ready to become engaged in civil 
campaigns to address the country‘s problems. 
These themes were developed further in his interview with the German daily Der 
Tagesspiegel on 27 November 2011, a week before the Russian parliamentary 
elections. Schockenhoff drew a bleak picture of the Russian political system and, 
quoting prominent Russian scholars, qualified it as ―neo-feudal power system‖, 
―tyranny of incompetence‖, ―blatantly inefficient‖ and degrading.  Within this 
context, he claimed, ―the most important chance [for Russia‘s modernisation]‖ was 
to be found in ―the increasing activeness of Russia‘s civil society‖. He therefore 
concluded that 
 
Germany and the EU need these citizens as partners for the 
modernisation partnership! […] In the future, it is therefore essential to 
get civil actors, NGOs, independent initiatives and experts much more 
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The mass protests following the parliamentary elections consolidated Schockenhoff‘s 
belief in the political potential of Russian civil society. On 15 December 2011, 
speaking at the lower house of the German federal parliament, he argued that the 
demonstrations had changed both Russia and Western perceptions of Russia. 
 
The protests were a victory over the fear of the Kremlin. They were 
above all a victory over the political apathy that paralysed Russian 
society in the last years. They have revealed a new generation, a changed 
society, many young people, activists and a growing middle class. For 
me, these are the new Russians – democratically-minded, active, 
engaged, well-informed […] These people are the most important force 
in favour of reforms and the most important modernisation partner of the 




Through predication, Schockenhoff qualified the demonstrations as a momentous 
triumph for Russian civil society and emphasised the importance of protesters for 
Russia‘s future. The semantic field associated with the demonstrations (―victory over 
fear‖, ―victory over political apathy‖) and demonstrators (―a new generation‖, 
―young‖, ―active‖, ―engaged‖, ―well-informed‖) is unambiguously positive, which is 
functional to Schockenhoff‘s declared aim to get Russian civil society more involved 
in the German-Russian modernisation partnership. By contrast, in the same speech 
the Russian political establishment is described as ―leading to apathy, cynicism and 
to a dangerous estrangement between power and society‖. 
Schockenhoff‘s criticism of the Russian political system was echoed by Löning in an 
interview with the German daily Die Welt on 20 December 2011. Löning denounced 
―many violations of human rights, the infringement of basic democratic principles 
and the near absence of the rule of law‖.
265
 Furthermore, he appealed to the Russian 
authorities to respect the freedoms of opinion and assembly and not to ―beat up or 
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arrest demonstrators just because they have different opinions from the Russian 
government‖. Most importantly, he urged the European Union to take a more critical 
stance in defence of democracy and human rights in Russia. 
 
The Russian parliamentary elections [on 4 December 2011] were 
criticised, but we Europeans should express our opinion much more 
clearly […] Human rights are the core values of the European Union. If 
we do not defend them, we betray our own values and the credibility of 
European foreign policy will go to the dogs. 
 
Löning‘s statement reflects the relevance of human rights and the European Union in 
German foreign policy discourses. Through perspectivation and the use of direct, 
idiomatic expressions, he conveyed the message that the credibility of the EU‘s 
foreign policy depended on the Union‘s response to contemporary events in Russia. 
Accordingly, he argued that the EU should prioritise values over economic interests 
and ―clearly demand from Russian political leaders the respect of the rule of law‖. 
He also advocated the application of sanctions on Russian public officials who were 
responsible for human rights violations. 
As the March 2012 presidential elections in Russia approached, Schockenhoff and 
Löning expressed their concerns about the conditions under which they would take 
place. Schockenhoff criticised the ―harassment‖ of independent election monitors 
and the fact that no one had been held responsible for the ballot-rigging that occurred 
during the December 2011 parliamentary elections.
266
 Löning denounced the further 
restrictions on civil freedoms and violations of human rights that took place both 
before the elections and in the ensuing months.
267
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Following Putin‘s return to the presidency in May 2012, Schockenhoff overtly 
condemned political developments in Russia. In an interview with Der Tagesspiegel 
in August 2012, he argued: 
 
The Russian leadership does not offer any dialogue to society. Putin 
relies on repression and confrontation […] Russia lags behind in all 
international rankings, regardless of whether they concern fighting 
corruption, competition or demographic development. Putin sees his own 




Schockenhoff‘s harsh critique of Russia reflected a clear prevalence of the normative 
dimension of Germany‘s foreign policy identity in his discourse. If Schockenhoff‘s 
stance had become dominant within the German foreign ministry, we could have 
expected a serious deterioration of German-Russian relations by the end of 2012, as 
the Russian authorities continued their repressive policies. However, a different 
discourse became prominent in German foreign policy circles after March 2012, 
toning down Schockenhoff‘s and Löning‘s criticism and arguing for partnership with 
Russia. 
 
Strategic partnership and friendly criticism 
An analysis of the German foreign ministry‘s and the federal chancellor‘s electronic 
archives suggests that Angela Merkel and Guido Westerwelle played a marginal role 
in the German public debate about developments in Russia between the fall of 2011 
and February 2012. After the March 2012 presidential elections, their official 
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statements about Russia‘s internal affairs became more frequent and constructed a 
distinct German official discourse. This narrative criticised the Russian authorities‘ 
handling of the presidential elections and the subsequent crackdown on the street 
opposition and civil freedoms.  However, Merkel‘s and Westerwelle‘s criticism was 
much milder than Schockenhoff‘s and Löning‘s. Most importantly, Merkel and 
Westerwelle argued strongly in favour of continuing dialogue with the Russian 
authorities and developing a strategic partnership based on shared economic and 
security interests. According to them, criticism and partnership were not mutually 
exclusive, as reciprocal trust and friendship was necessary while discussing difficult 
issues. 
In this argumentative strategy, economic advantage and security are the topoi linking 
the key argument (Russia is an essential economic and security partner for Germany) 
to its logical conclusion (Germany should continue to develop a strategic partnership 
with Russia). The discourse reflected long-standing German perceptions of Russia as 
an economic and security partner. It also appeared as a logical continuation of the 
basic principle of German Ostpolitik, namely the idea that economic cooperation 
may have positive effects on Russia‘s internal affairs.
269
 Considerations about the 
violations of human rights and democratic principles also played a role in this 
discourse, but they were largely overshadowed by the prominence of arguments in 
favour of economic and security cooperation. 
As argued, until February 2012 Merkel‘s and Westerwelle‘s statements on Russia 
largely ignored the issue of electoral fraud. The irregularities that took place during 
the December 2011 parliamentary elections and the ensuing mass demonstrations 
were mentioned only briefly in a few statements. For instance, at the OSCE 
ministerial council of 6 December 2011 Westerwelle declared: 
 
We have noted with concern the reports by the OSCE election observers 
on the recent parliamentary elections in Russia. These reports show that 
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the Russian Federation still has some way to go before it completely 
meets all OSCE standards […] We encourage the Russian Federation to 





In the light of the serious violations of democratic principles which the international 
press revealed immediately after the elections, Westerwelle's statement appears 
remarkably mild.
271
 The German foreign minister ignored the opposition's call for a 
repetition of the vote and merely ―encouraged‖ Russia to respect democratic 
standards at the next elections. Merkel only made a brief reference to events in 
Russia at the New Year reception for German diplomats, expressing her hopes that 
the Russian presidential elections would ―take place well, democratically‖ and 
anticipating that German-Russian cooperation would ―remain a focal point‖ for her 
government also after the elections.
272
 
Willingness to cooperate with the Kremlin became a central theme in Merkel‘s and 
Westerwelle‘s statements after February 2012, when internal developments in Russia 
began to feature more prominently in their speeches. This emerges clearly from 
Westerwelle‘s interview with the mainstream German newspaper Welt am Sonntag 
on 4 March 2012, the day when presidential elections were held in Russia. 
 
We would like to continue the modernisation partnership with Russia, 
which is urgently necessary, including the dialogue on the rule of law. 
Russia is a nation with a rich culture [Kulturnation] and a large part of it 
is in Europe. European security can only be achieved with Russia, not 
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In the interview, Westerwelle associated Russia with a positive semantic field 
through predication, notably by calling it ―a nation with a rich culture‖. Moreover, 
using the discursive strategy of categorisation, he constructed Russia as part of a 
European in-group on the account that ―large part of it is in Europe‖ and that 
―European security can only be achieved with Russia‖. This use of predication and 
categorisation was functional to substantiate Westerwelle‘s desire to continue the 
strategic partnership with Russia on the grounds that it played an indispensable role 
for Europe.  
On the other hand, Westerwelle appeared keen to avoid comments on the street 
protests in Russia. When specifically asked for his opinion on the topic, he described 
the demonstrations as ―interesting and a positive sign‖, but refused to comment on 
the violent clashes between protesters and the Russian authorities. His subsequent 
criticism of ―worrying developments‖ concerning press freedom and homophobia in 
Russia was toned down by the assertion that ―economic, political and social 
progress‖ was also taking place.
274
 
In his next newspaper interview, held with the German daily Passauer Neue Presse 
on 10 March 2012, Westerwelle clearly explained Germany‘s foreign policy line 
towards Russia following Putin‘s re-election. 
 
We believe president Putin‘s announcement that all evidence of electoral 
fraud will be investigated […] We have a strategic interest in the 
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partnership with Russia. We want to expand this partnership further. But 




Remarkably, Westerwelle trusted Putin‘s promises about investigating electoral 
irregularities, despite the fact that the irregularities had benefitted Putin himself and 
had been executed by a state apparatus that Putin largely controlled. As the passage 
shows, expanding the existing partnership with Russia was Germany‘s ―strategic 
interest‖ and hence its main priority. On the other hand, Westerwelle‘s pledge to 
maintain a critical stance towards Russia appears weak, as it was constructed with a 
double negation (―does not mean‖, ―we will not express‖) and was not accompanied 
by any actual criticism in the interview. 
Westerwelle‘s discourse was embraced by Merkel, which practically meant that 
throughout the spring of 2012 both Germany‘s top foreign policy makers emphasised 
achievements in economic relations and only made mild statements about democracy 
and the human rights situation in Russia. This emerged, for instance, at Merkel‘s 
joint press conference with Putin in Berlin, on 1 June 2012. The German chancellor 
first praised the ―very intense, good and friendly relations with Russia‖, with 
particular emphasis on ―economic cooperation‖.
276
 Her comments on Russia‘s 
internal affairs were limited to the claim that  
 
We [Germany] have a strong interest in the continued development of 
democratic plurality in Russia. Because, as far as I can tell from my 
experience, this is the only way a strong civil society can form and 
support the development of a country. 
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Using perspectivation (signalled by the phrase ―as far as I can tell from my 
experience‖), Merkel alluded to her personal experience as former citizen of the 
German Democratic Republic in order to stress the importance of civil society in 
democratic transitions. However, by referring to her experience in East Germany she 
also avoided addressing directly the situation in Russia. Moreover, the phrase 
―continued development of democratic plurality‖ suggests that democratic plurality 
was already developing in Russia, a remarkably optimistic assessment in the light of 
two recent flawed elections. 
The few times when Merkel and Westerwelle discussed the violation of democratic 
principles and fundamental freedoms in Russia, they both strongly emphasised that 
criticism and occasional disagreement was not intended to disrupt the German-
Russian strategic partnership. For instance in his November 2012 interview with the 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Westerwelle claimed that German and Russian 
leaders had ―differences of opinion‖ on some of Russia‘s recent internal 
developments, but remained ―honest friends and strategic partners‖.
277
 Similarly, 
speaking at a German-Russian civil society forum in November 2012, Merkel argued 
that Germans and Russians should listen to each other‘s arguments ―as partners and 
friends‖ also when discussing issues on which they disagreed. Furthermore, 
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Pragmatism and reconciliation before values: Polish leaders’ 
discourses 
The analysis of Polish top foreign policy makers‘ public statements in 2011 and 2012 
revealed that they were reluctant to comment on contemporary domestic 
developments in Russia. In this period, the main focus of their diplomacy towards 
Russia was on promoting trade and seeking reconciliation by tackling contentious 
issues in bilateral relations. During 2011, Poland and Russia negotiated the 
establishment of a special visa-free regime for their citizens residing in the Russian 
enclave of Kaliningrad and the adjoining Polish territories. The agreement was 
signed by the Russian and Polish foreign ministers in Moscow in December 2011 
and was hailed as a step towards the lifting of all visa requirements between the 
European Union and Russia.
279
 
Much attention was devoted to the process of historical reconciliation, a highly 
sensitive issue in both Poland and Russia (cf. De Lazari 2011). The Polish-Russian 
Working Group for Difficult Matters, an official forum bringing together academics 
from both countries, advanced projects that were conducive to a shared interpretation 
of contentious events in the history of Polish-Russian relations. The Polish foreign 
ministry strongly supported these efforts and reported the achievements of the 
Group‘s meetings in press releases on the ministerial website.
280
 Reflecting the 
atmosphere of cultural reconciliation, the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, 
Patriarch Kirill, paid a historic visit to Poland in August 2012.
281
 
Throughout 2011 and 2012, Polish diplomacy tackled several bilateral disputes, most 
notably the investigation of the plane crash in which president Lech Kaczynski died 
in April 2010 and the return of the plane‘s wreck to Poland.
282
 Tensions and 
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disagreements persisted on the matter, but this did not prevent progress in other areas 
of bilateral relations. Most importantly, in November 2012 the Polish state-controlled 
energy company PGNiG successfully negotiated a reduction in the price of gas 
purchased from the Russian state company Gazprom.
283
 
The wider context of Polish diplomatic efforts to improve relations with Russia in 
2011 and 2012 helps understand why Polish foreign policy leaders refrained from 
commenting on electoral manipulations and on the repression of mass protests in 
Russia. The discourse advocating a pragmatic approach to relations with Russia, 
which was constructed in governmental circles after the election of Donald Tusk in 
2007, shaped the statements of Polish foreign minister Radoslaw Sikorski. 
Conversely, long-standing Polish perceptions of Russia as an undemocratic and 
corrupt country played a lesser role in official discourses. 
 
Sympathy with demonstrators, but other priorities 
Foreign minister Sikorski was the only Polish foreign policy leader who made 
regular statements regarding the mass protests in Russia, mostly on occasions in 
which journalists specifically asked him to comment on the events. When addressing 
the issue, Sikorski‘s main argumentative strategy consisted in expressing sympathy 
towards the demonstrators. However, these expressions of sympathy were not 
accompanied by any criticism of the Russian authorities. Conversely, Sikorski 
argued that Putin enjoyed large support in Russia. Furthermore, he juxtaposed this 
interpretation of events to claims that Poland needed to pursue reconciliation and 
cooperation with the Kremlin regardless of domestic developments in Russia. 
Political and economic advantage are the topoi linking this argumentative strategy to 
its logical conclusion: reconciliation and economic cooperation took priority over 
value-driven support of civil society and democratic change in Russia. 
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In the months preceding the outbreak of mass protests in Russian cities, Sikorski 
maintained an ambiguous stance in his assessments of domestic developments in 
Russia. In a speech held at Harvard University in February 2011, he argued that 
Poland was ―dedicated to good relations with Russia‖, but criticised its system of 
government. 
 
Democracy, markets and respect for the rights of the individual – these 
define relations between Europe and America. Russia, along with many 
other former Soviet republics, still does not accept those values. Moscow 
hankers after something rather different: ‗managed democracy‘. Which is 




Through the discursive strategy of categorisation, Sikorski constructed Russia as 
alien to Europe and the United States due to its disregard of democratic principles 
and human rights. This description of Russia appeared in continuity with traditional 
Polish perceptions of the country as oriental, undemocratic and corrupt.
285
 
However, a few weeks later Sikorski described domestic developments in Russia in 
more positive terms. In his speech before the lower house of the Polish parliament 
(Sejm), he claimed: 
 
Those who believe that one way of thinking reigns in Russia are 
mistaken […] Many Russians, including top leaders, are becoming aware 
of the need to curb corruption, modernise the economy and enhance the 
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 See chapter 4. 
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Furthermore, on this occasion Sikorski argued that Russia could choose ―the 
democratic path leading to integration with the West‖, thereby blurring the 
boundaries of the categorisation constructed in his Harvard speech. Admittedly, he 
also stated that part of the Russian leadership ―continue[d] to long for superpower 
glory and heavy-handed rule‖ and that he did not know ―which way Russia [would] 
go‖. However, he unambiguously argued that Poland needed to cooperate with the 
Kremlin ―no matter how Russia is ruled‖ because it was an ―important neighbour‖.
287
  
While the December 2011 elections in Russia approached, this pragmatic stance 
prevailed in Polish foreign policy circles. This emerges clearly in Polish president 
Bronislaw Komorowski‘s letter to the EU-Russia civil society forum that took place 
in Warsaw on 1 December 2011.
288
 In spite of the forum‘s primary focus on issues 
such as the promotion of democracy and the rule of law, Komorowski made no 
reference to the violation of democratic principles that took place in Russia during 
the electoral campaign.
289
 Instead, he advocated ―normalisation‖ and 
―rapprochement‖ in Polish-Russian relations. Using the discursive strategy of 
predication, he positively described Russia as ―our [Poland‘s] neighbour‖ and as an 
actor that would ―always play one of the key roles on the European scene‖. 




Despite the numerous denunciations of irregularities in the December elections and 
the beginning of mass protests in Russia, the rhetoric of Polish foreign policy leaders 
did not change. On 14 December, ten days after the elections and the beginning of 
street protests, Sikorski paid an official visit to Moscow and signed the agreement 
establishing a visa-free regime for the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad and the 
adjoining Polish territories. At the joint press conference with the Russian foreign 
minister, Sikorski praised Russia as Poland‘s ―supportive neighbour‖ and did not 
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make any reference to the mass protests that were taking place in many Russian 
cities.
291
 Only when specifically asked by a journalist of the Polish magazine Polska 
Times, Sikorski commented on the demonstrations. 
 
At this time we are observing a reinvigoration of civil society in Russia. 
This makes us happy, because so far it has been said that Russians are 
passive and it turns out this is not true. We have our Polish experiences in 
this area. Poland is a country that fought for freedom, won it and that is 





Sikorski‘s statement reflected dominant national identity narratives about Polish 
heroism and fight for freedom in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
293
 He 
constructed a historical parallel between the struggle of Polish patriots and that of 
Russian demonstrators, thereby exposing his empathy for the latter. However, 
Sikorski‘s support was limited to expressions of happiness and sympathy. Most 
importantly, the Polish foreign minister failed to criticise the Russian authorities‘ 
handling of the elections and of the subsequent protests. 
In January and February 2012, as the Russian presidential elections approached and 
street protests continued, Polish foreign policy leaders continued to avoid 
commenting on Russia‘s domestic developments. For this period, only a statement by 
Sikorski vaguely expressing support for Russia‘s ―democratic aspirations‖ was 
retrieved.
294
 On 7 March 2012, following Putin‘s victory in the elections, 
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Komorowski congratulated the newly-elected Russian president and advocated 
―cooperation and dialogue‖ with Russia.
295
 On the same day, Sikorski briefly 
referred to the Russian election during a joint press conference with US secretary of 
state Hilary Clinton. Despite numerous reports of electoral fraud and the repression 
of demonstrations in Russian cities, he made no negative comments.
296
 He merely 
defined Russia ―an important neighbour of Poland‖ and stood by Clinton while she 
argued that the Russian presidential election had ―a clear winner‖, namely Putin.
297
 
Sikorski returned to the topic of the Russian presidential elections and mass protests 
during an interview with the French daily Le Monde in late March, in response to a 
question on the lawfulness of Putin‘s election.  
 
The prime minister [Putin] has demonstrated that he has strong support 
among the population, but at the same time we see the awakening of civil 
society. I have sympathy for these Russians who do not want to move to 
London or Paris, but wish it were the same in Russia. This will give 
Vladimir Putin the chance to keep his promises, particularly those of his 
first mandate, when he spoke of Russia‘s modernisation, of the fight 




In addition to reiterating some of the claims made in previous interviews (such as 
expressing sympathy towards Russian demonstrators), Sikorski highlighted that Putin 
enjoyed strong support in Russia. Furthermore, the Polish foreign minister portrayed 
the street protests as an opportunity for Putin to carry out reforms and, in the same 
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interview, he categorised Russia as ―a potential member of the West‖.
299
 Sikorski‘s 
rhetoric revealed the intent of his government to seek pragmatic cooperation with the 
new Russian president. 
This intent was formulated most clearly in Sikorski‘s annual address to the Sejm on 
the priorities of Poland‘s foreign policy, on 29 March 2012. The Polish foreign 
minister argued that his government would ―continue to work towards Polish-
Russian reconciliation‖ and that in 2012 the reconciliation would ―take on a spiritual 
dimension‖ thanks to the first ever visit of the Patriarch of Moscow to Poland.
300
 The 
press releases of the Polish foreign ministry during the following months show that 
the policy of reconciliation and cooperation with Russia was pursued consistently, 
focusing in particular on the resolution of historical contentions, the visit of the 
Moscow Patriarch and the implementation of the visa-free regime between the 
Kaliningrad enclave and the bordering Polish region.
301
  
In the last months of 2012, Sikorski‘s interviews continued to reflect the Polish 
government‘s pragmatic approach to its relations with Russia. In an interview with 
the BBC programme Hardtalk, he argued that Poland was ―working to reconcile with 
Russia‖ and had an important ―commercial relationship‖ with it.
302
 Questioned on 
whether Poland‘s approach implied turning a blind eye on Russia‘s domestic 
developments, Sikorski deliberately refused to comment on the issue, claiming that 
trade had ―nothing to do‖ with Russia‘s domestic developments. Furthermore, in an 
interview with the French television channel France24, he claimed that Poland‘s 
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relations with Russia were ―steadily improving‖ and that Putin was ―in the lead in 
improving relations with Poland‖.
303
 
Sikorski‘s last statements of 2012 on Polish-Russian relations epitomised the rhetoric 
of pragmatism and reconciliation that permeated Polish discourses throughout the 
period under analysis in this chapter. At a joint press conference with his Russian 
counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, the Polish foreign minister expressed ―satisfaction with 
the progress made in Polish-Russian relations in both the economic and socio-
cultural context‖, highlighting the achievements of the preceding year.
304
 No 
comment was made on the electoral process and the handling of mass demonstrations 
in Russia during the previous months. 
 
Overshadowed by trade: the Russian protests in Finnish 
official discourses 
Throughout 2011 and 2012, Finland‘s relations with Russia focused primarily on 
trade, investments in the Arctic region and the facilitation of cross-border mobility 
for Finnish and Russian citizens. Commercial relations were the most salient issue. 
Russia‘s application to join the World Trade Organisation (WTO) was accepted on 
16 December 2011, after 18 years of negotiations, and took place formally on 22 
August 2012.
305
 As Russia was Finland‘s main commercial partner, its WTO 
accession had a strong positive impact on bilateral relations. From the Finnish 
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Furthermore, Finnish leaders fostered cooperation with Russia over the exploration 
of Arctic mineral resources, which in their view offered the prospect of large long-
term profits for Finnish companies. In particular, they encouraged Finnish 
investments in Arctic Russia and promoted the export of relevant Finnish technology 
and expertise. In order to further enhance bilateral relations, Finnish authorities also 
attempted to facilitate the mobility of Russian and Finnish citizens across the border, 
particularly through the opening of new visa application centres and the issuing of a 
large number of visas to Russian citizens.
307
 
Among Finnish foreign policy makers, Russia‘s accession to the WTO and growing 
bilateral contacts strengthened the deep-rooted conviction that Russia was an 
essential partner for Finland.
308
 This context helps understand why Finnish leaders 
refrained from comments on the violation of democratic principles and human rights 
that characterised the 2011 and 2012 elections in Russia. During this period, their 
statements on Russia focused almost exclusively on economic cooperation. A more 
critical discourse emerged only in the spring and summer of 2012, urging the 
Russian authorities to strengthen the rule of law and respect human rights. However, 
this discourse did not supplant the one on economic cooperation, which remained 
dominant until the end of 2012. 
 
Values matter, but economics more 
In most of the statements retrieved for this analysis, Finnish foreign policy makers 
portrayed Russia as a fundamental economic partner for Finland. The increasing 
violations of democratic principles and civil unrest in Russia did not affect this 
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discourse significantly. According to the main argument in this narrative, Russia was 
becoming increasingly important for Finland as a result of its WTO accession and 
economic growth. Hence, Finland had to seek cooperation and intensify commercial 
relations. Economic advantage is the topos in this argumentative strategy. Within this 
discourse, Russia‘s democratisation and modernisation were considered as desirable 
developments, but by no means as fundamental preconditions for cooperation. This 
foreign policy stance reflected Finland‘s traditional pragmatic approach towards 
Russia, which shaped its bilateral relations with the Soviet Union during the Cold 
War and became a key constituent of Finnish foreign policy identity.
309
 
In December 2011, while mass protests were spreading to numerous Russian cities, 
Finnish leaders rejoiced about Russia‘s WTO accession. Speaking at a seminar on 
the future of Europe in the Finnish city of Turku, prime minister Jyrki Katainen 
argued that ―both Russia and its trading partners like us benefit hugely from Russia‘s 
integration into the global, rule-based system of trade relations‖.
310
 A few days later, 
Alexander Stubb (now minister for European affairs and foreign trade) claimed that 
trade with Russia ―headed towards a new era‖ and invited Finnish companies to 
make investments in the country.
311
 
On the other hand, Finnish policy makers did not comment on the electoral 
manipulations and mass protests that were taking place in Russia during the same 
period.  This stance was maintained also in forums where civil society and electoral 
issues were normally discussed. This emerges, for instance, from foreign minister 
Erkki Tuomioja‘s December 2011 speech at the ministerial council of the OSCE, the 
organisation which inter alia monitors and reports on elections in most European 
countries, including Russia.
312
 By the time the speech was held, OSCE reports about 
electoral manipulations had become available and spurred critical remarks on Russia 
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by other participants in the ministerial conference, including German foreign 
minister Westerwelle.
313
 Nevertheless, Tuomioja abstained from commenting on the 
topic. Similarly, president Tarja Halonen did not discuss internal developments in 
Russia during her last official visit to Moscow, on 17 and 18 January 2012.
314
 
The discourse advocating economic cooperation with Russia remained dominant also 
after the election of Sauli Niinistö, who succeeded to Halonen as president of Finland 
in March 2012. In his inauguration speech, Niinistö argued that ―the values important 
to us [Finns] are fairness, strengthening sustainable development and supporting 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law‖.
315
 Nevertheless, his remarks on 
Russia reflected the pre-eminence of economic pragmatism over normative 
considerations. 
 
Our relationship to Russia remains at the centre of our foreign policy. 
Both our bilateral relations with Russia and the evolving co-operation 
between the EU and Russia are important for us. Human and commercial 
interaction is increasing, and it is important to develop an operating 
environment as predictable as possible. 
 
Developing a positive ―operating environment‖ for trade with Russia remained 
Finland‘s chief preoccupation under the new president. In Niinistö‘s speeches, 
Russia was constructed as a fundamental partner and defined as ―extremely 
important for Finland‖, ―our greatest single trading partner‖ and ―at the centre of our 
foreign policy‖.
316
 Until the spring of 2012, this stance did not leave much room for 
criticism. 
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Nordic identity: dealing with an authoritarian partner 
A partial change in Finnish official discourse took place in the spring and summer of 
2012, when the country‘s foreign policy leaders started to voice their concerns about 
authoritarian developments in Russia. Most likely, the emergence of a more critical 
discourse was linked to the increasing repressiveness of Russian official policies 
after Putin‘s re-election in March 2012. Finnish leaders felt they could no longer 
ignore Russia‘s growing authoritarianism, which stood in clear contradiction with the 
values and norms they cherished in public statements.
317
 
While taking a more critical stance towards internal developments in Russia, Finnish 
policy makers continued to foster economic cooperation. In order to justify this 
posture, Finnish leaders made instrumental use of the country‘s Nordic identity. They 
argued that Finland was a Nordic society based on values such as the rule of law, 
democracy, openness and equal opportunity.
318
 This provided them with moral 
ground to criticise domestic developments in Russia. At the same time, however, 
they argued that Russian society was fundamentally different from Nordic societies 
and had to be accepted for what it was. This approach, together with the narrative 
portraying Russia as a fundamental economic partner, allowed Finnish leaders to 
reconcile criticism with the support for a strong commercial relationship. Pragmatism 
is the topos linking this argumentative strategy to its policy implications. 
The discourse criticising internal developments in Russia emerged progressively 
during the spring of 2012. Its inception can be detected, for instance, in a speech held 
by foreign minister Tuomioja in Helsinki on 12 April 2012, at a seminar concerning 
security in Northern Europe. 
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For Europe and the Nordic area, developments in Russia are an important 
factor. It is of crucial importance that the situation in Russia remains 
stable and the democratic reform process continues along with 
strengthening the rule of law. Without this Russia‘s leaders cannot expect 




Tuomioja‘s statement was somewhat ambiguous, as it argued for both stability and 
for democratic change. However, if compared with previous statements, it reveals 
that the state of democracy and the rule of law were acquiring a more important role 
in Finnish official discourse on Russia. 
By the late summer of 2012, the critical discourse about authoritarian developments 
in Russia had become more clearly delineated. On 20 August 2012, Niinistö 
expressed his concerns during an address to Finnish ambassadors. After discussing 
post-Soviet Russia‘s economic achievements, he argued: 
 
Even in the eyes of the Russians themselves, Russia has not yet become 
everything that was perhaps hoped for. The reactions of the civil society 
show signs of frustration, disappointment and protest […] We should not 





Finnish leaders followed this policy line during the visit of Russian foreign minister 
Sergei Lavrov to Finland in August 2012. Tuomioja expressed his concerns about the 
tightening of laws on the freedom of speech in Russia, while Niinistö and Katainen 
discussed the state of civil society in the country.
321
 This was a remarkable shift from 
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the official discourse in the previous months. However, as argued, the new narrative 
did not replace, but rather coexisted and was reconciled with the discourse focusing 
on economic cooperation. In the address to Finnish ambassadors referred to above, 
Niinistö also claimed: 
 
As for us Finns, we must always take Russia for what she is. This is often 
easier said than done, as Russian society needs to be viewed through 
different lenses from those we use for Nordic society. Russia will remain 
important for Finland. Our strengths lie in our relations, which are 
functional at all levels, and in our ability to launch initiatives and create 





Niinistö argued that any criticism of Russia had to take into account its different 
societal development and its economic importance for Finland. Most importantly, in 
spite of increasing concerns about its domestic developments, the image of Russia as 
a key partner remained dominant in his discourse. In official statements made in the 
last months of 2012, Niinistö and the other Finnish foreign policy leaders continued 
to portray Russia as one of the most attractive markets for Finnish companies, as well 






This case study highlighted the prevalence of economic interests over normative 
considerations in German, Polish and Finnish discourses on Russia during the street 
protests that took place in Russian cities in late 2011 and in 2012. As the protests 
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occurred at a time when trade relations between the European Union and Russia were 
quickly improving, they provided an invaluable opportunity to research the 
discursive interaction between economics and norms in policy makers‘ narratives 
about Russia. As shown in chapter 4, parallel national discourses about Russia as 
both an economic partner and an authoritarian state had coexisted and clashed for a 
long time, each becoming dominant in different periods and social contexts. 
German discourses best reflected the tension between economic interests and 
normative concerns. Between December 2011 and February 2012, low ranking 
foreign ministry officials focusing on civil society and human rights in Russia shaped 
the dominant German discourse. This narrative reflected the democratic and 
humanitarian component of German foreign policy identity. It was very critical of 
authoritarian developments in Russia and advocated a normative approach for 
German and EU foreign policy, including targeted sanctions towards Russian 
officials that were considered responsible for electoral mismanagement and human 
rights violations.  
From March 2012, this narrative became increasingly challenged by a milder, more 
pragmatic stance, which was advocated by chancellor Angela Merkel and foreign 
minister Guido Westerwelle. Their discourse attempted to reconcile the normative 
component of German foreign policy identity with long-standing German 
perceptions of Russia as an economic partner. Merkel and Westerwelle argued that 
cooperation with Russia and criticism of its internal affairs were not mutually 
exclusive. Practically, however, this discourse put greater emphasis on economic 
interests, thereby implicitly rejecting the normative foreign policy approach 
advocated by the competing narrative. Due to Merkel‘s and Westerwelle‘s higher 
position in the hierarchy of government and greater access to national media, their 
discourse became dominant after March 2012. 
As their German counterparts, Polish leaders emphasised economic and political 
cooperation far more than the respect of democratic standards. In 2011 and 2012, the 
Polish debate on Russia focused primarily on reconciliation and the resolution of 
practical issues in bilateral relations, such as the renegotiation of the price of Russian 
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gas and the investigation of the presidential plane‘s crash in Russia in 2010. Polish 
leaders opted for a cooperative and pragmatic approach towards Russia. This 
reflected the substantial shift in Polish foreign policy identity under Tusk‘s 
government, which was discussed in chapter 4. 
Within this context, little room was left for critical remarks on elections and street 
demonstrations. Foreign minister Sikorski was the only Polish leader who regularly 
commented on domestic developments in Russia, mostly when journalists 
specifically asked him to do so. On these occasions, he expressed sympathy for 
Russian demonstrators and, drawing on a dominant Polish identity discourse, argued 
that Polish patriots also had to fight for democracy in the past. However, these 
statements were not followed by criticism of Russian policies and authorities. 
Sikorski emphasised that Putin‘s popularity remained very high and that Poland 
would continue to pursue cooperation and historical reconciliation with the Russian 
establishment. 
Finnish foreign policy leaders also prioritised trade and cooperation with Russia. As 
Russia was Finland‘s main trade partner, its accession to the World Trade 
Organisation in August 2012 had positive effects on bilateral relations. Until the 
spring of 2012, Finnish leaders refrained from making critical comments on domestic 
developments in Russia. This foreign policy stance appeared as a continuation of 
Finland‘s long-standing cooperative approach towards both the Soviet Union and 
post-Soviet Russia. 
In the spring and summer of 2012, Finnish foreign policy leaders constructed a more 
critical discourse. Most likely, the new narrative emerged as a reaction to the 
increasing repressiveness of Russian policies after Putin‘s re-election, which stood in 
clear contradiction with the democratic and humanitarian values advocated by 
Finnish leaders. However, this narrative did not supersede the one on partnership and 
economic cooperation. It was relativised by the argument that Russian society was 
based on different values from those of Nordic societies such as Finland. 
Furthermore, Finnish leaders continued to claim that Russia would remain an 
important partner for Finland regardless of its internal developments. 
Divisive identity, divided foreign policy? 
 
234 
Post-electoral democratic protests in Russia 
Therefore, narratives stressing economic cooperation emerged as dominant in all 
national discursive arenas under analysis. At official level, constructions of Russia as 
a partner proved stronger than those portraying it as a challenge for EU norms and 
values. From a comparative perspective, national discourses on Russia in 2011 and 
2012 revealed a greater degree of convergence than in the two previous case studies. 
Economic and political pragmatism was increasingly becoming the common 
denominator of national narratives on Russia. 
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Chapter 8: National identities in the EU discursive 




This chapter analyses German, Polish and Finnish foreign policy leaders‘ discourses 
on Russia during their latest national presidencies of the European Union, which took 
place between July 2006 and December 2011. In particular, it focuses on speeches in 
which national leaders discussed policies towards Russia in their functions as 
representatives of the rotating presidency. This focus allows an analysis of the 
relevance of national identity in the formulation of narratives about Russia in the EU 
discursive arena. Moreover, it exposes similarities and differences in national 
conceptualisations of Russia at the EU level, arguing that these can be understood 
through the prism of national identity. 
The main research questions addressed in this chapter are: how do German, Polish 
and Finnish leaders describe Russia and the EU‘s relations with Russia during their 
respective national presidencies of the European Union? How do dominant 
discourses relate to national identity and to historical perceptions of Russia? Which 
discursive strategies are used and how do they relate to the key arguments made by 
the speakers? Does national identity contribute to an understanding of different 
discourses on Russia within the European Union? As in the previous case studies, the 
interpretation of discourses relies on the findings of chapter 4 concerning national 
identity and dominant historical narratives about Russia. 
The chapter begins with the contextualisation of the three EU presidencies under 
analysis. The main foreign policy events and the status of EU-Russia relations during 
each presidency are reviewed briefly. Subsequently, the main discourses on Russia 
and EU-Russia relations of the three presidencies‘ leaders are presented. The analysis 
follows the chronological order of the presidencies, starting with the Finnish and 
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ending with the Polish presidency. Finally, dominant discourses on Russia during the 
three presidencies are compared and contrasted in the chapter‘s concluding remarks. 
Essentially, this case study shows that national conceptualisations of Russia based on 
dominant identity narratives constitute and influence foreign policy discourses also 
within the European Union. Furthermore, it exposes how national priorities 
concerning Russia are transposed discursively to the European level. Ultimately, the 
results of this analysis allow for an identity-based understanding of divergence and 
convergence in the three presidencies‘ discursive construction of relations with 
Russia. 
 
The Finnish, German and Polish presidencies of the EU, 
2006-2011 
The presidency of the European Union rotates among member states every six 
months and provides the country holding it with the opportunity to include inter alia 
its national policy priorities in the Union‘s agenda (cf. Szabo 2011, Vandecasteele et 
al. 2013). Most importantly for the purposes of this study, the political leaders of a 
member state holding the rotating presidency intervene in debates at EU institutions 
in order to present policy priorities and strategies to implement them during the 
presidency. Chronologically, Finland‘s was the first of the three presidencies under 
investigation, spanning from July until December 2006. The German presidency 
followed immediately after, from January until June 2007. In contrast, the Polish 
presidency took place much later, between July and December 2011. The three 
presidencies fall within the timeframe of this study (2005-2012). However, as they 
took place at different times, a few introductory and contextual remarks are 
necessary before presenting the analysis of discourses. 
While the Finnish and German presidencies occurred before the entry into force of 
the Treaty of Lisbon (which became effective on 1 December 2009), the Polish 
presidency had to follow the rules established by the new legal framework. From a 
juridical and political perspective, this difference is significant because the Lisbon 
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Treaty reduced the powers and prerogatives of the rotating presidency, particularly in 
the field of foreign policy. The treaty provided for the appointment of a permanent 
Council president and a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy, chairing respectively the European Council and the Foreign Affairs 
Council. Both chairs had previously been held by the rotating presidency. 
Furthermore, the treaty narrowed the agenda-shaping powers of the rotating 
presidency, particularly in foreign policy (Gebhard 2011: 122-123, Szabo 2011: 6-9). 
For the purposes of the ensuing discourse analysis, however, the different legal 
framework under which the Polish presidency operated is not of essential 
importance. In spite of its reduced powers, the rotating presidency continued to 
influence debates and advocate its priorities in many EU institutional forums, 
including those concerning the Union‘s external action (cf. Gebhard 2011: 123, Pech 
2011: 34-35). This is particularly true of the Polish presidency, which was very 
active in setting the agenda for EU policies towards the Eastern neighbourhood 
(Vandecasteele et al. 2013: 20; cf. Bunse and Klein 2014). Therefore, in spite of the 
changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, we can expect also high-ranking 
representatives of the Polish presidency to have participated in the debate and 
constructed narratives about the Union‘s foreign policy.  
While EU institutional changes did not affect considerably the substance of this 
analysis, the international context in which each presidency took place was an 
important varying factor. As different international configurations may have affected 
the presidencies‘ priorities, and hence Russia‘s prominence therein, appropriate 
contextualisation is necessary. The Finnish presidency started half a year after a 
major Russian-Ukrainian dispute over the price of Russian gas, which led to a 
temporary drop in shipments to the EU (Stern 2006: 43-49). We can therefore expect 
energy relations with Russia to feature prominently in Finland‘s presidency agenda 
and in the speeches of Finnish leaders. 
Furthermore, the Finnish presidency attempted to start negotiations with Russia for a 
new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), as the existing legal framework 
for bilateral relations was expiring at the end of 2007. However, this attempt was 
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frustrated by a Polish veto on the launch of negotiations in November 2006. Warsaw 
used the veto in response to a Russian ban on the import of Polish meat, imposed 
earlier in 2006 (Reeves 2010: 351). The human rights situation and freedom of the 
press in Russia also raised concerns in the EU during the Finnish presidency. These 
issues featured prominently in European media after the murder of Anna 
Politkovskaya, one of the most prominent critics of the contemporary Russian 
political establishment (Azhgikhina 2007). 
In order to address outstanding issues in EU-Russia relations, the Finnish leadership 
invited Russian president Vladimir Putin to attend an informal summit of EU heads 
of state or government in the Finnish city of Lahti on 20 October 2006.
324
 Moreover, 
the following November the Finnish presidency hosted one of the biannual EU-
Russia summits in Helsinki.
325
 The presidency‘s focus on Russia was compounded 
by the decision to renew the Northern Dimension, a Finnish policy initiative at the 
EU level launched in 1999 to promote cooperation in Northern Europe with Russia, 
Iceland and Norway (cf. Haukkala 2010: 152-167).
326
 
Despite the efforts of the Finnish leadership, EU-Russia relations appeared to be 
deteriorating when Germany took over the rotating presidency in January 2007. In 
the following six months, the Polish veto frustrated German hopes of opening 
negotiations with Russia on a new PCA. In early January, the reliability of EU fossil 
fuel imports from Russia was called into question again when deliveries of Russian 
oil were discontinued as a result of a dispute between the Kremlin and Belarus, a key 
transit country (cf. Balmaceda 2012). The dispute did not have any significant impact 
on the EU and was solved within two days. However, in a meeting with Putin on 21 
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January, German chancellor and European Council president Angela Merkel 
expressed the need of better communications with Russia over energy issues.
327
 
Even more significantly, the German presidency took place against a broader context 
of deteriorating security relations between Russia and the West. Speaking at the 
Munich Security Conference in February 2007, Putin attacked US plans to deploy an 
anti-missile defence system in East-Central Europe and the unwillingness of NATO 
countries to ratify the Adapted Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe.
328
 Tensions 
over both issues resulted in Putin‘s announcement of a Russian moratorium on the 
treaty in late April 2007 (Wilcox 2011; cf. Averre 2009a: 101-102). While these 
controversies did not involve the EU presidency directly, they arguably had an 
impact on EU-Russia relations, as most EU countries were also NATO members and 
US allies. 
Furthermore, in April 2007 tensions between Russia and Estonia escalated as a result 
of the Estonian government‘s decision to relocate a Soviet war memorial in the 
capital city of Tallin. The decision led to heavy protests by the large Russian 
minority living in Estonia, which perceived the monument as an important identity 
symbol. Protests took place also in Moscow, where demonstrators besieged the 
Estonian embassy for a week. Most significantly, the websites of numerous Estonian 
public and private institutions were targeted by widespread cyberattacks. The 
Estonian government accused the Kremlin of masterminding the attacks (cf. Ehala 
2009, Haukkala 2010a).
329
 The EU-Russia summit organised by the German 
presidency took place against this backdrop in May 2007. 
Mostly due to this succession of crises, relations with Russia were one of the main 
concerns for the Finnish and German presidencies. By the time Poland took over the 
rotating presidency in July 2011, tensions with Russia no longer dominated the EU‘s 
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foreign policy agenda. Some contentious issues (for instance, negotiations on a new 
PCA) no longer seemed to be a priority for either side, while others (notably the 
security of Russian energy supplies) appeared to be temporarily solved.
330
 
Furthermore, developments in other regions of the world, most particularly the Arab 
Spring revolutions, shifted the attention of European foreign policy makers away 
from Russia. 
With regard to Eastern Europe, the Polish presidency focused primarily on the 
organisation of the Eastern Partnership summit in Warsaw, which took place on 29 
and 30 September 2011 (Vandecasteele et al. 2013: 10). As Russia did not participate 
in the Eastern Partnership, Polish leaders referred to it only tangentially during the 
summit. In relations with Moscow, the Polish presidency sought to avoid tensions 
and prioritised pragmatic issues, notably the negotiations on a visa-free area for 
residents of Russia‘s Kaliningrad region and the adjacent Polish provinces.
331
 
Furthermore, in contrast with its posture during the Finnish and German 
presidencies, in the second half of 2011 the Russian government was much more 
focused on domestic politics, notably on the upcoming parliamentary elections of 




The Finnish EU presidency: building bridges with the 
Russian partner 
During its EU presidency, Finland devoted considerable attention to strengthening 
relations with Russia, particularly in the areas of trade and energy. The priorities of 
Finland‘s presidency concerning EU external relations reflected long-standing 
                                                          
330
 The last energy transit crisis (involving a Russian-Ukrainian dispute) took place in January 2009, 
after which the EU and Russia set up an early warning mechanism to ensure a rapid and coordinated 
reaction in case of emergency situations; 
see http://ec.europa.eu/energy/international/russia/dialogue/warning_en.htm (accessed 
15/2/2014).  
331
 “Visa-free travel gets a lift from Russia-Poland agreement”, Russia Today, 14 December 2011, 
http://rt.com/politics/russia-poland-moscow-visa-free-travel-katyn-767/ (accessed 15/2/2014).  
332
 See chapter 7.  
Divisive identity, divided foreign policy? 
 
241 
National identities in the EU discursive arena 
Finnish perceptions of Russia as a key economic and security partner.
333
 The 
dominant discourse on Russia among Finnish foreign policy leaders stressed the need 
of fostering closer ties between the European Union and the Kremlin, particularly 
due to Russia‘s significance as an energy provider.  
Next to this narrative, a normative discourse was also prominent in Finnish foreign 
policy circles. It argued that relations with Russia should be based on the respect of 
market principles, human rights and democracy. In addition, it stressed the 
importance of solidarity among EU member states as a precondition for the 
formulation of a shared and effective European foreign policy towards Russia. This 
discourse epitomised the significance of the normative dimension and of EU 
solidarity in Finnish foreign policy identity. 
 
Russia as a strategic European partner  
The discourse advocating closer ties with Russia was based primarily on economic 
arguments, but it also rested on cultural considerations. Finnish leaders argued that 
cooperation with Russia should be pursued both in order to strengthen the security of 
EU energy supplies and because Russia belonged to Europe in cultural terms. In this 
argumentative strategy, economic advantage and culture are the topoi connecting the 
main argument (Russia is a key energy partner and belongs to Europe culturally) 
with its logical conclusion (relations with Russia must be strengthened). The 
historical construction of Russia as a key economic partner, and particularly Finnish 
leaders‘ self-perception as bridge builders between the West and Russia, provide the 
identity-based interpretive key to understand this discourse. 
The importance attributed to Russia transpired from the initial stages of the Finnish 
presidency. Speaking at a plenary session of the European Parliament in early July 
2006, prime minister Matti Vanhanen announced that ―Finland‘s presidency [would] 
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place particular emphasis on relations with Russia‖.
334
 A few days later, foreign 
minister Erkki Tuomioja told the European Parliament‘s Committee on Foreign 
Affairs that Russia was ―among our [Finland‘s] key priorities in EU‘s external 
action‖.
335
 Finnish leaders‘ self-perception as bridge builders between Russia and the 
West emerged most clearly in Vanhanen‘s address to the Finnish Parliament 
concerning the priorities of the Finnish presidency. 
 
The EU‘s relations with our most important neighbour, Russia, and the 
Northern Dimension are included in the list of priorities during our term. 
We believe that we can contribute towards improving relations between 
the EU and Russia […] We should put the EU‘s relations with Russia on 




Vanhanen‘s claim that Finland could ―contribute towards improving relations 
between the EU and Russia‖ exemplified the long-standing attitude of Finnish 
leaders to seek a role as facilitators in relations between Russia and the West.
337
 In 
addition, the use of perspectivation (highlighted by the repetition of the pronoun 
―we‖) conveyed Vanhanen‘s personal commitment to strengthening EU-Russia 
relations. Arguably, as ―we‖ stood broadly for ―Finnish leadership‖, perspectivation 
in this context also suggested that Finnish diplomacy was particularly suited to the 
task of strengthening the partnership with Russia. 
In his address to the Finnish Parliament, Vanhanen defined Russia as ―our most 
important neighbour‖, using the discursive strategy of predication. In the speeches by 
Finnish leaders retrieved for this study, predication was instrumental in the 
construction of Russia as a key partner for the EU and as a European country. The 
use of this linguistic device was reiterated in many of the Finnish texts under 
analysis. For instance, in his talk at the Conference of Parliamentary Committees for 
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Union Affairs, Vanhanen argued that ―Russia is a European country, a close 
neighbour and strategic partner for the European Union‖.
338
  
Most notably, both Vanhanen and president Tarja Halonen portrayed Russia as a 
―strategic partner‖ on multiple occasions during the Finnish presidency. In 
September 2006, for example, Halonen told members of the European Parliament 
that ―today Russia is a strategic partner of the EU‖.
339
 Speaking at the European 
Business Leaders Convention in Saint Petersburg in July 2006, Vanhanen explained 
that the strategic nature of the EU-Russia partnership was due to their 
complementarity in the energy field:  
 
Russia is a strategic partner to the EU, and this is especially true in 
energy, where Russia and the EU have complementary needs – the EU as 




Halonen and Vanhanen followed the same line of argument in other speeches held 
during the Finnish presidency, describing EU-Russia relations in terms of ―mutually 




Portraying Russia as a country close to the EU in cultural, economic and political 
terms was functional to the Finnish presidency‘s objective of strengthening relations 
with the Kremlin. In particular, Finnish leaders repeatedly classified Russia as a 
European country through the discursive strategy of categorisation. As shown, 
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Vanhanen stressed that Russia was ―a European country‖ in an EU institutional 
context.
342
 In another speech held at the European Parliament, he argued that the EU-
Russia partnership should be based on ―our common European values‖.
343
 Halonen 
also emphasised Russia‘s Europeanness in her speech at the European Parliament in 
September 2006, highlighting in particular historical factors and Russian leaders‘ 
statements on the country‘s European orientation. 
 
The fate of Russia and that of the rest of Europe have been linked for 
centuries […] The Russian leadership has repeatedly declared that Russia 




The underlying logic of this categorisation was that, if the perception of Russia as a 
European country became dominant among EU public opinion and political elites, 
the Finnish presidency could effectively use cultural and historical arguments to 
justify its cooperative stance towards Moscow. Hence, the discursive construction of 
Russia as ―European‖ would allow Finland to act in accordance with its self-
perception as bridge builder between the West and Russia. 
Furthermore, the portrayal of Russia as a strategic, European partner paved the way 
for ambitious policy objectives for the Finnish presidency. At the beginning of the 
presidency semester, Vanhanen told the European Parliament that the Finnish 
presidency aimed to establish a ―broad-based partnership‖ with Russia.
345
 In mid-
July, he specified that Finland intended to ―launch negotiations on an ambitious and 
comprehensive new post-PCA with Russia‖.
346
 Despite the Polish veto on the launch 
of the negotiations in October, Vanhanen continued to stress that relations with 
Russia were a priority for the Finnish presidency. As late as November 2006, on the 
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eve of the EU-Russia summit in Helsinki, he argued that ―the main objective of the 
Finnish presidency [was] to contribute to the development of the EU-Russia 




A partnership based on values and solidarity 
Finnish leaders qualified their arguments in favour of the partnership with Russia 
with normative statements specifying the conditions for cooperation. These 
statements can be analysed as a distinct narrative that reflects the prominence of 
market principles and of values such as democracy and EU solidarity in Finnish 
foreign policy identity. The main argument in this narrative contended that norms 
and solidarity among member states were essential prerequisites for a successful EU 
foreign policy. Law and advantage are the topoi connecting the argument with its 
logical conclusion: in relations with Russia, member states should follow the Union‘s 
founding principles and be united in order to achieve the best possible foreign policy 
outcome. 
The normative discourse appeared in Vanhanen‘s address to the European Parliament 
on 5 July 2006, when he argued that the partnership with Russia had to be 
 
based on our [the EU‘s and Russia‘s] common European values and 
global interests. The goal is to intensify Russia‘s involvement in 




Vanhanen specified what he meant by ―common European values‖ in a subsequent 
speech at the EU-Russia Industrialists‘ Round Table Meeting. 
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Foundations of our strategic partnership are the shared values of 
democracy, rule of law and human rights as well as the principles of 




As emerges from this passage, Finnish leaders conflated human rights and market 
principles into a single normative discourse concerning relations with Russia. This 
narrative reflected the Finnish presidency‘s key objective of establishing an 
overarching normative base for EU-Russia relations, particularly through a new 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. The interaction of identity, discourses and 
policy that emerges in this context provides further evidence for the model theorised 
in chapter 2. The normative discourse is a reflection of deep-rooted Finnish support 
of human rights, democracy and market principles, which are constituents of Finnish 
national identity. In addition, the normative discourse is closely interrelated with 
policy making, which shows that policies are discursively constructed. 
Finnish leaders‘ advocacy of market principles was particularly forceful in the field 
of energy, the most important area of EU-Russia economic relations. Following the 
disruptions caused by the Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute of January 2006, the 
Finnish presidency sought Moscow‘s cooperation to restore European confidence in 
Russia‘s role as energy supplier. Vanhanen‘s talk at the European Business Leaders 
Convention in Saint Petersburg epitomised Finland‘s normative approach to energy 
relations. 
 
During the Finnish presidency of the EU, Russia has an excellent 
opportunity to demonstrate its willingness to work constructively with 
the EU as a reliable supplier and energy partner. The key in developing 
this energy relationship between Russia and the EU is reciprocity […] 
Energy trade with Russia should be based on business interests, long-
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Consistent with Finland‘s construction as bridge builder with Russia, Vanhanen 
adopted a positive stance towards energy cooperation, which is reflected in his 
choice of vocabulary (―work constructively‖, ―reliable supplier‖, ―energy partner‖). 
Simultaneously, however, he made normative statements on how cooperation 
―should be‖ in the future. 
His speech at the European Parliament on the outcome of the Lahti summit exposed 
the combination of a positive posture towards Russia with the advocacy of norms for 
cooperation. 
 
The tone of the debate was positive and, despite certain slight 
differences, also very coherent […] With regard to energy relations, we 
agreed that there is a need for tighter cooperation. This cooperation 
should be based on the principles laid down in the Energy Charter and 
the G8 declaration […] These principles should already be applied now 





Although during the summit Putin had clashed with several European leaders on the 
issue of human rights, Vanhanen wrote off disagreements with Russia as ―certain 
slight differences‖ (cf. Peterson 2012: 214). However, he also took a normative 
stance on the relationship with Russia, which is highlighted by the repetition of the 
verb ―should‖ and the phrase ―there is a need for‖. 
Furthermore, Vanhanen argued that the achievement of a common position on Russia 
including all EU member states was the essential precondition for a value-based 
relationship. 
 
The European Union needs to be able to speak to its partners with one 
voice. If we are divided and disunited, we will be weak. We will not be 
able to defend our interests or promote the values on which the Union is 
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based. At Lahti, we succeeded in showing president Putin that the Union 




Vanhanen‘s statement reflected Finnish commitment to EU solidarity and values. 
Most notably, it exposed his belief that EU solidarity was essential for a successful 
policy towards Russia. This argument was reiterated by other leaders of the Finnish 
presidency. For instance, Tarja Halonen claimed that cooperation within the EU was 
―vital‖ for the Union‘s energy policy towards Russia.
353
 
Significantly, Vanhanen used the need to formulate a common EU position on Russia 
also as an argument to prompt reluctant member states to engage in dialogue with the 
Kremlin. For example, he urged Polish leaders to lift their veto on the start of 
negotiations on a new EU-Russia PCA, arguing that ―without a new agreement for 
the Union as a whole, the only option is for each country to deal bilaterally with 
Russia on energy and other crucial issues‖.
354
 Vanhanen‘s statement suggested that 
EU member states could not avoid dealing with Russia on essential matters such as 
energy supplies. Accordingly, vetoing negotiations with Russia within the EU would 
merely move them to the bilateral level, where individual member states had less 
bargaining power. Through this line of argument, the Finnish presidency could 
advocate simultaneously stronger relations with Russia and EU solidarity, thereby 
acting consistently with Finland‘s self-perception both as bridge builder with Russia 
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The German EU presidency: partnership for energy and 
human rights 
The stance of the German presidency on relations with Russia was similar to that of 
the Finnish presidency, particularly in its advocacy of a new EU-Russia Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreement. German leaders‘ support for the strategic partnership 
with Russia was even more emphatic, notably in the field of energy. The long-
standing German-Russian energy partnership and Germany‘s Ostpolitik tradition 
help understand this approach. In some of the speeches under analysis, they were 
overtly used by speakers as arguments to explain or justify Germany‘s position 
towards Russia. 
German leaders also adopted a normative discourse about EU-Russia relations, 
stressing democratic principles and human rights. However, the German narrative 
differed from the Finnish normative discourse. It suggested that the partnership with 
Russia would be conducive to its democratisation and hence put less emphasis on the 
respect of democratic principles and human rights as preconditions for cooperation. 
Moreover, it juxtaposed economic partnership and democratic transformation, 
thereby implying that they were closely interconnected. 
 
Partnership and energy 
Throughout the German presidency, Russia‘s key role as EU energy provider was the 
main argument in German leaders‘ speeches advocating cooperation with Moscow. 
In this discursive strategy, economic advantage is the topos linking the argument 
(Russia is an essential energy provider) to its logical conclusion (the EU should 
pursue a partnership with Russia). The objective of strengthening energy relations 
provided the rationale for the overall policy of the German presidency towards 
Russia. This is exemplified by German leaders‘ claims that the EU should negotiate a 
new PCA with Russia in order to consolidate and regulate energy relations. Other 
policy fields were subordinate to energy. 
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This line of argument appeared in Angela Merkel‘s first speech at the European 
Parliament during the German presidency, in January 2007. 
 
Yet we must not look solely towards America. For Europe‘s partnership 
with Russia is also strategically significant and should be expanded as 
broad as possible. That is why we have to negotiate a new Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreement. The question of cooperation on energy 
issues will play a key role in this. We will do our utmost to ensure that 




Merkel stressed the ―key role‖ of energy cooperation in relations with Russia, which 
she portrayed as ―strategically significant‖, using the discursive strategy of 
predication. Moreover, she expressed her personal commitment to starting 
negotiations on the new PCA during the German presidency, which is emphasised 
through perspectivation (signalled by the phrase ―we will do our utmost‖).  
Merkel‘s urge to start negotiations on the PCA was reiterated in most of her 
addresses to the European Parliament as representative of the German presidency and 
became more and more emphatic as the EU-Russia summit approached. Energy 
cooperation was used consistently as the main argument for launching negotiations. 
On 13 February, she argued that energy policy would be a priority for the German 
presidency in the PCA negotiations. In addition, she regretted that negotiations had 
not started earlier and expressed her hopes that they would begin at the Samara 
summit (―I am hopeful that we will have taken a positive step forward by the time we 
meet for the EU-Russia summit in May‖).
357
  
Merkel‘s views were echoed by Steinmeier in his speech at the European Parliament 
in mid-March 2007. The German foreign minister claimed that the German 
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presidency ―continue[d] to advocate the early launch of negotiations on a new 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement‖ because the EU needed ―a reliable and 
transparent energy relationship with Russia‖.
358
 Confronted with Poland‘s protracted 
opposition to starting negotiations, Merkel made another forceful appeal at the 
European Parliament at the end of March. 
 
Alongside the transatlantic partnership, the strategic partnership with 
Russia is absolutely crucial to us.  I hope that we will be able to 
overcome the obstacles which are currently preventing us – or to be more 
precise the Commission – from engaging in negotiations […] for the 
negotiations on a new partnership agreement are of course essential, 
particularly with regard to energy security and the energy partnership. I 
therefore believe we should attach prime importance to these 
negotiations. The EU-Russia summit to be held in Samara in Russia is 




Merkel‘s choice of vocabulary and use of predication conveyed the urgency of 
negotiating a new PCA with Russia. The partnership with Russia was defined 
―strategic‖ and ―absolutely crucial to us‖ and PCA negotiations were considered 
―essential‖ and of ―prime importance‖. The discursive construction of Russia as a 
key strategic partner was functional to Merkel‘s objective of opening negotiations at 
the Samara summit, which she described as an event ―of the greatest significance‖. 
Merkel further emphasised the importance of the relationship with Russia by 
juxtaposing it to the transatlantic partnership. The comparison was even more 
explicit in her speech at the official ceremony held in Berlin to celebrate the fiftieth 
anniversary of the treaty establishing the European Economic Community. 
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I firmly believe that close, amicable relations with the United States of 
America and a strong NATO are and will remain in Europe‘s 
fundamental interest. […] A comprehensive strategic partnership with 
Russia is just as important to Europe. We need both a strategic 




Speaking to an audience of EU heads of state or government, Merkel went as far as 
putting relations with Russia on a par with the alliance with the United States, which 
has been one of the cornerstones of Germany‘s foreign policy since the end of the 
Second World War (cf. Hyde-Price 2000:180). This juxtaposition highlights the 
construction of Russia as an essential economic and security partner in German 




Partnership, human rights and economics 
Alongside the discourse concerning energy relations with Russia, another narrative 
was also prominent in German leaders‘ speeches during Germany‘s EU presidency. 
It advocated economic cooperation with Russia by stressing that it would have 
positive effects on its democratic transformation. Thus, the narrative provided a 
value-based argument in favour of economic cooperation. Economic advantage is the 
topos linking the main argument (economic cooperation with Russia contributed to 
its democratic transformation) with its logical conclusion (Germany and the EU 
should strengthen the partnership with Russia). The construction of Russia as a key 
economic partner and the prominence of values such as democracy and human rights 
in German identity provide a framework to understand this discourse. 
The linkage between economic partnership and democratisation appeared, for 
instance, in Steinmeier‘s address to the OSCE Permanent Council in January 2007. 
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While presenting the objectives of the German rotating presidency in the EU‘s 
neighbourhood, he stated: 
 
Firstly, during the next few months we would like to consolidate and 
expand the European Union‘s strategic partnership with Russia. Russia‘s 
transformation into a democratic state based on the rule of law and into a 
strong economic partner is a key task for the EU. […] We therefore want 





The concepts of democratisation and economic partnership were juxtaposed and 
subsumed under a single, overarching task for the EU. The idea that the EU could 
contribute to Russia‘s transformation through a policy of engagement and 
partnership was consistent with the key tenet of West Germany‘s Ostpolitik from the 
1960s onwards, namely the concept of ―change through rapprochement‖ (Wandel 
durch Annäherung). Indeed, in a speech delivered at the end of the presidency 
semester, Steinmeier overtly claimed that Willy Brandt‘s Ostpolitik provided the 
philosophy for his party‘s policy towards Russia in 2007.
363
 
Accordingly, Steinmeier argued that the EU should continue cooperation with Russia 
in spite of problems in its process of democratisation. In January 2007, in a speech 
concerning the future of Europe, he stated: 
 
A long-term future alliance with Russia is no less important [than 
Turkey‘s EU accession]. Surely, it‘s a difficult topic, especially these 
days […] Russia is no flawless democracy. It does not have a long 
democratic tradition either. But it is in the interest of Europe that we do 
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and support everything in order to favour the anchoring of European 
values in Russia and a tight interdependence with our continent. And, not 




As in the speech at the OSCE Permanent Council, Steinmeier juxtaposed the EU‘s 
economic interests and the objective of contributing to Russia‘s democratisation. 
Although he admitted that Russia was ―no flawless democracy‖, Steinmeier used 
both the economic and the normative argument in order to advocate an ambitious 
policy of engagement, aiming at ―a long-term future alliance‖.
365
  
Furthermore, Steinmeier claimed that Russia‘s democratic transformation should 
take place in accordance with both European values and its traditions. In an article 
concerning the EU‘s policy towards Eastern Europe that was published in the 
international relations magazine Internationale Politik in March 2007, Steinmeier 
argued: 
 
We want a thriving Russia that is geared to European values and 
manages successfully its transformation into a stable, constitutional 




The phrase ―taking into account its own traditions‖ toned down Steinmeier‘s 
normative discourse, as it suggested that Russia could follow its own path to 
democracy. This argument reflected Steinmeier‘s cooperative attitude towards the 
Kremlin and his reluctance to endorse an inflexible normative policy. Such an 
uncompromising stance would have been hard to reconcile with the German EU 
presidency‘s objective of starting negotiations on a new PCA at the Samara summit. 
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 Frank-Walter Steinmeier’s article on Internationale Politik, “Verflechtung und Integration”, March 
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At the summit, despite the enduring Polish veto on PCA negotiations and the 
escalation of the Russian-Estonian crisis in April, Merkel and Steinmeier kept a 
conciliatory tone towards Russia. Merkel stated that there were many areas where the 
EU and Russia could work together and claimed that difficulties could be 
overcome.
367
 Similarly, Steinmeier argued that conflicts could be solved and that he 
intended to contribute to their resolution. Within this context, he also reiterated the 
significance of relations with Russia. 
 
Alongside the consolidation and expansion of our transatlantic 
partnership, alongside the deepening of European integration, of course 
we have to develop a reasonable relationship with Russia. That is why I 
always say that we can‘t forget our long-term interests despite the current 
conflicts. We have to work on this, even if sometimes – as in the last 




Steinmeier mentioned relations with Russia next to the transatlantic partnership and 
the deepening of European integration, which highlights the importance he attached 
to them. Most notably, his statement unambiguously conveyed the message that 
cooperation with Russia should continue because long-term interests were more 
important than occasional conflicts. This line of argument exemplified German 
leaders‘ deep-rooted belief that Russia is a key factor in the international arena and 
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The Polish EU presidency: pragmatism and civilisational 
mission 
During the Polish presidency, the foreign policy statements of Polish leaders focused 
primarily on Eastern Partnership countries, notably on Ukraine. This focus 
corresponded to the presidency‘s objectives of intensifying relations with Ukraine 
and holding a successful Eastern Partnership summit in Warsaw at the end of 
September 2011. Within this context, relations with Russia (which did not participate 
in the Eastern Partnership) played mostly a secondary role in Polish official 
statements. The economic crisis, the Arab Spring and reflections on the symbolic 
significance of the Polish presidency as accomplishment of Poland‘s ―return to 
Europe‖ also took precedence over relations with Russia. This scale of priorities is 




Nevertheless, the topic of EU-Russia relations was addressed in a few speeches by 
foreign minister Sikorski and president Komorowski. In these texts, the dominant 
narrative portrayed Russia as a partner and focused on the achievement of 
substantive objectives in bilateral relations, notably the Kaliningrad transit 
agreement. In line with the reorientation of Polish foreign policy towards Russia 
pursued by Tusk‘s government, Polish leaders advocated pragmatic engagement with 
Moscow. Next to this discourse, another narrative stressing the need to democratise 
and Europeanise Russia was also prominent. It emerged within the discursive 
construction of a civilisational role for Polish and EU policy in Eastern Europe. It 
reflected deep-rooted perceptions of Russia as an oriental and undemocratic country, 
as well as Polish leaders‘ long-standing self-perception as carriers and propagators of 
European culture and values. 
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Pragmatism and constructive engagement 
According to the dominant narrative, cooperation with Russia was in the EU‘s 
interests, therefore a policy of constructive engagement should be pursued. 
Economic and political advantage are the topoi linking the main argument 
(cooperation with Russia was in the EU‘s interests) with its logical conclusion 
(pursuing a policy of constructive engagement). This argumentative strategy was 
functional to Poland‘s immediate policy objectives in relations with Russia during 
the presidency, notably the conclusion of a local border traffic agreement concerning 
the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad and adjacent Polish provinces.  
The discourse advocating cooperation with Russia appeared already on the eve of the 
Polish presidency, in the first public speeches held by Polish leaders to outline the 
presidency‘s priorities. At the end of May 2011, speaking at a conference on the EU 
neighbourhood in Brussels, Sikorski stated: 
 
Two issues were prominent: one was Belarus […] Secondly, the local 
border traffic agreement for the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, which is 
now in the Commission and we hope we will lead to the changing of the 
regulation, so that Poland and Russia can sign the agreement this 
summer. […] I see some disturbing elements of Russophobia here in 
Brussels, not everybody wants to give this concession to the Russians. 
We are concerned about this in Poland. I would ask your support because 




Sikorski claimed that cooperation with Russia was in the EU‘s interests. Pragmatic 
arguments (signing the Kaliningrad agreement) were intertwined with cultural ones 
(Europeanising Russia), providing an example of interdiscursivity. The discourses 
about cooperating with Russia and Europeanising it were used in parallel in order to 
advocate a policy of engagement. Moreover, Sikorski accused opponents of 
cooperation of Russophobia, a term often used to describe prejudiced criticism of 
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Russia (cf. Tsygankov 2009).
371
 Sikorski‘s accusation strikingly contrasts with the 
fact that Poland itself had been one of Russia‘s most vocal critics within the EU until 
a few years earlier. This extract therefore highlights Sikorski‘s willingness to 
distance himself from the policy of the previous Polish government and to construct 
a new, pragmatic Polish foreign policy approach towards Russia. The use of 
perspectivation throughout the passage (signalled by the phrases ―we hope‖, ―I see‖, 
―we are concerned‖ and ―I believe‖) contributed to conveying his critical stance 
towards opponents of cooperation. 
Sikorski reiterated his support for a policy of engagement with Russia on different 
occasions during the presidency. In an article published on The Guardian the day 
after the inauguration of the Polish presidency, he declared that Poland would ―work 
to set up a new framework for co-operation between the EU and Russia, its largest 
neighbour‖.
372
 At the Eastern Partnership conference in Warsaw, arguably the main 
foreign policy event organised by the Polish presidency, he stated that ―Russia‘s 
constructive input‖ was necessary for the resolution of post-Soviet conflicts and 
claimed that negotiations with Russia on a new PCA were ―a step forward‖.
373
 
Furthermore, in November 2011 Sikorski and German foreign minister Guido 
Westerwelle jointly authored a letter addressed to the EU‘s High Representative 
Catherine Ashton, which argued for the revitalisation of EU-Russia relations. The 
letter had a strong symbolic value, as it was written jointly by the foreign ministers 
of two EU countries that had often disagreed on the way the Union should approach 
Russia. It also offers one of the most significant examples of the Polish presidency‘s 
discourse about engaging Russia. Aptly using the discursive strategy of 
categorisation, the letter argued that Russia belonged to the ―European family of 
nations‖ and implied that this affinity could provide the basis for a rapprochement 
between Russia and the EU. Although it also highlighted issues in Russia‘s 
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democratic transformation, the letter ultimately stated that the EU should ―stay the 




The analysis of speeches summarising the achievements of the Polish presidency 
suggested that the cooperative approach towards Russia was part of a broader 
strategy to achieve substantive policy results and alter the perception of Poland as an 
obstacle to policy making within the EU. This emerged with utmost clarity in 
Sikorski‘s address for the closing of the Polish presidency in January 2012. 
 
You will remember the fears that were voiced initially in the Western 
media. [It was claimed] That Poland will take sides and that the heirs of 
liberum veto will surely be heard more than once. This was not the case. 
We have silenced our critics. And by no means with fudge sweets, but 
with our impartiality, with our readiness to make compromises and the 
successes known to you. It is enough to mention the Six-pack, the 
partnership agreement with Ukraine, the small border movement 
agreement with the Konigsberg [Kaliningrad] region, the accession treaty 




Sikorski stressed that the Polish presidency had achieved much more than its 
detractors expected. He particularly criticised the construction of Polish politicians as 
―the heirs of liberum veto‖, a practice that in the early modern age allowed any 
member of the Polish parliament to veto legislation. The rebuttal of this historical 
parallel highlighted Sikorski‘s attempt to construct a new image of Polish actorness 
at the EU level. The Kaliningrad border traffic agreement was listed among the 
presidency‘s successes, thereby emphasising that Poland‘s cooperative approach 
towards Russia was a significant constituent of the new foreign policy image. 
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The civilisational discourse and Russia’s Europeanisation 
As emerged from the analysis of his speech in Brussels in May 2011, Sikorski argued 
for a policy leading to Russia‘s Europeanisation on the grounds that the latter was in 
the EU‘s interests. Advantage is therefore a key topos in this argumentative strategy. 
However, a broader investigation of Polish discourses during the presidency showed 
that other factors also played a role in Poland‘s advocacy of Russia‘s 
Europeanisation. The discourse on Europeanisation did not concern only Russia; it 
shaped the Polish discursive approach to the Eastern neighbourhood more in general. 
Polish leaders described Poland‘s experience of post-communist transition as a 
successful template for the EU‘s Eastern neighbours and portrayed Poland‘s EU 
presidency as the accomplishment of this success.
376
 Furthermore, they argued that 
EU policies towards neighbouring countries should aim at the diffusion of European 
values and of the European civilisational heritage. 
Hence, history (Poland‘s post-communist transition) and culture (European values 
and civilisation) were also important topoi in the argumentative strategy advocating 
Russia‘s and other post-Soviet EU neighbours‘ Europeanisation. Historical narratives 
portraying Poland as a disseminator of European culture, with a civilising mission in 
Eastern Europe (see chapter 4 and Prizel 1998: 52-67), provide an identity-based 
framework to understand the discourse on Europeanisation. Long-standing Polish 
constructions of Russia as an oriental, undemocratic country (and therefore in need 
of Europeanisation) contribute to explaining why this discourse appeared also in 
speeches concerning relations with Russia. 
 Civilisational and historical arguments were prominent in Bronislaw Komorowski‘s 
speeches concerning Poland‘s assumption of the EU presidency. In a talk held in 
Berlin in June 2011, Komorowski argued that Poland‘s emancipation from 
communist rule in 1989 created ―a broader framework and better possibilities for the 
implementation of a joint civilisational and political project such as the European 
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Union and its enlargement‖.
377
 This narrative involved two key aspects: it stressed 
Poland‘s role in the process of European integration and defined the latter in 
civilisational terms, thereby paving the way for the claim that also its expansion 
(namely EU enlargement) should follow civilisational criteria. 
 
A consequence of our civilisational identity is something that, today, we 
can call the European lifestyle, the European social and economic model 
[…] Europe‘s borders are determined by its identity. Europe is not only a 
geographic concept, it is above all a cultural concept. Therefore, the 
enlargement of the European Union should take place according to the 
civilisational criterion, which includes the intellectual aspect, the field of 





Komorowski‘s conception of the EU‘s enlargement as a civilisational process was 
remarkably similar to notions of Poland‘s messianic and civilising role in Eastern 
Europe, which were widespread among the Polish gentry during the Polish-




By analogy, the EU‘s process of association with Eastern partnership countries fitted 
particularly well with these notions, as partner countries were required to adopt 
European legislation and values. Hence, in an address to the European Parliament 
Komorowski praised Ukraine for ―making efforts to come closer to the Union in 
order to associate with it‖. He then reiterated his view of a ―Union which will ensure 
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 See chapter 4. 
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Europe a role in the world in keeping with the size of its civilisation and […] protect 
the vitality of that civilisation – European civilisation.‖
380
 
Within this narrative, the EU‘s and particularly Poland‘s task was that of helping 
Eastern partners to adopt European norms. Polish leaders resolved to do this by using 
their country‘s European integration as reference. This transpires, for instance, from 
Sikorski‘s speech at the Eastern Partnership summit in Warsaw. 
 
Most importantly, the [summit] declaration will consist of a strong 
message supporting the integration of partner countries with the 
European Union, the acknowledgment of European aspirations and 
European choice of partner countries as well as a reference to the 
community of values inscribed in the Treaty of the European Union […] 
We want to share the experiences from our own integration process, so 





Sikorski portrayed partner countries as learners who, as highlighted in the proposed 
declaration, have ―European aspirations‖ and have made a ―European choice‖ that 
was defined by the values inscribed in EU treaties. As aspirants to European 
integration, partner countries could benefit from the experience of Poland‘s EU 
accession. The image of Poland constructed in this extract is that of a successful 
member of an exclusive ―community of values‖ which, as emphasised by 
perspectivation (signalled by the phrases ―we want‖, ―our own‖), felt sufficiently 
confident to teach other countries those values. 
The Polish discourse about Europeanising Russia followed the same line of 
argument. Sikorski‘s remarks at the European Parliament‘s Committee on Foreign 
Affairs in November 2011 exemplified this narrative. 
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We want to help Russia Europeanise itself and to tie it closer to Europe. 
We have spelled out this objective in a joint Polish-German letter to the 
High Representative […] A partnership with this country, based on 





Although partnership, rather than association with the EU, was the stated objective of 
relations with Russia, the conditions to achieve it were the same: Russia needed to be 
―Europeanised‖ and ―tied closer to the EU‖. Through the use of perspectivation (―we 
want to help‖), Sikorski stressed that Poland was willing to provide help in order to 
Europeanise Russia, thereby acting in accordance with the Polish identity discourse 
that portrays the country as a conveyor of European values. Similarly, the letter 
mentioned by Sikorski in this extract argued that the EU‘s help would allow Russia 






This chapter argued that national identity and historic perceptions of Russia provide 
a framework to understand the construction of German, Polish and Finnish narratives 
about Russia in the EU discursive arena. It also highlighted the convergence of these 
narratives in the area of economic and political cooperation. It did this by exploring 
national leaders‘ discourses during their country‘s last EU presidency. The rotating 
presidency of the European Union provided national leaders with a platform to 
advance their country‘s priorities in the EU foreign policy agenda. Therefore, foreign 
policy speeches held by leaders of the rotating presidency were ideal sources to study 
the discursive interplay among national identity, national policy and EU policy. 
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As the three presidencies under analysis took place at different times, and thus in 
distinct international scenarios, contextualisation was necessary. Relations with 
Russia were a particularly prominent issue during the Finnish and German 
presidencies, which occurred respectively in the semesters July-December 2006 and 
January-June 2007. During this period, the start of negotiations with Moscow on a 
new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and the security of Russian energy 
supplies were at the top of the EU‘s foreign policy agenda. Conversely, during the 
Polish presidency (July-December 2011) relations with Russia were not among the 
most critical issues. This was due both to the simultaneous occurrence of key events 
in other areas of the EU‘s neighbourhood (notably the Arab Spring) and to the Polish 
presidency‘s decision to focus primarily on relations with Eastern Partnership 
countries. Furthermore, the economic crisis in the Eurozone shifted the presidency‘s 
attention towards domestic issues, relegating foreign policy in general to a less 
important role. 
The different relevance of relations with Russia during the three presidencies is 
reflected in the frequency with which the topic appeared in national leaders‘ 
speeches. German and Finnish leaders often broached the issue, portraying it as a top 
foreign policy priority. On the other hand, their Polish counterparts addressed the 
topic less regularly, sometimes only briefly within the broader context of the Eastern 
neighbourhood. Nevertheless, dominant narratives about relations with Russia could 
be identified also in the Polish case, which allows a comparison of discourses across 
the three presidencies. 
All presidencies advocated constructive engagement with Russia. This discursive 
approach was not a novelty for German leaders, as it originated with West 
Germany‘s Ostpolitik in the 1960s and 1970s. Similarly, the Finnish narrative could 
be understood within the context of a long-standing foreign policy identity that 
conceptualised Russia as a key partner. For Polish leaders, however, the discourse 
about cooperation with Russia was new. Rather than reflecting an established 
tradition, it highlighted their intention of constructing a new foreign policy image for 
Poland. In particular, it aimed at altering the perception of Poland as an obstacle to 
Divisive identity, divided foreign policy? 
 
265 
National identities in the EU discursive arena 
the development of EU-Russia relations, which had become dominant in the years 
immediately following the country‘s EU accession. 
The narrative about cooperation with Russia had different nuances depending on the 
presidency in question. During the German and Finnish presidencies, the focus was 
primarily on the energy partnership. German leaders were particularly vocal in their 
support for energy cooperation, which was highlighted by their frequent use of 
perspectivation when addressing the topic. Finnish leaders stressed Russia‘s 
European identity and cultural proximity in order to advocate the intensification of 
economic cooperation. In their speeches, the linguistic strategies of predication and 
categorisation were often used to describe Russia as a close neighbour and as a 
European country. Polish leaders put less emphasis on the energy partnership and 
more on formulating a pragmatic approach to relations in general. In spite of these 
differences, it is significant that the three presidencies converged on a policy of 
engagement and cooperation with Moscow.  
Next to the discourse on economic cooperation, the presidencies under analysis 
constructed narratives concerning the normative foundations of EU-Russia relations. 
On this issue, discursive differences were greater, reflecting different identity and 
foreign policy constructions. The Finnish presidency was adamant in stressing that 
market principles and democratic values were the basis of the relationship; this 
reflected Finland‘s traditionally strong normative approach to foreign policy. 
Following the Ostpolitik tenet of ―change through rapprochement‖, the German 
presidency conveyed the message that Russia‘s democratic transformation and 
economic cooperation with the EU could take place simultaneously, as mutually 
reinforcing processes. German leaders also accepted that Russia would follow its 
own path to democracy. Conversely, Polish leaders argued that EU policies towards 
the Eastern neighbourhood and Russia should promote the Union‘s values and 
civilisational heritage. Significantly, they portrayed Poland as a propagator of such 
values, thereby echoing Polish historical narratives that describe the country as a 
disseminator of European culture, with a civilisational mission in Eastern Europe. 
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Ultimately, this case study showed that national identity permeates foreign policy 
leaders‘ narratives also in the EU discursive arena. Most significantly, it highlighted 
that national identities are not necessarily an obstacle to the formulation of a shared 
discourse on Russia at the EU level. In fact, the dominance of long-standing and (in 
the Polish case) new narratives portraying Russia as a partner was essential for the 
convergence of national discourses in the field of economic relations. 
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Conclusion: towards a shared discourse on Russia? 
 
This dissertation examined the relationship between national identity and official 
discourses about Russia in three member states of the European Union. One of its 
key aims was to assess to what extent the ―othering‖ of Russia was still an important 
component of foreign policy discourses in the countries under analysis in the years 
2005-2012. Through a comparison of national narratives, the thesis also explored 
prospects for the emergence of a shared European discourse on Russia. The analysis 
showed that national identity and historically constructed images of Russia 
permeated foreign policy narratives, both in the national and the EU discursive arena. 
Based on the outcome of this research, it is possible to make some general remarks 
concerning the study of international relations. 
National identities are a key factor of international politics. They play an essential 
role both in inter-state relations and within international organisations. Some scholars 
(see Delanty 1995, Habermas 2003) have described the EU as a post-national 
organisation, namely an entity where supranational structures are more important 
than nation states and national identity. However, this thesis has shown that the 
Union constitutes no exception: national identity deeply influences foreign policy 
debates also in the EU discursive arena. Hence, national identity is an essential 
construct that neither International Relations scholars nor their colleagues working in 
the sub-discipline of EU studies can ignore.  
Within the study of national identity, particular attention must be devoted to the 
politics of memory. Narratives about a country‘s past are fundamental components of 
national identity because they define the nation‘s historical heritage and create a 
reciprocal sense of obligation among its members over time. Furthermore, the study 
of memory politics exposes the construction of a country‘s historical Others and their 
impact on national identity formation. It is therefore essential for an investigation of 
EU member states‘ relations with Russia, which is one of Europe‘s main historical 
Others (Neumann 1998). 
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The dissertation focused in particular on the role that national identities and memory 
politics play in foreign policy narratives. Divergent national foreign policy 
discourses were expected because Russia played different roles in identity 
construction in the EU member states under analysis. The case studies partly 
confirmed this expectation. However, the analysis also suggested that, from 2008 
onwards, German, Polish and Finnish official discourses about Russia started to 
display several similarities. In order to explain this shift, the thesis argued that 
political elites favouring a pragmatic relationship with Russia became dominant in 
the three countries under analysis. Having won the contest for political leadership, 
these elites constructed foreign policy narratives drawing on national identity 
discourses that were functional to a pragmatic approach to Russia. Where such 
discourses were not available, as in the Polish case, the governing elite attempted to 
forge a new narrative and partly reshape the country‘s foreign policy identity. 
The following sections revisit the main findings and arguments, drawing conclusions 
on the prospects for the emergence of a shared discourse on Russia in the European 
Union. They also discuss the main limitations of the theoretical and methodological 
approaches adopted in the dissertation and possible avenues for further research. 
 
National identity and discourse: reassessing and theorising 
the research puzzle 
The divided nature of EU foreign policy towards Russia provided the initial 
empirical stimulus for this work. In the last decade, Russia was a country of great 
economic and strategic importance for the EU. However, it was also one of the most 
controversial partners for European foreign policy makers. The statement of former 
EU trade commissioner Peter Mandelson (cited in Kagan 2008: 14) that no other 
country revealed the Union‘s internal differences as much as Russia epitomised the 
relevance of this conundrum for European foreign policy. As these differences 
followed national fault lines, an adequate understanding of the issue had to focus on 
the domestic, national level of analysis. 
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EU member states have a long history of differentiated and in some cases very 
controversial relations with Russia, which had an impact on national identity 
construction. The dissertation theorised that divergent discourses on Russia within 
the EU could be explained by using national identity as an interpretive framework. In 
order to do this, the thesis relied primarily on social constructivist scholarship that 
conceptualises identity as a cognitive device providing national leaders with an 
understanding of other countries‘ motives, interests and actions (Hopf 2002: 5). As 
Richard Ned Lebow (2008) and Jeffrey Checkel (2006) have argued, identities are 
malleable constructs that guide the formulation of national interests and foreign 
policy decisions. By contrast, identity is exogenous to neorealist and neoliberal 
theory. Neoliberal and neorealist scholars tend to consider identities as constant 
factors, which do not influence agents and structures (Laffey and Weldes 1997). 
Social constructivists agree that identity is an important constituent of international 
relations, which is shaped by interaction with one or more significant Others. 
However, different schools of thought exist within constructivism on the role of 
Others in identity formation and the epistemological approach to study the 
relationship between identity and foreign policy discourses. Alexander Wendt (1999) 
claimed that conflict with external Others is an essential element of national identity 
construction. In addition, he adopted a positivist approach to the study of 
international relations, theorising a causal relationship between identity and foreign 
policy. 
Wendt‘s epistemology was criticised by scholars who claimed that identities are not 
logically bounded entities and cannot be used as explanatory categories in causal 
models due to their complexity (Zehfuss 2001). Richard Ned Lebow (2008) argued 
that identity is not always constructed in opposition to an Other; identity formation 
also entails positive interaction with external actors and the assimilation of elements 
of foreign cultures. Furthermore, Ole Waever (2002: 22) contended that Wendt‘s 
approach neglected material power and therefore failed to account for an essential 
factor of international politics. 
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The dissertation attempted to refine the Wendtian approach by addressing this 
criticism and incorporating its most compelling observations into a revised 
theoretical model. In this respect, it also sought to answer Jeffrey Checkel‘s (2006) 
call to bridge rationalist and interpretive constructivist approaches. The relationship 
between national identity and foreign policy discourses was conceptualised as 
complex and mutually constitutive, rather than in terms of a unidirectional cause-
effect correlation. National identity construction was studied within the domestic 
constituency and in the context of a country‘s relations with external actors, allowing 
for the eventuality of both positive and negative interaction. Furthermore, the 
theoretical model endogenised material power as a key element of international 
relations that acquires significance within particular political contexts and discursive 
constructions.  
The formulation of an identity-based model for the study of European foreign policy 
discourses on Russia was the dissertation‘s main theoretical contribution. The 
application of discourse-historical analysis and the adoption of a historicist approach 
to the study of foreign policy discourses were the key methodological innovations of 
this work. The discourse-historical approach, a variant of critical discourse analysis 
developed by Ruth Wodak (2002a), had previously been applied to examine media 
and institutional debates about immigration and identity politics (Krzyzanowski 2010 
and 2009, Oberhuber et al. 2005, Reisigl and Wodak 2001, Wodak 2009). This 
dissertation provided the first application of the methodology to the study of official 
European discourses on Russia and their relationship with national identity. 
Thanks to the interdisciplinary nature of the discourse-historical approach (Wodak 
2002a), it was possible to integrate the theoretical model of the dissertation with an 
interpretive framework that was largely derived from the findings of historical 
scholarship. As argued, national identity construction takes place over a long time 
span. For most European nations, this process dates back from the nineteenth century 
or earlier (Gellner 1983, Guibernau et al. 2004, Hobsbawm 1990, Smith 1996). 
Therefore, the thesis claimed that current discourses are best studied in a longue 
durée perspective. Admittedly, this approach risks overstating historical factors in 
the interpretation of current discourses. However, the longue durée perspective 
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ultimately offered an insightful analysis of foreign policy discourses. While other 
methodological approaches may have also provided interesting and relevant 
interpretations, the one adopted in the dissertation proved very apt to understand the 
historical dimension of foreign policy narratives. 
The empirical analysis did however expose a few limitations and shortcomings of the 
theoretical and methodological approaches adopted in the dissertation. Explaining 
why a particular discourse acquired or lost dominance proved difficult without 
introducing factors that are not strictly related to national identity. Changes in the 
dominance of discourses were explained through references to foreign policy 
leaders‘ agency, notably their pursuit of political and economic goals and their 
reactions to developments in international structures. For instance, it was claimed 
that, after 2007, Polish leaders developed a new discourse on Russia in order to 
pursue economic and political objectives. Moreover, it was argued that Finnish 
discourses on internal developments in Russia became more critical in response to 
the increasing repressiveness of the Kremlin‘s policies in the spring of 2012. These 
claims suggest that a more thorough analysis of agency can contribute to explaining 
change in constructivist and discourse analytical approaches. Such an analysis would 
also address one of the long-standing problems in constructivist theory, which has 
struggled to address adequately the problem of agency (cf. Knafo 2008: 13).  
Furthermore, the theoretical and methodological framework of the dissertation 
allowed for the study of foreign policy only at the level of discourses. The adoption 
of a different approach may have resulted in a more direct analysis of EU and 
member states‘ policies towards Russia. For instance, rationalist models could 
provide a more comprehensive analysis of decision-making in the EU at the height of 
the August 2008 crisis in Georgia. This is not to say that the theoretical model 
adopted in the dissertation has less explanatory power than others; it only means that 
different approaches highlight different perspectives depending on the focus of the 
analysis. 
Due to the complexity of the national and EU discursive arenas, the investigation of 
discourses was limited in scope to those advocated by the most prominent officials in 
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power. The rationale for this selection was that such officials were the most 
influential in the domain of foreign policy and enjoyed considerable discursive 
power thanks to their visibility in the media. The discourses of oppositional forces, 
minority groups and other non-official narratives were left out of the analysis. 
However, it is important to note that these also play a role in the domestic 
construction of identity and foreign policy. Hence, an analysis that took them into 
account would provide a more exhaustive discussion. 
 
National identities and Russia’s role as Other in historical 
perspective 
The investigation of national identity construction and historical narratives about 
Russia revealed considerable differences among the three countries under analysis, 
which were mostly linked to distinct historical experiences. Controversial bilateral 
relations with Russia in the past left an enduring trace in German, Polish and Finnish 
identities. While in Germany and Finland positive and negative narratives about 
Russia coexisted and alternately became dominant, mainstream Polish discourses 
were unambiguously negative throughout the country‘s modern history. 
In Germany, narratives portraying Russia as authoritarian and corrupt existed side by 
side with those depicting it as an important economic and strategic partner. Criticism 
of Soviet and Russian authoritarianism in post-war (West) Germany can be seen as a 
reflection of the country‘s own history. Following the catastrophic outcome of 
Wilhelmine and Nazi authoritarianism, the Federal Republic of Germany 
restructured German identity around democratic principles and respect for human 
rights. This led the country to adhere to international institutions that claimed to 
support these principles (notably NATO and the European Union) and opposed 
Russian authoritarianism (Banchoff 1999: 273-274, Herf 1997). 
However, from the late 1960s the Federal Republic adopted a more cooperative 
approach towards Soviet Russia, which became enshrined in the concept of 
Ostpolitik. The Ostpolitik discourse advocated dialogue and partnership with Russia. 
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It argued that the resulting rapprochement with Moscow would lead to positive 
domestic change in Russia. Ostpolitik was also seen as contributing to Germany‘s 
economic interests and preference for a multilateral approach to international 
relations. German narratives depicted Russia as a key actor in the international arena 
and a partner that had to be engaged in a multilateral context (cf. Albert 1995). The 
Ostpolitik discourse became dominant and was endorsed by all the main political 
parties in the Federal Republic (Schildt 2003: 171). 
By contrast, dominant Polish historical narratives consistently portrayed Russia as 
one of the main national threats. The image of Russia as Poland‘s main Other was 
functional to the construction of discourses on Polish heroism and martyrdom, which 
are central to Polish national identity. According to these narratives, Poland fought 
valiantly against Russian imperialism and authoritarianism for most of its modern 
history, thereby sacrificing itself for the defence of Western civilisation 
(Ruchniewicz 2007). However, Poland‘s commitment was not reciprocated by its 
Western allies, which (as the narrative goes) abandoned it to its fate during the 
Russian and Soviet occupations. Religious imagery drawing on the country‘s 
Catholic identity was used to bolster the discourse on martyrdom. Poland was 
described as ―the Christ of nations‖, sacrificing itself for the sake of other European 
peoples (Prizel 1998: 41-42, 72-73). 
The construction of Russia as oriental, undemocratic and corrupt also served the 
function of relativising Poland‘s cultural distance from the West. Polish narratives 
stressed the superiority of Polish over Russian culture in order to claim that, in spite 
of its long political subjugation to Russia, Poland belonged to the West (Prizel 1998: 
82-85, Zarycki 2004). In the foreign policy of post-communist Poland, this discourse 
translated into a strong Euro-Atlantic orientation and opposition to Russia. Only in 
the late 2000s did dominant official narratives partially change, allowing for the 
emergence of a discourse that portrayed Russia as a potential partner within a 
pragmatic foreign policy (Feklyunina 2012: 438-445). 
In Finnish historical narratives, dominant representations of Russia changed 
considerably over time. For most of the nineteenth century, Tsarist Russia was 
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portrayed as a benevolent Other, which had allowed Finland to emancipate itself 
from Swedish rule and granted political autonomy within the empire‘s structures 
(Joenniemi 2010: 48). Positive perceptions faded out in the latter part of the century, 
when the Tsarist Empire attempted to russify ethnic Finns. Tensions between newly 
independent Finland and Soviet Russia intensified in the interwar period, reaching a 
peak during the military confrontation that lasted almost uninterruptedly from 1939 
until 1944 (Browning 2008: 169-178). 
Post-war Finland largely reformulated its identity and foreign policy posture. Anti-
Russian narratives were considered responsible for the escalation that had dragged 
the country into a disastrous war and were marginalised in official discourse. Soviet 
Russia was reconceptualised as an important partner. During the Cold War, the 
cooperative stance towards Moscow allowed Finland to retain independent political 
and economic structures and fulfil its self-perception as bridge between East and 
West (cf. Tiilikainen 1998: 153-156). Military neutrality, the practical outcome of 
Finland‘s positioning between East and West, became part of the country‘s national 
identity and remained an essential constituent of its international posture after the 
end of the Cold War (Möller and Bjereld 2010: 371). At the same time, Russian 
military might and economic influence continued to be sources of insecurity for the 
Finnish elite. After the fall of the Soviet Union, these preoccupations were voiced 
more openly in official discourse, showing that perceptions of Russia as a potential 
threat persisted in spite of economic and diplomatic cooperation (Forsberg 2006: 
143). 
Having reviewed national identity formation and historical narratives about Russia in 
the selected countries, the thesis assessed whether these constructions had an impact 
on official discourses on Russia in recent years. In order to do this, three case studies 
of high relevance for EU-Russia relations were investigated. The chapter concerning 
the Nord Stream pipeline focused on discourses about Russia‘s energy power and 
related European energy security issues. Perceptions of Russia as a security and 
military actor were investigated in the case study on the August 2008 crisis in 
Georgia. The chapter on post-electoral mass demonstrations in Russia in 2011-2012 
allowed an assessment of whether the normative constituents of German, Polish and 
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Finnish identity were reflected in official pronouncements. Furthermore, dominant 
discourses on Russia during the selected countries‘ presidencies of the European 
Union were analysed in a separate case study in order to assess the reflection of 
national identity narratives and prospects for the emergence of a shared discourse on 
Russia in the EU discursive arena. 
 
A European cacophony: national discourses on Nord Stream 
The analysis of official discourses on Nord Stream revealed considerable 
divergences across member states, particularly in the years 2005-2007. The debate on 
the construction of the pipeline became highly politicised and Polish officials made 
extensive use of memory politics in order to justify their opposition to the project. 
German leaders also made selective references to the past in order to back their 
policy. Conflicting German, Polish and Finnish historical narratives about Russia re-
emerged in official statements. Within this context, national identity provided an 
excellent framework to interpret official discourses.  
German leaders‘ positive attitude to energy cooperation with Russia was explained 
within the context of the Ostpolitik tradition (cf. Albert 1995, Schildt 2003). German 
officials openly referred to the history of German-Russian cooperation in the energy 
field from the 1970s onwards to argue that Russia was a reliable partner. Their 
claims that energy cooperation would have positive repercussions also in other fields, 
particularly for the dialogue on human rights and democracy with Russia, reflected 
the Ostpolitik logic of ―change through rapprochement‖. This approach predicated 
that Western cooperation with Moscow would eventually lead to political and social 
change in Russia. Furthermore, German leaders attempted to reconcile their stance 
towards Russia with Germany‘s pro-European identity by claiming that Russia and 
the EU were interdependent in the field of energy, hence the German-Russian energy 
partnership served broader EU interests. 
Polish leaders had a diametrically opposed view of German-Russian energy 
cooperation. They argued that it was detrimental to Polish interests and allowed 
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Russia to use its energy power as an instrument to coerce Poland. In addition, they 
formulated analogies with German-Soviet cooperation at the beginning of the Second 
World War, which had resulted in the destruction of the Polish state. The 
construction of Russia as a threatening, imperialist power in Polish identity played a 
central role in this discourse (cf. Zarycki 2004). Moreover, Berlin‘s stance on Nord 
Stream reawakened Polish identity narratives portraying Germany as a menacing 
Other (Ruchniewicz 2007). This provided evidence for theoretical claims about the 
complexity of the construction of the Other in national identity (see chapter 2). As 
the Polish case revealed, multiple Others, notably Russia and Germany, played a role 
in shaping foreign policy discourses. 
Polish leaders also claimed that Nord Stream negatively affected European energy 
security as a whole because, by cutting off several EU member states, it showed the 
lack of solidarity within the European Union. This argument mirrored the Polish 
identity narrative about the unreciprocated commitment to the West (cf. Loew 2008: 
87-95, Prizel 1998: 41-42, 72-74, Ruchniewicz 2007: 11-12). It was argued that, in 
the Nord Stream controversy, Germany had proven a disloyal partner for Poland and 
other East-Central European countries. Following Donald Tusk‘s rise to power in 
late 2007, the use of identity and historical narratives against Nord Stream became 
less prominent in Polish official discourse. However, Polish leaders upheld their 
opposition to the project, relying mostly on economic arguments. 
Finnish discourses on Nord Stream reflected the dichotomous construction of Russia 
in Finnish identity as both an important economic partner and a potential security 
threat (cf. Forsberg 2006, Vihavainen 2006). On the one hand, Finnish leaders 
portrayed the pipeline as a positive development, arguing that the EU needed 
additional energy infrastructure and that Russia had already proven to be a reliable 
supplier. On the other hand, they emphasised the normative foundations for energy 
cooperation with Russia (notably the respect of market and EU rules) and the 
potential environmental threats deriving from the construction of the pipeline. 
Finnish leaders‘ final decision to allow the building of Nord Stream in Finnish 
territorial waters can be understood within the established Finnish foreign policy 
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tradition of engaging Russia and pursuing norm-based cooperation (cf. Etzold and 
Haukkala 2011: 253-254). 
Overall, discourses on Nord Stream varied depending on the ways in which Russia‘s 
energy power was conceptualised in national identity narratives. In Poland, it was 
constructed as an instrument for Russia‘s geopolitical and imperialistic goals, hence 
dominant discourses were very critical. In Germany, and to some extent also in 
Finland, it was perceived as an opportunity for enhancing trade and EU-Russia 
relations as a whole. Therefore, the different perceptions of Russia‘s energy power 
confirmed the theoretical claim that material power acquires significance only within 
specific discursive constructions (see chapter 2 and Waever 2002: 22) Furthermore, 
the case study exposed multiple and ambivalent representations of Russia, which is 
consistent with Iver Neumann‘s (1998) claim that Russia is a liminal case of 
European identity: depending on circumstances and context, European discourses 
either externalise it as a threat or portray it as part of geographic, cultural and 
economic constructions of Europe. 
From a broader theoretical perspective, this case study also showed that national 
identities can lead to discursive conflicts in the international arena. As argued in the 
theoretical section of this work, national identities play an important role in interest 
formation. Hence, if identities are radically different, countries will develop 
divergent foreign policy interests and priorities. This suggested that, if EU member 
states want to forge a common foreign policy, national identities will have to be 
reconciled and at least partially reconstructed around shared values and discourses. 
 
The rocky path towards a shared discourse: the August 2008 
war 
Divergences were found also between national discourses concerning the Russian-
Georgian war of August 2008. As in the previous case study, German and Polish 
leaders provided different readings of events, drawing largely on dominant narratives 
in national memory and identity. However, most discourses across the three national 
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case studies were not as conflictual and irreconcilable as those concerning Nord 
Stream. This is particularly significant if we take into account that the events in 
question (Russia‘s military intervention outside its borders, in another European 
state) were highly dramatic and could have produced more radical responses in 
countries where Russia was traditionally perceived as a security threat. Only the 
Polish president formulated a very critical, anti-Russian narrative, which however 
did not find resonance in other Polish, German and Finnish official discourses. 
German leaders rejected confrontation with Moscow and dismissed arguments about 
the beginning of a new Cold War with Russia, which were widespread in 
international media and official discourses during the August 2008 crisis (Sakwa 
2012: 593-603). German collective memories of the Cold War, particularly the 
country‘s division and the possibility of nuclear war on German soil, influenced the 
stance of policy makers in Berlin. German criticism of Russia during the crisis was 
mild, focusing primarily on the disproportionate nature of Russian military 
intervention and on the need to seek a mediated solution to the crisis. This discourse 
was a reflection of fundamental constituents of post-1945 German national identity, 
such as the rejection of war as means to solve disputes, the support of multilateralism 
and international law. Ultimately, however, German leaders were reluctant to 
abandon their long-standing, cooperative stance towards Russia; despite the tensions 
caused by the military escalation, the Ostpolitik approach prevailed. 
In Poland, official positions about the crisis were discordant. This was due mostly to 
the fact that the president of the republic and the government (which were supported 
by different political forces) pursued divergent domestic and foreign policy goals and 
used national identity narratives differently. Polish president Lech Kaczynski 
formulated a discourse that was profoundly hostile towards Russia and drew from 
Polish identity narratives portraying Russia as aggressive, imperialist and 
incompatible with Western civilisation. On the other hand, high government officials 
combined milder criticism with the advocacy of continued engagement with Russia. 
The dissertation made the claim that this approach was part of a broader policy of the 
new Polish government, which aimed at normalising relations with Moscow and 
marginalising traditional anti-Russian attitudes in official discourse. Hence, Polish 
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leaders‘ statements about the August 2008 crisis demonstrated the complexity of the 
national foreign policy arena, where conflicting discourses coexist and compete for 
dominance. 
The analysis of Finnish official statements also highlighted two dominant discourses. 
In contrast to the Polish case, where the two main official narratives were prominent 
at the same time, each discourse gained dominance at different stages of the crisis. In 
the tense months before the outbreak of war and during the military conflict, 
perceptions of Russia as a security challenge prevailed. The second discourse 
became dominant in the post-war period and advocated a quick resumption of the 
partnership with Moscow. The two discourses mirrored the dichotomous 
construction of Russia in Finnish identity as both a potential security threat and an 
essential partner. The shift in dominance from one discourse to the other did not 
occur abruptly, neither were the two discourses completely discordant. At the peak of 
the crisis, Finnish leaders voiced concern over the security threat emanating from 
Russia, but they simultaneously advocated engagement with Moscow as the best way 
to defuse tensions. A gradual transition from the first to the second discourse 
occurred as the crisis de-escalated, reflecting the malleability and adaptability of 
discursive constructions. 
Hence, with the exception of Lech Kaczynski‘s discourse, the analysis of official 
narratives about the August 2008 war revealed some convergence across the three 
national arenas under investigation. Conflicting views still existed; the image of 
Russia as a potential security threat influenced Polish and (to a lesser extent) Finnish 
discourses, whereas it hardly played any role in German narratives. Moreover, 
German and Finnish leaders were keener than their Polish colleagues to resume 
cooperation with Russia when the crisis de-escalated. However, narratives 
advocating a pragmatic approach to Moscow were prominent across the three 
national discursive arenas. By emphasising constructions of Russia as an important 
security and commercial partner, national leaders conveyed the message that 
engagement was the best policy option. This also suggested that, in the three 
countries under analysis, narratives about economic and security cooperation 
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provided an opportunity for reconciling national identities and discourses about 
Russia. 
 
Paving the way for a common stance: pragmatism and 
economics 
The case study concerning discourses on mass protests in Russian cities in 2011 and 
2012 exposed the growing focus on Russia‘s economic significance in German, 
Polish and Finnish official narratives. As the events in question signalled an 
unambiguous authoritarian shift in Moscow, the re-emergence of historical narratives 
portraying Russia as undemocratic was expected. However, the analysis showed that 
these narratives were marginal. Representations of Russia as a key commercial 
partner and the advocacy of a pragmatic approach to bilateral relations overshadowed 
the normative discourse.  
A very critical discourse on the Russian establishment was prominent only among 
some German officials during the first months of the protests. It was propagated by 
second-in-rank representatives of the foreign ministry who managed to influence the 
relevant domestic debate while Germany‘s top leaders appeared reluctant to 
comment on internal developments in Russia. As the Russian presidential election of 
March 2012 approached, chancellor Merkel and foreign minister Westerwelle 
intervened more frequently in the debate, arguing that cooperation with Russia and 
criticism of its domestic developments were not mutually exclusive. This discourse 
attempted to reconcile the normative component of German foreign policy identity 
with constructions of Russia as a key economic partner. Due to Merkel‘s and 
Westerwelle‘s greater political prominence and media visibility, their narrative 
quickly became dominant, which highlighted the discursive power of national leaders 
in foreign policy debates. 
Polish discourses revealed that, four years into Tusk‘s mandate, Poland‘s new 
pragmatic approach to Russia had become consolidated. Following Lech 
Kaczynski‘s sudden death and the election of more moderate Bronislaw Komorowski 
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to the presidency in 2010, the Russophobic far right no longer had any 
representatives in the country‘s top foreign policy posts. This allowed Poland to 
formulate a more coherent official stance towards Russia. Throughout 2011 and 
2012, Polish official statements about Russia focused on practical issues (trade, 
cross-border mobility of citizens) and reconciliation in bilateral relations. When 
asked to comment on the protests, foreign minister Sikorski expressed sympathy for 
the demonstrators. Otherwise, he continued to advocate cooperation with the Russian 
authorities. 
Finnish leaders‘ stances were similar to those of their German and Polish 
counterparts. As Russia was Finland‘s main trade partner, Finnish policy makers 
rejoiced when it finally joined the World Trade Organisation in mid-December 2011. 
Despite electoral fraud and mounting protests in Russian cities, economic 
considerations dominated Finnish official discourses on Russia throughout the 
following winter. A more critical narrative focusing on Russia‘s domestic 
developments emerged in the spring of 2012, as the Kremlin adopted harsher 
measures to curb the protests. However, this narrative did not preclude economic 
cooperation. Russia‘s democratic deficit was relativised through claims according to 
which Russian society was fundamentally different from Finland‘s and hence it had 
to be judged from a different perspective. Together with the construction of Russia as 
a key partner for Finland, this logic was functional to justifying further economic 
cooperation despite Moscow‘s repressive policies. 
Hence, the national discourses under analysis showed a high level of convergence. 
By stressing that Russia remained a key partner in spite of its domestic 
developments, national leaders implicitly established a scale of priorities in which 
economic interests ranked higher than normative considerations. As seen in chapter 
4, both narratives stressing the principles of democracy and human rights and 
constructions of Russia as an economic partner were rooted in the national identities 
under analysis - with the partial exception of Poland, where the discourse depicting 
Russia as a partner had emerged only recently. In the winter of 2011-2012, against 
the broader context of Russia‘s increasing economic importance and integration in 
international economic structures, the narrative about economic partnership emerged 
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as dominant. This substantiates the claim made earlier in this work that international 
structures influence the domestic contest among conflicting identity discourses. 
National leaders also played a key role in this contest. As theorised in chapter 2, they 
were not simply influenced by identity discourses, but actively contributed to 
determining the dominance of one over another. In particular, this case study showed 
that policy makers emphasise particular identity constructions in order to pursue their 
domestic and foreign policy goals (in this case, supporting cooperation with Moscow 
and the national industry that trades with Russia). It is significant that the leaders of 
three countries which traditionally had different stances towards Russia chose to 
emphasise the same construction, namely that of Russia as a partner. This suggests 
that economic and political pragmatism potentially provided the discursive 
foundation for a shared stance towards Russia within the European Union. In order to 
investigate this finding in a more specific EU discursive arena, the thesis analysed 
the main foreign policy narratives concerning Russia advanced by the last German, 
Polish and Finnish presidencies of the European Union. 
 
Russia and the EU: no longer a divisive factor?  
The analysis of discourses on Russia during the respective national presidencies 
confirmed that economic and political pragmatism played an essential role and was 
conducive to a shared narrative about Russia. All three presidencies under 
investigation advocated constructive engagement and cooperation with Moscow. It 
was particularly remarkable that Poland also adopted this stance by the time it took 
over the rotating presidency, in the second half of 2011. This starkly contrasted with 
Warsaw‘s harsh criticism of Russia within the EU in the mid-2000s, which had led it 
to vetoing negotiations on an EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
(Reeves 2010: 351). Hence, the aforementioned claim of Peter Mandelson that no 
other country divided the EU as much as Russia was losing relevance by the early 
2010s. 
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This does not mean that a shared discourse on Russia existed within the EU by the 
end of the timeframe under consideration. As the analysis of the three EU 
presidencies highlighted, differences persisted with regard to the EU‘s normative 
approach to relations with Russia. While German leaders argued that economic 
cooperation and democratic transformation in Russia took place simultaneously, their 
Finnish counterparts stressed that market principles and democratic values were 
preconditions for cooperation. Polish leaders went even further with their emphasis 
on norms, claiming that the EU should take a civilisational approach towards its 
Eastern neighbours. The thesis showed that these differences mirrored deep-rooted 
constituents of national identity and traditional national approaches to Russia. 
Therefore, different identity constructions and divisive historical narratives on Russia 
continued to be reflected in national discourses, even while the latter converged on 
the advocacy of economic and political pragmatism in relations with Moscow. 
As argued in chapter 3, the countries selected for investigation were representative of 
the various member states‘ stances towards Russia within the EU. However, 
discourses within EU institutions would also have to be explored in order to draw 
deeper conclusions about narratives in the European Union. More national discursive 
arenas would have to be examined in order to provide an analysis that reflects the 
whole spectrum of national discourses on Russia in the EU. A broader investigation 
could include the study of discourses in other large EU member states, such as 
France and Britain, which are particularly influential in shaping the Union‘s relations 
with Russia (cf. ECFR 2014: 119). An analysis of narratives in other East-Central 
European countries is also likely to present interesting results: while most of these 
countries share the experience of Soviet control during the Cold War, some (such as 
Hungary) have recently developed a friendly stance towards Russia (Sadecki and 
Kardas 2014). Hence, the analysis could explore the factors within and without 
national identity that led to the new foreign policy posture. Furthermore, the 
statements of influential epistemic communities, advocacy groups and civil society 
organisations would have to be investigated in order to provide a more complete 
account of national discourses on Russia, including unofficial and competing 
narratives. 
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Due to time and space constraints, this dissertation focused on official narratives in 
three EU member states, exposing the increasing convergence of discourses in 
countries with traditionally different stances towards Russia. It showed that 
convergence was primarily the result of the fact that constructions of Russia as an 
important economic and political partner became dominant across the three national 
discursive arenas under analysis. This finding substantiated some of the key 
theoretical claims made by the dissertation. Changes in official foreign policy 
discourses take place as different national identity constituents and narratives 
become dominant over time. From late 2008 until 2012, the dominance of official 
constructions of Russia as a partner in Germany, Poland and Finland allowed 
national foreign policy discourses to converge.  
As the analysis of Polish discourses highlighted, policy makers can also formulate 
narratives that are not strongly rooted in the national heritage and, through their 
discursive power, contribute to remoulding national identity. Polish leaders‘ 
acceptance of their country‘s Eastern borders in 1989 and the recognition of Poland‘s 
Eastern neighbours as equal nations provide an example in this respect (see chapter 4 
and Snyder 2003: 220-225). The discursive construction of Russia as a partner under 
Tusk‘s government may well become engrained in Polish identity and have an 
impact on Poland‘s stance towards Moscow also in the long run.  
Furthermore, the thesis exposed the complexity of the construction of the Other. As 
argued, multiple Others (Russia and Germany) featured in Polish official narratives 
on Nord Stream. This highlights that Russia is by no means the only Other for the 
European Union and its member states. Using the same theoretical and 
methodological approach, further research could explore the role of different Others 
in European domestic and foreign policy discourses. For instance, studying the 
construction of immigrants, ethnic or sexual minorities in domestic policy debates 
would be highly topical: internal Others are at least as important as external ones in 
national identity construction (cf. Krzyzanowski 2010, Wodak 2002a).  
As for external Others, an analysis of narratives on Turkey building on Neumann‘s 
(1998) work is likely to produce very interesting results, particularly because Turkey 
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is another key EU neighbour that, according to Neumann, played an essential role in 
the emergence of a European identity. Future works could also investigate European 
discourses on the United States. The USA were traditionally a closer (and arguably 
less controversial) Other for Europe in cultural and political terms. However, the 
divided stance of EU member states towards the US during George W. Bush 
administration and, more recently, the debates originating from the National Security 
Agency spying scandal would provide highly stimulating case studies. 
Although Russia is probably the most controversial among Europe‘s historical 
Others, the dissertation‘s findings corroborated Richard Ned Lebow‘s (2008a) claim 
that positive interaction between Self and Other can occur. In the debate on Nord 
Stream, Polish leaders tended to construct Russia as a threatening Other in the field 
of energy relations. Narratives describing Russia as a threat were prominent also 
during the August 2008 war, notably among Polish and (to a lesser extent) Finnish 
leaders. However, Russia‘s othering did not always have negative connotations. In 
fact, some German and Finnish discourses (particularly those concerning energy 
relations) portrayed Russia as a positive Other. German and Finnish policy makers 
often claimed that Russia was European or shared European culture and values, 
thereby blurring the boundaries between their Selves and the Russian Other. 
Following Tusk‘s election, even long-standing Polish constructions of Russia as the 
main national threat were challenged by more positive narratives at the official level.  
The findings of this work suggested that national discourses on Russia in the EU may 
become increasingly similar if constructions of Russia as a pragmatic partner (and 
hence as a positive or neutral Other) remain dominant. As the analysis of discourses 
from 2005 to 2012 showed, approaching Russia pragmatically allowed national 
leaders to marginalise the most polarising constituents of national identity. 
Conversely, whenever constructions of Russia as a threat became prominent, national 
discourses tended to diverge. Different and divisive national historical narratives 
resurfaced, leading to contrasting assessments of the nature of the threat emanating 
from Russia. This was particularly evident in the analysis of discourses concerning 
Nord Stream and energy security. 
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At the end of the timeframe for this study, pragmatism had become a common 
feature of German, Polish and Finnish discourses on Russia. This may have changed 
in light of the crisis between Russia and the European Union concerning political 
developments in Ukraine in 2013 and 2014. The Russian army‘s military 
intervention in Crimea is likely to revive deep-seated perceptions of Russia as a 
security threat in many EU member states. It is possible that, following these events, 
a shared European discourse on Russia will emerge, focusing on the construction of a 
threatening Other. Further research could explore whether such a discursive shift is 
taking place. However, this study has shown that othering and antagonising Russia 
has not proved to be a cohesive factor for European member states in the recent past. 
Another possible scenario involves the continuation of a pragmatic stance, which 
would attempt to engage Russia in order de-escalate and resolve the crisis over 
Ukraine. National identity and national leaders‘ choices of emphasising particular 
constructions of Russia will play an important role in determining which approach 
will prevail. Based on the outcome of this research, a pragmatic stance appears to 
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